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Foreword
HE distribution and administration of property on death is a subject of perennial interest,
whether from a comparative or a practical
point of view. Provision must be made to care for the
assets in the estate of the decedent pending their
liquidation and/or transfer to those respectively entitled-the family heirs, the legatees, the creditors,
and the tax authorities. This process of administration
may be organized, as in the Civil Law, by operation of
law, casting the universal succession on the legitimate
heir, or by the appointment of a fiduciary, as in the
Common Law, to administer the estate for the benefit
of those interested. In the process, complications may
arise, not only from differences in the rules applying to
different types of assets-of which the distinction made
in the Common Law and certain other systems of
succession, between interests in land, governed by the
law of the situs, and other property, subject to the
personal law of the domicil or nationality, is a common
illustration-but especially when the assets are found
in a number of jurisdictions, with variations in their
laws and systems of administration, each in effective
control of some part of the estate. With the increased
fluidity of property across state borders and widespread
interstate or international investments, the frequency
of such situations, where it is necessary to provide for
the simultaneous administration of decedents' estates
in several states, has correspondingly multiplied,
notably in the United States. In this subject matter,
the position of the personal representative of the
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deceased appointed in one state, as respects administration of property located elsewhere, is of central
practical interest, as the present study sufficiently
evmces.
In dealing with the legal rules affecting foreign
personal representatives, the author of the present
monograph is to be commended for the lucid analysis
in the following pages of the principal questions that
an executor or administrator appointed in one state
will encounter in the administration of a single estate
on a multi-jurisdictional basis: his right to sue and
liability to suit in other states, the effects of his extralegal action outside the state of his appointment, and
the possibilities of reforming existing laws so as to
make feasible a system of single administration of
decedents' estates. This analysis is preceded in the
first chapter by a useful historical and comparative
survey, summarizing the basic differences between the
Civil Law system of universal succession and the
Anglo-American system of divided administration and
suggesting that the latter, as derived from the practice
in the ecclesiastical courts, is in a sense an historical
accident. Doubtless, the principle of the latter system
that the management of a single mass of property
should be divided, for official purposes, among as many
jurisdictions as there may be in which property is found,
owes its durability to the dispersion of authority in the
field of private law within the United States and in
the international sphere. But the principle is a source
of practical difficulty that has inspired the important
exceptions that have had to be introduced to secure a
reasonable measure of adjustment in settling estates in
a world governed by many territorial sovereigns. It is
to the author's credit that he has not limited himself
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to careful consideration of these improvisations but has
also constructively contemplated the needs of modern
life that argue for the development of a unified system
to administer estates that pass on death. This is a
subject that obviously concerns every lawyer and
everyone else.
HESSEL

E. y NTEMA

Preface
HE preparation of this work was undertaken as
the research project which is the major requirement for the degree of Doctor of the Science of
Law at the University of Michigan. The topic was suggested by a discussion in a course on Conflict of Laws
under Professor Y ntema, which arose out of a consideration of several leading cases, notably Wilkins v. Ellett,
Maasv. German Savings Bank, and Vaughan. v Northrup.
The rules developed to deal with extraterritorial actions
of personal representatives caught my interest as one
of the most graphic illustrations of a field where blind
adherence to the system of legal logic has obscured
what is obviously a socially undesirable result. It is
hoped that this discussion, if it does not pose satisfactory solutions, will at least demonstrate the problems
which need to be solved.
Some expression of gratitude must be made to those
people who have assisted me materially in this project.
Firsti wish to thankthe Committee on Graduate Study
at the University of Michigan Law School, who awarded
me a fellowship from the William W. Cook Research
Fund for my year of study there. My great debt is to
Professor Hessel E. Yntema, who taught me Conflict of
Laws and who, as chairman of my graduate committee,
guided this work with tolerance and understanding. I
am also deeply indebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes,
who read my drafts carefully and made a number of
very helpful suggestions. A word of gratitude must be
given to Alan Mewett, who graciously helped me with
any problems that I had in the English materials.
Whatever merit there is in this study is due in large
measure to the helpfulness of these people.
BANKS McDowELL, JR.
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CHAPTER

I

The Personal Representative

P

ROPERTY is probably the most vital relationship
in modern legal systems. It may not be the bulwark of civilization that John Adams felt it was
when he wrote:
"The moment the idea is admitted into society, that property
is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a
force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and
tyranny commence. " 1
Still the experience of even such a society as the communistic state of Soviet Russia, where most property
rights have been taken away from individuals and transferred to the government, has been that there is need
for a vast number of legal rules to regulate property
relations. 2 So long as man lays claim to the material
objects in his environment, some rules must be devised
to control the way in which those objects are enjoyed
and to settle disputes which arise.
An integral part of every system of property law deals
with the problems of devolution of property on the
death of the owner. As a matter of theory, a legal order
could provide that any property which a person acquired during his lifetime would revert to the state on
his death, thereby abolishing any rights of succession.
However, no legal system has seriously attempted doing
that. A man may leave dependents after his death who
1

Adams, THE WoRKS OF JoHN ADAMs, Vol. VI, 9 (1851).
For a detailed discussion, see Gsovski, SoviET CIVIL LAw, Vol. II,
I8-148 (1948).
2
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must be cared for and maintained. If his property interests pass to such persons, society will have fewer problems in the support of elderly people, widows, and
minor children. Beyond this, it is felt that an individual
who has accumulated property through his industry
should have the power to dispose of it on his death to
those friends whom he wishes to reward. Hence, within
limits, a man is usually permitted to leave his property
on death to anyone he designates by will, or in the absence of a will, the legal order specifies which relatives
will be his heirs.
The transfer of a man's property interests after his
death creates some serious practical problems. The
primary reason for this is the complex nature of property in modern societies. There are such various types
as real property, movable chattels, corporate stocks,
negotiable instruments, insurance, bank deposits, etc.
The decedent may own an absolute interest in these or
he may share them with other persons. His right to use
the objects may be immediate or to take effect in futuro.
If the estate is very large, the assets will be located in
many jurisdictions. As the property interests of a decedent may be of various kinds and frequently will be
widely scattered, a period of some time will be required
for the legal order to determine what objects and obligations he has claimed as his own and what his interests
in them are.
Once the legal order has discovered all the assets of a
deceased person, a number of claims to this property
must be adjudicated. Creditors will want the obligations
of the decedent owing to them satisfied. The state may
have a claim in the form of estate taxes. It is possible
that potential heirs or beneficiaries under a will might
disagree on who will succeed the decedent and what
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each one's interest is to be. While these various claims
are being presented and adjudicated, the property of
the decedent must be conserved and then delivered to
the successful claimants and heirs.
In order to solve these problems arising from the
death of a property owner, some procedure must be devised whereby the property of decedent is collected and
conserved, a period is provided during which claims
against the estate may be presented and paid, and then
the property is distributed to the persons entitled to
take it under the law of succession. The procedure by
which this is done in Anglo-American systems is the
probate administration, and the person who performs
the functions of administration is designated as the
personal representative.
I. THE UNIVERSAL SuccESSOR

American lawyers, because of a certain provincialism
in their training, tend to regard Anglo-American solutions to legal problems as the only possible solutions or,
at any rate, the best ones. However, it is important to
note that there is a scheme of administration which is
much older in origin and more widespread in modern
usage than the one with which we are familiar. It had
its beginning in that highly developed legal system
found embodied in the Corpus Juris.
The Romans developed a rather elaborate law of
succession. 3 There were a number of different types of
wills by which a testator could devise his property.
There was also a complete system of intestate succession, but early there developed a dislike of intestacy for
3 The following discussion on the Roman scheme of administration is
based on Buckland, A TExT-BOOK OF RoMAN LAw FROM AuGuSTUS TO
JusTINIAN, 2nd Ed., chapters VII-IX (1921).

4
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religious reasons, so that in the great majority of deaths,
property was transferred by a testamentary instrument.
According to Buckland,
"The Will of Roman Law had for its primary purpose in
historical times the appointment of a heres or heredes, a
successor or successors in whom the rights and liabilities of
the deceased should vest as a whole." 4

It is this institution of the heres or heir which is the significant concept for our purposes. His importance in the
scheme of succession is attested by the fact that the
institutio heredis by which he was appointed had to
appear first in the will and any legacy which preceded
it was void.
The first important point to note about the heres was
that he took title to all the property of the decedent.
There might be several heredes, but their shares had to
be such that they totalled the entire estate of the decedent. Of course, the testator could leave legacies to
other persons which the heres was obligated to pay, but
the title to the entire estate went to the heres as soon as
he entered on his duties. For a time testators granted
such excessive legacies that the heres would refuse to
accept the hereditas and so the decedent would die in testate, but by the lex Falcidia of 40 B.C., it was provided
that the heres must be left at least a quarter of the
estate.
In later theory, the heres was said to be a continuation
of the personality of the decedent. This was not true for
all purposes, but the results of the concept were that in
addition to receiving title to all of the decedent's property, the heres was liable for all his debts. The explanation for this phenomenon is not clear, but seems to lie
4

Id. at

282.
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in the social and religious nature of early Rome. The
main function of the early will may have been to transfer the chieftainship from the deceased head of the
family to his successor. Then he would receive not only
the property of the decedent, but his obligations as well.
More probably, the institutio heredis was developed to
insure that the religious obligations to the family gods
would be carried out. It was thought to be a great disgrace to die without providing a successor who would
perform these religious duties on behalf of the family.
Just as the language of the Romans has become a
dead language, so the law of the Corpus I uris has ceased
to operate as a legal system. But Latin lives on in the
Romance languages, and likewise, Roman Law has
survived in the civil law which operates in a large portion of the countries of the world, including most of the
European nations. This adoption of Roman Law naturally included its scheme of administration of a
decedent's estate. The Roman heres has become the
"universal successor" in the civil law. To illustrate the
institution of the universal successor, its operation in
French law will be considered. 5
The decedent may make a will, and then the universal
successor is the legataire universe!. In addition, there is a
system of intestate succession. This seems to be so satisfactory that only a small portion of Frenchmen make
wills. When a man dies intestate, his universal successor is the heir or heirs specified by the law of succession.
The heir becomes the owner of the estate at the time
of death. He is faced with three choices-(!) he may
accept pure and simple, (2) he may accept with benefit
of inventory, or (3) he may renounce the succession.
5 The discussion of the universal successor in French Law is based on
Amos and Walton, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAw, chapter XIII (1935).
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The act of acceptance pure and simple must be sufficient to indicate that he assumes the character of heir.
This is the heir who continues the person of the decedent. He owns all the estate of the decedent, and there
is complete confusion between that estate and his own.
He can prosecute all actions which belonged to the decedent. The heir is liable for all of the decedent's debts.
This is the type of universal successor most similar to
the classical Roman heres.
When an heir accepts with benefit of inventory, he
must make a declaration in court and inscribe it on a
special register. Within a specified period thereafter, he
must make an inventory of the movable estate of the
decedent. The effect of this type of acceptance is to prevent the confusion between the property of the heir and
that of the decedent. The heir is then liable for decedent's debts only to the extent to which there is property of the decedent to satisfy them.
An heir may renounce the succession and is then considered as if he had never been an heir. His share of the
estate will go to his co-heirs who are in the same degree,
or if there are no co-heirs, to the next heir in the line of
succession. If there is no heir other than the renouncing
one, the state will serve as the universal successor.
There may be several heirs. Those who accept will
receive their proportionate share of the estate and will
likewise be liable for their share of the deceased's obligations, but the aggregate of these interests must always
equal the total estate of the decedent.
Thus one method of solving the problems raised in
the administration of an estate is to require the person
who receives the property of the decedent under the
law of succession to perform the necessary duties. If the
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heir is treated as receiving title to the whole estate of
the decedent, as being able to bring any actions belonging to him, as liable for decedent's debts, and for the
payment of legacies, an easy and relatively simple solution is provided. Such a system can be effectively used
only in those societies where the heir who is to act as
universal successor will receive, in most instances, a
substantial portion of the decedent's estate. If he does
not receive much of the property to keep as his own, he
will refuse to accept the duties of administration. This
was the experience which the Romans had when they
found it necessary to provide that the heres was entitled
to receive at least a fourth of the estate. The important
distinction to bear in mind is that the universal successor is treated as the owner of all the property left by
the decedent from the date of death. The estate of the
decedent is thus treated as a single entity or as a whole
passing to the universal successor regardless of the location of the property. The development across the English Channel brought about a very different theory of
the nature and the authority of a personal representative and is responsible for the legal problems discussed
in this work.
2. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

The type of administration with which we are familiar
developed in England. Actually our study of the evolution of the personal representative begins on the continent of Europe with a concept of Germanic origin.
The executor in English law probably originated from
the Germanic institution of the sa/man. 6 This was a per6 Holdsworth, A HisToRY OF ENGLISH LAw, Vol. III 563 (rgo8);
Holmes, "Early English Equity," I L.Q.R. 162, 165 (I885).
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son to whom property was transferred in order that he
might convey it according to the grantor's wishes. The
only right which a salman acquired over the property
was the right to reconvey it according to the grantor's
directions. 7 This institution was a flexible instrument
which could be used for many purposes, 8 the most important of which was the making of a revocable will. 9
Originally the salman was appointed by a bilateral act
in which both he and the testator took part, but by the
time the salman was introduced in to England, it was
customary to appoint him in a clause of the will itself. 10
From this, the modern legal concept developed that the
executor is a personal representative appointed by the
testator in the will.
The first important event to occur in England was the
separation of the lay from the ecclesiastical courts by a
royal ordinance in the reign of William the Conqueror. 11
Although the common-law courts and later the chancery
court had important roles to play in the administration
of estates, it was the ecclesiastical court where the most
significant developments took place in the history of the
personal representative. The organization of the eccle7 Goffin, THE TESTAMENTARY ExECUTOR IN ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE,
26 (1901).
8 Among other uses, there was a sort of trust by which persons, such as
Jews, who were prohibited from owning land, could have the enjoyment of
the property. There was also a transaction whereby a sale of land would be
made through a powerful noble as sa/man to give security to the transfer.
9 An example of this type of transaction would be as follows: " ... a man
gong to war or on a journey would make over his property to a sa/mann
with instructions to convey it to some church or other holy foundation in
the event of his death, but to deliver it back to himself if he returned
safely." Goffin, op cit., supra note 7 at 25.
10
I d. at 32.
11 Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction,"
8 MissouRI L. REv. 107 at Io9 (I943).

THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

9

siastical courts was rather irregular. 12 There were usually the courts of the bishop in each diocese, which were
presided over by the ordinary. The ordinary was frequently the bishop of the diocese himself, but might be
a deputy such as an abbot or an archdeacon. 13 There
were also peculiar courts having testamentary jurisdiction. Appeal from these courts went to the courts of
the archbishop in the respective provinces, Canterbury
and York. Prior to the Reformation, appeals from the
archbishops' courts went to the Pope, but later to the
High Court of Delegates made up of three common-law
judges and four to six doctors of the civil and canon law.
Real property was always outside the jurisdiction of
the ecclesiastical courts. 14 If a man died intestate, the
title to the land passed automatically to his heirs. If
the land was devised by will, the will was treated as a
deed. All questions of title to land were determined by
the common-law courts and consequently were completely outside the orbit of the ecclesiastical courts.
It was with the disposition of a man's chattels that
the personal representative was concerned. At the time
of Glanville, a man could leave by will only one third of
his chattels if he left a wife and heir and half if he left no
wife. 15 At this time, the heir was the true representative
of the testator. He probably could sue to recover debts
due to the decedent. He paid the debts and if the decedent's effects were not sufficient, he had to make it up
out of his own property. 16 He was also obliged to observe any reasonable testaments of his decedentY
12

/d. at II5.

1a Goffin, op
14 Atkinson,

16

cit., supra note 7 at 68.
supra note II at 121.

I d. at IIO.
Holmes, "Executors", 9 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1896).
17 Atkinson, supra note II at IIO.
16
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Glanville mentions the executor, so that this institution was in use in England before the end of the twelfth
century. 18 The most probable explanation for its appearance was the fact that clergymen travelled a good bit
between England and the English possessions on the
continent. They had always been interested in testamentary matters, and it is likely that they brought the
institution of the salman back with them. The executor
of this period had a very limited function, chiefly to see
that legacies were paid out of those chattels from which
a testator could make a bequest. If the heir refused to
pay the legacy or interfered in any way, he could bring
suit to enforce payment. 19
The heir at this point was not a universal successor,
although he was similar in many respects to the Roman
heres. A universal succession requires that the estate
pass as a whole to the heir. Yet in England a portion of
a testator's chattels had to go to the widow, and the
heir did not control these. Further, if a man died intestate, either the church or his lord would take a part of
his personal property. The use of the executor to insure
payment of legacies was also inconsistent with a theory
of universal succession. 20 The clergy whose influence in
testamentary matters became so powerful through the
ecclesiastical courts were thoroughly familiar with
Roman Law and its scheme of administration. However, their powerful influence when the English administration was in its most fluid state led toward the
development of the personal representative rather
than endeavoring to convert the heir into a universal
successor.
18

Holdsworth, op. cit., supra note 6 at 563.
Atkinson, supra note I I at I I I.
20
This analysis of the difference between the heir and the universal
successor was made in Atkinson, supra note I I at I I I.
19
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For a hundred and fifty years after the time of Glanville, there was a gradual transfer of representative
functions from the heir to the sa/man or executor. It is
not important for the purposes of this work to trace the
detail of this development, particularly since several
very good studies have been made of it. 21 By the end of
the thirteenth century, the executor could be sued both
by the beneficiares under the will and by the creditors
of the decedent. 22 The executor could not prove his title
until he had gotten probate of the will in the ecclesiastical courts, but after this was done, he could sue to
collect the debts of the testator. 23 During the early period of his development, the executor was probably
treated as having absolute ownership of the decedent's
chattels and thus was liable out of his own property for
decedent's debts, much in the same position as the English heir and the Roman heres had been. 24 However, by
the middle of the fourteenth century, it was recognized
that a separation existed between the testator's property and that of the executor, and a judgment rendered
against the executor in favor of a creditor of the decedent was de bonis testatoris. 25 From this time on, the
executor is a personal representative in the modern
sense of the term.
The development of the executor as a personal representative has been traced many times, but the true
explanation for this peculiar phenomenon, instead of
the assimilation of the Roman scheme of universal succession, is obscure. It may lie, as does the reason for
21 Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction,"
8 MissouRI L. REv. I07 (1943); Goffin, op. cit.; Holdsworth, op. cit., supra
note 6 at 563-595; Holmes, op. cit., supra note I6.
22 Holdsworth, op. cit., supra note 2I at 565.
23
Id. at 566.
24 Holmes, supra note 2.1 at 43·
26
I d. at 45·
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many English legal concepts, in the struggle between
courts for jurisdiction. The ecclesiastical courts were
attempting in this period to obtain jurisdiction over
all testamentary matters. As might be expected, the
common-law courts were not too friendly toward this
ambition. The ecclesiastical courts first obtained the
concession from the temporal courts that the executor
had to probate the will in their courts. 26 Further, before
they were willing to admit the will to probate, they insisted that the executor give an oath that he would
account for all his dealings to the ordinary. 27 This duty
to account was enforced by the then very potent threat
of excommunication for failure to obey the orders of the
ecclesiastical courts. Also, the executor could be removed for misconduct by the church courts. 28 The
common-law courts retained the power to entertain
actions of debt by and against executors and always
had exclusive jurisdiction over real property. If a scheme
of universal succession were adopted, the only aspects
of administration which would require adjudication
could be adequately handled in the common-law
courts. Since the universal successor is personally liable
for all debts and legacies, the creditors and legatees
would have a satisfactory remedy in the common-law
action of debt. Quite possibly, the clergy, who were
always influential with those persons who had reached
that time in life when they become aware of the necessity of making a will, suggested the use of the executor,
because it was the institution which was most subject
to control by the church and the ecclesiastical courts.
Another reason probably lies in the different practices
26

Atkinson, supra note

'J:l
28

Ibid.
Ibid.
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of succession. In Rome, the universal successor was
developed largely for family and religious reasons. In
France it was adopted because of the influence of
Roman Law, but it worked well enough because the
general practice was to die intestate, thus leaving the
total estate to the heirs. With the property in their
hands, they can easily be required to perform the duties
of administration. In England, however, there seemed
to be a greater fondness for disposing of one's chattels
by will. In addition, these legacies seemed frequently to
go to persons other than a man's lawful heirs. Thus the
institution of sa/man or executor was first used to insure
that an unwilling heir could not interfere with the payment of legacies. It soon became the regular custom
for a testator who wished to make legacies to provide an
executor to make sure that the legacies were paid. From
this, it was an easy step to the use of an executor to
administer all of a testator's chattels under the watchful
eye of the ecclesiastical courts.
The concept of the executor was responsible for the
development of another type of personal representative.
If a person died intestate or left a will without having
appointed an executor, his estate was administered in
the ecclesiastical courts. Originally, the ordinary took
possession and administered the decedent's goods, but
it early became common for him to appoint a person to
carry out the actual duties of administration. 29 It was
this appointee who was to become the administrator.
In this early period, the ordinary was not a true personal representative of the decedent since he could not
sue to recover his assets nor be sued for his debts. 30
29
30

Holdsworth, op. cit., supra note
ld. at 568.
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at 567-568.
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It was the statute of 1357 31 that really originated the
administrator. 32 It compelled the ordinary to appoint
an administrator from among the close friends of the
decedent. It also gave the administrator power to sue on
obligations due to the decedent and made him answerable for decedent's debts. This statute modeled the
administrator on the already well-established concept
of the executor.
Thus the two personal representatives with whom
we are familiar in Anglo-American law are the testamentary executor and the administrator. 33 The executor
is the appointee of the testator in the will, while the ad_.
ministrator is appointed by the probate court. As a
practical matter, the distinction between the two
causes only a few minor differences as respects the applicable legal rules in the modern administration. 34 The
law relating to one is generally applicable to the other.
There is another historical development in the concept of the personal representative which is of primary
importance in the problems discussed in this work. As
we have seen, the personal representative, in early English law, had to obtain his right to administer the
estate from the ecclesiastical courts. The estate would
be probated in the diocese where the decedent was
domiciled at the date of his death. 36 However, if he left
JI Edward III, st. I, c. II.
Holdsworth, op cit., supra note 2I at 568-569.
aa There is a quasi personal representative known as the executor de son
tort which may be treated as a third type of personal representative. For a
brief discussion of this concept, see infra pp. I22-I24·
34 The only difference of importance to this study is that an executor
may be given a power to sell decedent's real property in the will and he will
be permitted to exercise this power by a conveyance to foreign lands. Needless to say, the administrator has no such privilege. See infra pp. I25-I29.
35 Sweet v. Partridge, 5 Ves. Jun. I48, JI Eng. Rep. 5I7 (I799).
31

32
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bona notabilia 86 of more than five pounds in a diocese
other than the one in which he was domiciled, there
would have to be a prerogative probate in the court of
the archbishop of the province. 37 There were two provinces in England, York and Canterbury. When a man
left bona notabilia in one or more dioceses in each province, an early case decided in I 596 that the prerogative
probate of Canterbury would govern, on the ground of
the necessity for a unified administration. 38 However, in
1661, it was held to be the rule that when a man died
leaving bona notabilia in each province, it would be necessary to have two administrations. 39 This became the
settled law. 40 This was also held to be the result when a
man at death left bona notabilia in a diocese in a province and also in a peculiar carved out of that same
province. 41 From these early cases, the rule has developed that the authority of a personal representative
does not extend beyond the territory of the jurisdiction
which appointed him.
The disruption which has been caused in probate
administration by this theory raises the interesting
problem why this rule developed. Probably the archbishops were jealous of any invasion of their authority
and wished to maintain supreme control in their respecBona notabilia are goods and chattels of a decedent which are of
sufficient value to be accounted for in an administration. This value became fixed at five pounds.
37 Burston v. Ridley, I Salkeld 39, 91 Eng. Rep. 40 (1702); Stokes v.
Bates, 5 B. & C. 491, 108 Eng. Rep. 183 (1826).
38
Byron v. Byron, Cro. Eliz. 472, 78 Eng. Rep. 709 (1596).
39 Allison and Sharpley v. Dickenson, Hardres 216, 145 Eng. Rep. 460
(1661).
40 Burston v. Ridley, I Salkeld 39, 91 Eng. Rep. 40 (1702); Stokes v.
Bates, 5 B. & C. 491, 108 Eng. Rep. 183 (1826).
41 Price v. Simpson, Cro. Eliz. 718, 78 Eng. Rep. 953 (1599).
36
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tive jurisdictions. 42 Certainly, permitting a personal
representative appointed elsewhere to administer goods
in his province would deprive the archbishop of all
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate. The case authority which first established the rule supports this theory
when it said:
" ... administration granted in one province, is void as to
goods in another, because there are distinct supreme jurisdictions. " 43
The cases on this point were decided in the temporal
rather than the ecclesiastical courts. They involved
actions for debt brought in the common-law courts by
an administrator appointed in one province against a
debtor residing in another province, or an equity action
to discover property in a province other than the one in
which the administrator was appointed. In these cases,
the temporal courts had to determine the source of the
administrator's authority and its territorial extent as
defined by the ecclesiastical courts. Therefore their
reasoning, based on jurisdictional limitations, should
accurately reflect the attitudes of the ecclesiastical
courts.
Whatever may be the explanation for its development, this concept of the territorial limitation on the
authority of the personal representative has become a
firmly established rule of Anglo-American law. The
theory behind the rule seems to be that the personal
representative is an artificial person created by the law
of the state in which he is appointed, and since the law
of that state cannot extend beyond its territorial limits,
42 Buchanan & Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in View of
First National Bank v. Maine," 48 HARV. L. REv. 9II at 913 (1935).
43 Allison and Sharpley v. Dickenson, Hardres 216, 145 Eng. Rep. 460
(1661).
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the personal representative cannot exist outside its
boundaries. 44 The important consequence of this type
of thinking has been the requirement of separate administrations on a single estate comprising assets in several
states. If a decedent dies testate, his executor will qualify as the personal representative where the decedent
was domiciled at the date of death. However, it is very
likely that the decedent will have property in another
jurisdiction. Under the traditional theory, the executor
cannot by virtue of his original grant of letters collect
or administer that property. He must qualify as ancillary administrator in the second state, or some other
person may be appointed administrator there. This
ancillary administration, even if the same person is the
personal representative in both, goes through all the
proceedings of administration under the supervision of
the local probate court and is completely independent
of the domiciliary administration. 45 Thus, the phenomenon frequently appears of two or more administrations
proceeding under the control of as many different legal
systems, each concerned with administering and determining the succession to the property of a single deceased person. It is from this concept of separate admmlstrations in each jurisdiction that most of the
conflict of laws problems in probate administration
ar1se.
3·

THE MoDERN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

An understanding of the conflicts problems relating
to personal representatives requires some general under44

Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, 1447 (1916).
Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 164 F. 817, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 553
(8th Cir. 1908); Voyles v. Robinson, 151 Miss. 585, 18 So. 420 (1928);
State ex rel. Finley v. District Court, 99 Mont. 200, 43 P. (2d) 682 (1935).
45
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standing of the functions of a personal representative in
a purely domestic administration. His functions are
completely interwoven with the problems of administering the decedent's estate. This is because the executor
or administrator performs all the activities of the administration. However, it is not the purpose of this study
to discuss problems of essentially probate law. It will be
assumed that the administration has been granted. 46
Therefore the problems of jurisdiction to grant a probate
administration and who may apply to secure an administration will not be considered. Also, this discussion
of administration ends with the final accounting by the
personal representative, so that it is not within the
scope of this work to treat problems of succession.
When a will has been admitted to probate or an
administration has been granted on the estate of a person dying intestate, the first duty of the probate court
is to appoint the personal representative. If the decedent
has left a will and that instrument nominates a specified
person as executor, the court must appoint him as the
personal representative unless he is completely incompetent to perform the duties of administration.47 If
there is no will or if the will fails to nominate an executor, the court will appoint an administrator. The personal representative may be a corporation as well as a
natural person, 48 but about a third of the states prohibit
46 A false impression may be created unless it is realized that it is in only
about one out of every four deaths that there is an administration. If the
estate is small, the heirs may by agreement pay off the debts of decedent
and distribute his property among themselves. In addition, there have
been statutory enactments dispensing with administration on estates
below a specified value. For a discussion of this matter, see Atkinson,
HANDBOOK oN THE LAw OF WILLS, 2nd Ed., 565-575 (I937).
47
In re Lawrence's Estate, 53 Ariz. I, 85 P. (2d) 45 (I938); In re Leland's Will, 2I9 N.Y. 387, II4 N.E. 854 (1916).
48 In re Lawrence's Estate, 53 Ariz. I, 85 P. (2d) 45 (1938); Equitable
Trust Co. v. Plume, 92 Conn. 649, I03 A. 940 (1918).
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nonresidents or foreign corporations from serving as
personal representatives. 49 There may be joint representatives in one administration. 60
The authority of the personal representative is said
to be derived from the court which appointed him. 61
Actually, he is often described as an "officer of the
court." 62 It was always understood that the authority
of the administrator was obtained from the ordinary
or court which appointed him. However, the old common-law theory was that the executor derived his
authority from the will itself and the appointment by
the probate court was merely evidence of his right. 63
The more modern view is that the executor, as well as
the administrator, gets his authority solely from the
appointment by the probate court in which the administration is being had. 64
It should be clear at this point that the "estate" is
not an entity. 66 The term "estate" refers to decedent's
property. The executor or administrator cannot be said
to be an agent or representative of the estate. The personal representative is more properly an agent of the
court which appointed him, and he has title to decedent's personal property and to some extent control
49

See infra p. 34·
In reDrew's Estate, 183 Minn. 374,236 N.W. 701 (1931); Lethbridge
v. Lauder, 13 Wyo. 9, 76 P. 682 (1904).
61
In re Estate of Ferris, 234 Iowa 960, 14 N.W. (2d) 889 (1940); Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 287, 193 So. 648 (1940).
62
Estate of Conkey, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 581, 96 P. (2d) 383 (1939); In re
Estate of Ferris, 234 Iowa 960, 14 N.W. (2d) 889 (1940); In re Drew's
Estate, 183 Minn. 374, 236 N.W. 701 (1931).
63 Middleton's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 28b, 77 Eng. Rep. 93 (1603); In re
Miller's Estate, 216 Pa. 247, 65 A. 681 (1907).
64
Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F. (2d) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2d Cir. 1931),
cert. den. 284 U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. 30, 76 L.Ed. 551; In re Van Vleck's Estate,
123 Iowa 89, 98 N.W. 557 (1904).
66
A. L. Goetzman Co. v. Gazett, 172 Minn. 68, 214 N.W. 895 (1927);
Ferrin v. Myrick, 41 N.Y. 315 (1869).
60
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over his realty. Therefore, it is the personal representative rather than the estate with whom third persons and
courts must deal.
The function of the personal representative is to administer the property of the decedent. As will be seen
constantly throughout this work, the distinction between immovable or real property and personal property is fundamental in problems of administration. This
is evident in the type of control which the personal
representative has over these two kinds of property
interests. In the case of immovable property, the
common-law rule is that title to the real property of the
decedent descends directly to the heirs or devisees without any action on the part of the personal representative.56 However, the modern view is that realty, while
still the property of the heir or devisee, may be taken to
pay decedent's debts if the personal property is not
sufficient to satisfy them. 57 Some states have legislation
which gives the personal representative the right to take
possession of the decedent's real property, to manage it,
and to collect the rents and profits. 58 The control of the
personal representative over the decedent's personalty
is much greater. At the time of his appointment, he
obtains title to all the personal property of the decedent,
both tangible and intangible. 59 If there is more than one
personal representative appointed on the estate, there
may be difficulty in determining which has title to any
particular piece of personal property. This difficulty is
avoided by the rule that the personal representative who
66 Stephens v. Comstock-Dexter Mines, Inc., 54 Ariz. 519, 97 P. (2d)
202 (1939); Aubuchon v. Lory, 23 Mo. 99 (1856).
57 See cases cited supra note 56.
68
See infra Chapter IV, p. 135.
6 9 Cunningham v. Rodgers, 267 F. 609 (D.C. Cir. 1920).

THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

21

collects the asset by reducing it to his possession will
have title to it. It should be clear that the title of the
personal representative is not absolute. He is a fiduciary
whose position is somewhat analogous to that of the
trustee. 60 He is administering the property for the
benefit of the creditors and beneficiaries or heirs, and
when the administration is completed, he must transfer
his title to those persons whom the court designates.
The first. duty of the personal representative is to
collect the assets of the decedent. These assets include
tangible personal property, intangible choses in action
which survive the death, and real property if the personal representative is given by will or statute the
power to sell this realty. In the collection of assets, he
may accept voluntary payment of obligations due to
the decedent and give a valid discharge for them. 61 If
the obligor is unwilling to make payment, he may bring
suit to collect the asset. If the cause of action accrued
prior to the death, he sues in his official capacity as personal representative. 62 If it arose subsequent to the
death, he may sue in his official or personal character. 63
The personal representative is required to file an inventory listing all of the decedent's assets within a certain
period after his appointment, usually from one to three
months, at which time he should have completed his
collection of the assets.
The next duty of the personal representative is to
conserve the assets he has collected and keep them
60 In re Stewart's Estate, 145 Ore. 460, 28 P. (2d) 642, 91 A.L.R. 818
(1934).
61 See cases cited infra Chapter V, note 35·
62 Kane v. Paul, 14 Pet. 33, 10 L.Ed. 341 (U.S. 184o); Hanover Fire Ins.
Co. v. Street, 234 Ala. 537, 176 So. 350 (1937); Kent v. Bothwell, I 52 Mass.
341, 25 N.E. 721, 9 L.R.A. 258 {1890).
63 See cases cited supra note 61.
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safely during the period of administration. In modern
estates of much size, this can be by far the most difficult
obligation of the personal representative. There may be
business enterprises which must be kept in operation.
In the absence of permission in the will, by statute, or
by the court, any expenditures made in this operation
of a business would be at the personal representative's
risk, and he would be personally liable for all losses
accruing during the business venture. 64 It may be necessary for the most efficient management to convert
some of the decedent's property into a more convenient
type of assets. In regard to personal property that he
has collected, the personal representative has the
power 65 and in some cases the duty to sell it, such as
when the assets are perishable goods. 66 In the case of
real property, he may have the power to sell it if given
by the will or statute. 67 He may also have the duty to
invest the cash which comes into his hands from sale or
otherwise, and his standard of duty will be the exercise
of good and conservative business judgment. 68 He is
personally liable for his own conversion of assets of the
estate in his control 69 and for any waste which occurs
to the assets through any action on his part which a
reasonably prudent man acting in good faith would not
have taken. 70 The personal liability which accrues

sos

64

Mayo v. Arkansas Valley Trust Co., 132 Ark. 64, 200 S.W.
(1917)
In re Jenning's Estate, 74 Mont. 449, 241 P. 648 (I92S).
65 Smith v. Steen, 20 N.M.
I
P. 927 (191 S); In re Heinze's
Estate, 224 N.Y. I, 120 N.E. 63 (1918).
66 Atkinson, op. cit., supra note 46 at 667.
67
See infra Chapter IV, pp. I2S-I32.
68
In re Macky's Estate, 73 Colo. I, 213 P. 131 (1923); In re Wilmerding's Estate, 238 N.Y.S. 37S (1929).
69
Meyers' Adm'rv. Meyers, 244 Ky. 248,
S.W. (2d) 81 (1932); Heap
242 N.W. 252 (1932).
v. Heap, 2S8 Mich.
70
In re Janke's Estate, 193 Minn. 201, 2S8 N.W. 3II (I93S); In re
Belcher's Estate, 221 N.Y.S. 7II (1927); In re Reilly's Estate, 77 Pa.
Super. 178 (1921).
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against the personal representative for failure to conserve and manage the assets properly, like all liability
of the personal representative to the heirs or beneficiaries, will be imposed on him at the time of his final
account by a surcharge. 71
Another of the duties of the personal representative is
to pay off the debts of the decedent and claims which
accrue after his death, such as funeral expenses and
estate taxes. The common practice is to provide a
period after the appointment of the executor or administrator during which claims can be presented for
payment. The length of this period varies anywhere
from three months to a year, with the average being
about six months. Those claims which are not presented to the personal representative within the specified time are barred. 72 A creditor may sue the personal
representative on an obligation of the decedent and
secure a judgment against him. 73 However, such a
judgment cannot be satisfied by levying an execution on
any of decedent's property. 74 The judgment must be
presented as a claim. 75 The purpose of this procedure is
to effectuate one of the most basic policies underlying
our probate proceeding, which is to secure equality of
payment to all the creditors of the decedent. After the
period for the presentment of claims has run, the
personal representative will pay out of the assets in his
hands the claims, first those classes of creditors which
Shinn's Estate, I66 Pa. I2I, 30 A. 1026, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (I895).
Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 2.99 U.S. 2I7, 57 S.Ct. I5I, 8I L.Ed. I33
(I936); Davis v. Shepard, I35 Wash. I24, 237 P. 2I, 4I A.L.R. I63 (I925).
73 Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U.S. 2I7, 57 S.Ct. I5I, 8I L.Ed. I33
(I936); Eddy v. Adams, I45 Mass. 489, I4 N.E. 509 (I888); Roberts v.
Roberts, 62. Wyo. 77, I62 P. (2d) I I7 (I945).
74 Brown v. Sweat, I49 Fla. 524, 6 So. (2d) 538 (I942); Grife v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 233 Iowa 83, 8 N.W. (2d) 584 (I943); In re Mannix
Estate, I46 Ore. I87, 29 P. (2d) 364 (1934).
76 Meredith v. Scallion, 5I Ark. 36I, II S.W. 516,3 L.R.A. 8I2 (I888).
71

72
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are preferred. Then he will pay the general creditors. If
there are not sufficient assets to cover their claims, he
will pay them in equal shares the remaining assets.
Lastly, the personal representative must file his final
account with the court which appointed him. If the
court does not regard any given expenditure listed in
the account as proper, he will be surcharged with the
amount. 76 Also, he may be personally liable for failure
to collect certain assets. 77 After the final account has
been approved, he will be directed to turn over the
remaining assets in his hands to those beneficiaries or
heirs who the court has decided are entitled to them,
and is then discharged as the personal representative. 78
4·

THE ScoPE AND PLAN OF THIS WoRK

The conditions of modern American life have intensified the conflicts problems in administering a decedent's estate. Although we have retained forty-eight
separate legal systems with distinctive geographical
territories, the barriers which prevent people and
property from moving freely across national borders
have been eliminated between our states by the Constitution. Certainly, people today do not confine their
lives and their possessions to one community as was
common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
when the rules of ancillary administration were being
worked out. Due to improved transportation facilities
and the homogeneous quality of the people, our populaShinn's Estate, 166 Pa. 121, 30 A. 1026, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895).
Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 28 Am. Rep. 330 (1878).
78 This discussion of the functions of the modern personal representative
is very brief and is not intended to be more than a framework on which the
conflicts discussion can be hung. For a more complete, but still brief picture
of this area, see Atkinson, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF WILLS, 2nd Ed.,
chapters 12 & 13 (1937).
76
77
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tion has become highly mobile, so that many persons
move periodically from state to state, frequently leaving
property behind them. At the death of such a person,
each state in which he left some of his property will be
faced with problems involving conflict of laws.
A second factor is the equalization of wealth which has
occurred in the twentieth century. There are more
medium-sized estates which will have scattered property interests in various jurisdictions. Therefore in a
larger proportion of deaths, there may be a need for
ancillary administration.
The commercial nature of modern property interests
has contributed to magnifying the problems. Much of
the total wealth of the nation is represented by credit
transactions. Since these are intangible interests and
therefore consist solely of legal relationships between
two or more persons, it is difficult to fix a situs for them.
Very often the debtor and creditor will reside in different
states so that, when one of the parties dies, conflicts
problems will be raised in the administration of his
estate. Frequently, the credit transaction will be
evidenced by a negotiable instrument which passes
freely from holder to holder and carries the situs of the
debt with it. This increases the possibility that the
parties to the transaction will be in different jurisdictions, thereby raising conflicts questions. Another type
of commercial interest which forms a substantial part
of property today is in the form of corporate stocks.
These shares of stock are usually treated as property in
the state of incorporation. 79 Since it is common to
organize a corporation in a state which is far removed
79
Nashville Trust Co. v. Cleage, 246 Ala. 513, 21 So. (2d) 441 (1945);
Murphy v. Crouse, 135 Cal. 14, 66 P. 971, 87 Am. St. Rep. 90 (1901);
Black Eagle Mining Co. v. Conroy, 94 Okla. 199, 221 P. 425 (1923).
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from its place of business, and since our huge corporations have national and international lists of stockholders, it is very likely that the domicile of a deceased
person will not coincide with the state where the
corporation in which he owns stock was organized.
The problems of multiple administrations are not
confined to a large estate, but will frequently occur in
the medium-sized and many times in the small ones.
Even a person from a low income group is likely to own
one or two shares of stock in a foreign corporation or to
have loaned money to a friend who has moved out of
the state without paying him. On his death, the problem
is raised how to collect these assets and whether an
ancillary administration is necessary.
As has been discussed previously, the general theory
is that a personal representative has no authority to act
in a jurisdiction other than the one in which he was
appointed. If there are assets to be administered in
another state, there must be an ancillary administration
in that jurisdiction. Since this result is usually explained
on the theory that the personal representative is an
artificial creature who has no existence outside of the
state which created him, it would seem logical to suppose
that he never performs acts in any other state. As a
matter of fact, the pressure of necessity has forced the
courts and legislatures to make frequent exceptions in
order to permit executors and administrators to act in
other jurisdictions. These exceptions have become so
numerous and are so fundamental that they raise the
questions whether ancillary administrations as a matter
of legal logic are still defensible and whether as a matter
of social policy it is desirable to retain the principle of
a separate administration in each jurisdiction.
The purpose of this work is to determine what acts a
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personal representative appointed in one jurisdiction can
perform in other states. The next chapter will consider
those instances where either by statutory modification
or by common-law decision the personal representative
is permitted to resort to the courts of other states to
secure some relief. The third chapter will discuss the
problems raised when the forum seeks to exercise
jurisdiction over an executor or administrator from
another state. The fourth chapter will treat the problems
of a personal representative in transactions regarding
immovable property located in foreign states. The
fifth chapter will deal with the effects of extra-legal
action by a personal representative when he enters
another state and there collects some property belonging to the decedent and removes it to the jurisdiction
where he is administering the estate. The final chapter
will consider whether the conditions of modern life
require that we consolidate and expand the numerous
exceptions that have been made by developing a system
of a single administration on a decedent's estate which
will operate in all jurisdictions. If this is found to be
desirable, then the best means of achieving it must be
determined.
It should be clear by now that this is primarily a
study in jurisdiction. The jurisdictional questions will
be raised on two levels. The first is the question of the
power of a legal order to adjudicate as to a personal
representative acting extraterritorially. Can the legal
system which appoints a personal representative authorize him] to act in another jurisdiction? Does the
state in which he attempts to act have the power to
permit him to do so? Can the state in which he acts
control his actions in regard to the act or in regard to
all aspects of the administration? All of these represent
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problems as to the power of a legal order to affect
rights of a personal representative who acts in a foreign
jurisdiction. Assuming that the legal system does
exercise jurisdiction, the second level to be discussed is
whether other states must recognize that action or
whether they have the jurisdiction to refuse to give it
effect. However, any study must go beyond the question
of mere power to act. It is necessary to consider next
what states actually do. This requires an examination
of the cases and statutes which permit a personal representative to act in other jurisdictions. Finally
these rules must be examined to see whether they are
desirable and what changes should be made.
Something should be said about the terminology
which will be used. There are technical terms by which
various types of personal representatives are distinguished ..If the personal representative is nominated in
the will and confirmed by the probate court, he is
spoken of as an executor. If he is appointed by the
probate court, he is an administrator. If there is a will
and he is appointed to administer under the will, he will
be referred to as an administrator cum testamento
annexo or c.t.a. If the administration has been started
and he is appointed to complete it, he is designated as
an administrator de bonis non or d.b.n. The term,
personal representative, refers, of course, to all types of
executors and administrators. Since the purpose of this
study is to treat the jurisdictional questions raised
when a personal representative appointed in one state
acts in another, the distinctions represented by this
terminology are not important and therefore will not be
used. Unless it is made clear during the discussion of a
problem that the distinction is important, the terms,
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personal representative, executor, and administrator,
will be treated as synonymous and will be used interchangeably.
The phrases, "foreign personal representative," "foreign executor," or "foreign administrator," mean one
who is appointed in a state other than the forum in
which he is a party to a suit or is performing some
action. The converse of this terminology, namely, a
"personal representative acting in a foreign jurisdiction," means that he is appointed in the forum and
performs some action in another state.

CHAPTER

II

Capacity of a Foreign Personal
Representative to Sue
I. GENERAL RuLE AT CoMMON LAw

T

HE LEGAL validity of any act performed by a
personal representative outside the state of his
appointment is dependent on the effect which
courts will ascribe to that act. The court which makes
such a determination may be the one which appointed
the personal representative and thus has complete
control over his activities. On the other hand, a court of
the state in which the act is performed may decide the
question. It may do so when passing on title to property
in relation to the foreign administrator or when it is
asked to give him some form of relief. This chapter will
consider the latter problem. When will the courts of
one state take jurisdiction of a case if the party seeking
relief is an administrator or executor appointed in
another state?
The general rule at common law is stated by Story as
follows:
"It has hence become a general doctrine of the common
law, recognised both in England and America, that no suit
can be brought or maintained by any executor or administrator, ... in his official capacity, in the Courts of any other
country, except that from which he derives his authority to
act in virtue of the probate and letters testamentary or the
letters of administration there granted to him .... " 1

A host of cases in the United States have laid down in
1 Story, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws,

(1841).
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accord with Story's statement the general rule that in
the absence of statutory permission a foreign administrator or executor may not sue in the courts of their
states. 2 This is also the rule in England 3 and probably
the Commonwealth countries as well. 4
The traditional explanation for the rule has been
given by Professor Beale thus:
" ... But as has been seen the claim due to the decedent is at
common law not to be paid to anyone else; and an administrator can sue only because of a statutory power given him.
But this power, like all created by statute, extends only to
the boundaries of the state; and the administrator appointed
in the state cannot claim the power." 5
This is based on an accentuated "territoriality" concept
of law. It seems to say that the administrator as a legal
person is a statutory creation, and since the statutes of
a state cannot by their own power operate outside the
boundaries of the state, the administrator cannot function as such outside its territory. The explanation is
questionable on its face and becomes completely unsatisfactory when it appears that the administrator
often performs acts outside the territory of the state
which appointed him 6 and that he frequently appears
as a party in the courts of other states. 7
2 Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, I935 (I9I6). See cases
cited in note I, I352; Reynolds v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. T. Ry. Co., 7
F.R.D. I65 (E.D Ky. I945); McKeen v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., I I I F. Supp.
876 (W.D. Mo. I953); Warren v. Globe Indemnity Co., 216 La. 107, 43
So. (2d) 234 (I949); Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. I30, 6I N.E. (2d) 412
(1945);Cannon v. Cannon, 228 N.C. 2II,45 S.E. (2d) 34 (1947);Wilcoxv.
District Court, 2 Utah (2d) 227, 272 P. (2d) 147 (1954); Joseph v. The
National Bank, 124 W.Va. 500, 2I S.E. (2d) I41 (1942).
3 Tourton v. Flower, 3 P.Will. 368,24 Eng. Rep. II05 (1735); Cheshire,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 4th Ed., 5I5-5I6 (I952).
4 Lunn v. Barber, [1949] Ontario Rep. 34·
5 Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at I533·
6 See infra Chapter V, pp. 15I-I62.
7
Infra PP· 35-54·
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It must be clearly understood that the rule is not the
result of lack of jurisdiction or power in the court to
make a foreign personal representative a valid party
plaintiff. The external limitations on any legal system
can come from only two sources. 8 The law of any nation
may be limited by clearly recognized rules of international law. In addition, the states of the United
States are limited in their power to make legal rules and
to adjudicate cases by certain constitutional provisions9 •
Neither of these prohibits a legal system from permitting
a foreign personal representative to sue in its courts.
Certainly, a foreign administrator may be allowed to
sue as a matter of comity. 10 Therefore, any restrictions
on suits by foreign personal representatives must be
imposed by a rule of the positive municipal law of the
jurisdiction. Our question is why this law and the courts
which apply it generally refuse to allow such an action.
The real explanation lies in a public policy which is
probably as old as the rule itself. The forum, having
control over property within its jurisdiction, insists
that the property be administered under its direction in
order to protect local creditors. Such a policy saves
local creditors the expense of going to a distant jurisdiction to present and prove their claims. It saves them
from litigating their rights in a forum where the rules
determining such rights may be different from those of
their home state. If the estate is insolvent, it guarantees
8 W.

W.

Cook, THE LoGICAL AND LEGAL BAsEs OF THE CoNFLICT OF

4I (I942).
9 Chiefly the Fourteenth Amendment (the due process clause) and
Article IV, sec. I (the full faith and credit clause).
10 Vaughan v. Northrup, I5 Pet. I, IO L.Ed. 639 (U.S. I84I); Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E. (2d) 852 (I937). "An exception
to the prevailing view that foreign administrators have no standing in our
courts is sometimes made as a matter of comity in the interests of justice."
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that local creditors will be paid to the extent to which
assets in the forum will cover the local debts. By
applying the general rule then, the forum is preferring
the claims of its citizens over the interest of the foreign
administrator in having a unified administration. This
explanation for the rule has been used by modern
courts. In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Iowa
said:
"The underlying reason for this rule is that a state will not·
allow property within its jurisdiction to be so taken by a
foreign administrator as to deprive its own citizens of opportunity to enforce their claims against it. The rule does
not arise from any want of legal right in the foreign administrator or lack of inherent authority in the court to accord
him recognition.' '11

The discussion in this chapter on the capacity of
foreign administrators and executors to sue will presuppose that there has been no ancillary administration.
A jurisdiction may refuse to allow a foreign personal
representative to sue to recover property of the decedent
within its territory. Instead it will require that an
ancillary administrator be appointed in its courts who
will administer the estate of the decedent under its
supervision. If there is an ancillary administration, the
proper party .to bring such an action would be the
ancillary administrator. 12 A foreign personal representative, who wishes to sue in another state, may always
11

Gross v. Hocker, 243 Iowa 294, 51 N.W. (2d) 466 (1952).
Accord: Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, ·s3
N.E. (2d) 673 (1949); North v. Ringling, 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 135 (1946). .
Contra: Warren v. Globe Indemnity Co., 216 La. 107, 43 So. (2d) 234 ·
(1949).
12 In re Chisholm's Will, 108 N.Y.S. (2d) 182 (1951).
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qualify in that state as ancillary administrator 13 if the
laws of the state permit him to do so. One third of the
states hold by statute, 14 decision, 15 or court order16 that
only residents are entitled to be appointed administrators in their jurisdictions. Thus a foreign personal
representative, who is not a resident, is not eligible to
serve as ancillary administrator in those states. If he
can qualify as ancillary administrator, he becomes
administrator of the estate in that jurisdiction and will
always be permitted to sue. If he brings an action as a
foreign personal representative and then qualifies as
ancillary administrator after the suit has been filed and
before there has been an objection to his lack of capacity
to sue, he will be permitted to continue the suitY
There have been three general classes of exceptions
which the courts have made to the general rule prohibiting suits by foreign personal representatives. Each
of these will be considered separately.
Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at 1533; Gross v. Hocker, 243 Iowa 291,
51 N.W. (2d) 466 (1952); Thomas v. Richards, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 640 (1950);
Hicks v. Shively, 137 S.W. (2d) 102 (Tex. 1940).
14 Ark. Stat., sec. 62-208 (1947); Deering's Cal. Code, Probate sec. 420;
Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 732:47; 113 Ga. Code Ann. 1204; Idaho Code, sec. I 5317; Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 229; Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 395.005
(1953); Mich. Comp. Laws, sec. 704.27 (1948); Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat.,
sec. 46uoo; Neb. Rev. Stat., sec. 3o-315 (1943); Baldwin's Ohio Rev.
Code, sec. 2n3.o6; Ore. Rev. Stat., sec. II5.4Io; Utah Code, sec. 75-4-4
(1953); Wash. Rev. Code, sec. I 1.36.oiO; Wyo. Comp. Stat, sec. 6-903
( 1945).
15 Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218 N.C. 215, IO S.E. (2d) 673 (1940). "A
foreign administrator has no authority in this state and cannot sue nor be
sued as such; and since a nonresident cannot be appointed administrator,
there should be an ancillary administration by a proper person in this
State."
16 Probate Court Rule 20, Minn. Stat. Ann., Vol. 31, p. 889.
17 Leahy v. Haworth, 141 F. 669 (8th Cir. 1905); Gross v. Hocker, 243
Iowa 291, 51 N.W. (2d) 466 (1952).
13
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(a) Waiver by defendant of the objection to capacity of a
foreign personal representative to sue
The first general exception deals with the problem
whether the objection to the capacity of the foreign
administrator to sue may be waived by the other party
to the action. It is a curious thing, but those courts that
for the most part cling persistently to the theory that a
foreign administrator because of his terri toriallimi ta tion
does not have the capacity to sue, will allow the other
party to the suit to waive this objection. 18 This is allowed
because the courts speak of the administrator's disability as a lack of capacity to sue. Then based on the
analogy to the rule applied to other parties who lack
capacity to sue, such as minors and mental incompetents, they say that this objection may be waived if the
other party to the suit does not bring timely objection.
Naturally this has led, particularly in the older cases,
to rather complicated procedural debates on what
constitutes a timely and proper objection. 19 Some courts
require that the objection be raised by a plea in abatement,20 others say that it may be done by a plea in bar, 21
and still others by a special demurrer if the incapacity
is apparent on the face of the complaint. 22 Pleading to
18 Jolley v. Sloan, 6I Ga. App. 747, 7 S.E. (2d) 325 (I940); Anthes v.
Anthes, 2I Idaho 305, I2I P. 553 (I912); Fort Fairfield Nash Co. v.
Noltemier, I35 Me. 84, I89 A. 4I5, 108 A.L.R. I276 (I937); Wikoff v.
Hirschell, 258 N.Y. 28, I79 N.E. 249 (I932); Wilson v. Wilson, 26 Ore.
25I' 38 P. I 85 (I 894).
19 See discussion of this problem in the annotation at 108 A.L.R. I282.
2 ° Kane v. Paul, I4 Pet. 33, IO L.Ed. 34I (U.S. I84o); Fort Fairfield
Nash Co. v. Noltemier, I35 Me. 84, I89 A. 4I5, 108 A.L.R. I276 (I937);
see cases cited in the opinion.
21
Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394 (U.S. I869).
22 Funk v. Funk, 76 Colo. 45, 230 P. 6n (I924); Wilson v. Wilson, 26
Ore. 25I, 38 P. I85 (I894).
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the merits constitutes such a waiver. 23 All these courts
would agree that the objection may not be raised for
the first time on appeal. Modern courts operating under
code systems of procedure would not be so concerned
with the technicalities of raising the objection. Still
they would require that a seasonable objection to the
plaintiff's capacity to sue be made. Pleading to the
merits 24 or filing a counterclaim would be a waiver. 25
The courts which have refused to follow the rule
allowing waiver of the objection have done so on a
different theory of the disability. 26 They say that a
foreign administrator appears in their courts only as an
individual, not in his capacity as representative of the
estate. Yet it is only as a representative that he can show
any interest in the subject matter of the cause of action
belonging to the estate. Since he fails to show any
interest in himself as plaintiff, he fails to state a cause of
action. The objection that the plaintiff has failed to
establish a cause of action in his favor may be raised at
any time during the proceedings and even on appeal.
Therefore, these courts say that the other party can
never waive his right to object to suit by the plaintiff as
foreign administrator.
The reasoning of either position does not seem sound.
The real reason for the general rule against suits by
foreign personal representatives is the policy of protecting local creditors. In any such suit, there are three
interests involved. One is the interest of the foreign
personal representative as plaintiff, another is that of
23 Brown v. Nourse, 55 Me. 230 (I867); Farmers Trust Co. v. Bradshaw,
242 N.Y.S. 598 (I93o).
24 Wikoff v. Hirschell, 258 N.Y. 28, I79 N.E. 249 (I932).
25 Jolley v. Sloan, 6I Ga. App. 747, 7 S.E. (2d) 325 (I940).
26 Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Brantley's Adm'r., 96 Ky. 297, 28
S.W. 477 (I894); Lefebure v. Baker, 69 Mont. I93, 220 P. I I I I (I923).
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the defendant, and the third is that oflocal creditors. It
is not consistent with the underlying reason for the
general rule to allow the defendant by his consent or
carelessness to bar the interest of the local creditors in
this action. While the majority of cases allow such a
waiver, the preferable result from the common-law
point of view would be that such action on the part of
the defendant would not constitute a waiver as long as
local creditors might be harmed.
There is an interesting side question which arises out
of the waiver cases. If the defendant fails to answer the
petition, may the foreign administrator as plaintiff take
a valid judgment by default? The foregoing cases which
require affirmative action by the defendant in making a
timely plea to plaintiff's lack of capacity would seem to
imply that such a default judgment would be granted.
Authority on the question is slight. The problem was
discussed in a case decided by a Federal District
Court. 27 The plaintiff, who was an administratrix
appointed in Indiana, sued two defendants in Kentucky
for conversion. One of the defendants failed to answer,
but the other defendant made proper objection to
plaintiff's capacity to sue. The court refused to grant a
judgment by default against the defendant who did not
answer, saymg:
"The defendant United Distillers has failed to answer the
petition, and except for the fact that its co-defendant has
raised the foregoing defense in its behalf a judgment by
default might be given. However, the defense raised is of such
a character as to inure to the benefit of all defendants, even
though not specifically pleaded by each defendant." 28
27

28

Ballard v. United Distillers Co., 28 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
28 F. Supp. at 635.
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Apparently default judgments would be granted in
favor of foreign personal representatives. However, it
seems that granting a judgment by default would be
unsound for the same reason that allowing a waiver of
the objection to suit by the other party is unsound. If
the court either from the face of the petition or surrounding circumstances has knowledge that the plaintiff
is a foreign administrator, it should refuse to grant a
judgment by default. By its refusal, it would thereby
give effect to the public policy of protecting local
creditors by not permitting assets of the estate to be
taken out of the jurisdiction.
(b) Suit by the foreign personal representative
as an individual

The second exception to the general rule concerns
those cases where the foreign administrator is said to be
suing not in his representative capacity, but as an individual. Since the cause of action arises out of plaintiff's
representative capacity, and since any recovery will be
treated as assets of the estate, 29 the distinction may not
be an easy one to draw, nor may it be an intrinsically
sound one. Yet it is a line which the courts have drawn
and must be considered. Under this exception, the
courts have decided several rather different fact situations which will be discussed separately.
The first of these concerns the case where the foreign
administrator is suing on a judgment he obtained in the
state of his appointment. Almost without exception the
cases permit such a suit. 30 The theory is that the old
29

Reed v. Hollister, 95 Ore. 656, 188 P. 170 (1920).
Moore v. Kraft, 179 F. 685 (7th Cir. 1910); Turner v. Alton Banking
& Trust Co., 166 F. (2d) 305 (8th Cir. 1948); Schlorer v. Mangin, 39 F.
Supp. 65 (E.D. N.Y. 1941); McCraw v. Simpson, 2o8 Ark. 471, 187 S.W.
(2d) 536 (1945); Reed v. Hollister, 95 Ore. 656, 188 P. 170 (1920).
30
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cause of action which the personal representative had to
sue on in his representative capacity is merged in the
judgment. The judgment represents a new cause of
action which never belonged to the decedent. Therefore,
the personal representative need not sue as a representative of the estate of the decedent, but may sue as an
individual who owns the claim based on the judgment.
Consequently, the general rule concerning suits by
foreign administrators is said to be inapplicable.
In all the cases supporting the exception as applied to
judgments, the administrator obtained the judgment
in the state of his appointment. There are, however,
many instances where a personal representative may sue
in a state other than the one in which he was appointed
and he will be granted a valid judgment. 31 May he then
sue on this judgment in a third state? This would seem
to follow from the reasoning employed in the above
cases. If it is said that the cause of action merges in the
judgment and the judgment becomes a new cause of
action which the administrator may sue on as an individual, then it should be immaterial where the
judgment was obtained as long as it was a valid one.
Suits on judgments raise an interesting constitutional
question in the United States. Must a court give effect to
the judgment of a sister state in favor of a personal
representative appointed in that state under Article
IV, Section I of the United States Constitution? 32 Since
courts, as a matter of fact, always do give such effect
under the theory discussed in the two preceding para31 He may sue on a cause of action in a representative capacity, but the
defendant will waive his objection to such suit and a valid judgment will
be granted, see supra pp. 35-38, or he may sue under a statute permitting
such suit and recover a valid judgment, see infra pp. 67-75.
32 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State... "
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graphs, the question is largely academic. There is no
authoritative decision because there is no United
States Supreme Court case deciding the question. However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in deciding a case
where an administratrix appointed in Oklahoma sued
on an Oklahoma judgment, first rested the decision on
the theory of merger of the cause of action in the
judgment and suit on that judgment in an individual
capacity. Then it said:
"We must and do give full faith and credit to this foreign
Judgment (art. 4, sec. I, Const. of United States) where, as
here, there is no contention that such judgment was fraudulently obtained or that the court where it was obtained was
without jurisdiction."33
This may be treated as dictum. Certainly it does not
represent a binding authority on a federal constitutional question. This is because a state may always
accord a judgment from a sister state more credit than
it would be entitled to under the ''full faith and credit"
clause. There really can be no reliable decision on this
constitutional question until the state court holds that
the judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit and
the United States Supreme Court holds that it should
have been given effect. Still the above case reaches what
seems to be the correct result on the constitutional
issue. The sister state has granted a valid judgment as to
parties over which it had jurisdiction, and the fact that
the successful plaintiff was a personal representative
should not alter his constitutional right to sue on that
judgment in other states. This argument should apply
not only to judments granted in the state of appointment, but also judgments in favor of personal represent33

McCraw v. Simpson, 208 Ark. 476, 187 S.W. (2d) 536 (1945).
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atives who secure them in states other than the one in
which they qualify.
The second situation concerns cases where the foreign
personal representative is suing on a negotiable instrument which is part of the assets of the estate in his
possession. The Restatement adopts the "mercantile"
theory on this question. According to Section 509 of
the Restatement, Conflict of Laws:
"An administrator in possession of a negotiable instrument, share certificate, or negotiable warehouse receipt or
bill of lading belonging to the decedent, and only such
administrator, can sue upon the duty represented by such
document wherever jurisdiction can be secured over the
debtor or his property." 34
The "mercantile" theory on which this rule is based
adopts the position that the property exists at the place
where the negotiable instrument is located rather than
at the place where the debtor may be found.
The cases decided under common-law rules do not
fully support the Restatement in this position. Some of
the older cases adopt a rule completely contrary to
Section 509, based on the concept that debts are bona
notabilia in the state where the debtor resides and a
foreign administrator, even though he may have the
"evidence" of the debt, is not entitled to collect the
debt. 36 The majority of cases hold that an administrator
who has in his possession a negotiable instrument made
34

RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws. § 509 (I934). Reprinted by permission of the American Law Institute. For the cases which support the
Restatement position, see Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at I547; Michigan
Trust Co. v. Chafee, 73 N.D. 86, I I N.W. (2d) 108, I49 A.L.R. I078
~I943). This case is a good discussion of the problem from the "mercantile" point of view which it adopts.
35 Mason v. Nutt's Ex'rs, I9 La. Ann. 4I (I867); McCarty v. Hall, I9
Mo. 480 (I85o).
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payable to bearer may sue on it in any jurisdiction. 3
The reason given is that the administrator as rightful
holder of the note is the "bearer" and may thus sue in
his individual capacity. However, if the note is payable
to order or is nonnegotiable, the foreign administrator
would not be allowed to sue on a note given to his
decedent during his lifetimeY A foreign administrator
would generally not be permitted to sue to recover
funds represented by a certificate of deposit in his
possession. 38 Contrary to the opinion of the Restatement, there is also authority which holds that a foreign
administrator in possession of share certificates of stock
would not be able to bring an action on that stock as
the basis for suit in the jurisdiction of incorporation. 39
Of course, if a note were given to the foreign administrator after the death of the decedent as payee, the foreign
administrator could sue on that note in any jurisdiction
in his individual capacity. 40
While the cases do not clearly support the Restatement in most of the rules of law laid down in section
509, that does not mean that such rules based on the
"mercantile" theory are not desirable. The tendency of
the commercial world is to treat negotiable paper and
stock certificates as property where they are found
36 Knapp v. Lee, 42 Mich. 41, 3 N.W. 244 (1879); Sanford v. McCreedy, 28 Wise. 103 (1871).
37 Lefebure v. Baker, 69 Mont. 193, 220 P. II II (1923); Thompson v.
Wilson, 2 N.H. 291 (1820); Cannon v. Cannon, 228 N.C. 2II, 45 S.E. (2d)
34 (1947); Terrel v. Crane, 55 Tex. 81 (1881); Hicks v. Shively, 137 S.W.
(2d) 102 (Tex. 1940); Knapp v. Lee, 42 Mich. 41, 3 N.W. 244 (1879)
(dictum).
38 McCully v. Cooper, I 14 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82 (1 896); Burbank v. Payne
& Harrison, 17 La. Ann. 15, 87 Am. Dec. 513 (1865).
39 Ewing v. Warren, 144 Miss. 233, 109 So. 6or (1926); Matter of Fitch,
16o N.Y. 87, 54 N.E. 701 (1899) (dictum).
40 Trotter v. White, 10 Smedes & Marshal16o7 (Miss. 1848); Robinson
· v. City Nat. Bank, 56 F. (2d) 225 (N.D. Tex. 1931).
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rather than at the domicile of the debtor or the corporation. It is clearly more convenient for business people to
deal with such pieces of paper as property because they
are so easily transferable. The legal problem involved in
this area is to determine the situs of the property for the
purposes of administration. There is no inherent
necessity or virtue in treating such interests evidenced
by documents as property at the domicile of the debtor
or corporation. Instead, it seems a good policy to have
our rules of law and their practical application conform
as closely as possible to business practice and the mental
attitude of business people. If businessmen and the
courts treat these pieces of paper as property for other
purposes, they should be so treated for administration
purposes. Then the administrator who gets possession of
the notes or share certificates will have title to them and
may sue on them anywhere in his individual capacity.
A third situation which arises under this general
exception concerns a suit to recover insurance proceeds.
A foreign personal representative who has an insurance
policy payable to the estate of deceased or to his
executor or administrator may sue to recover the
proceeds in any state where the insurer can be sued. 41 A
leading case on this question is Cramer v. Phoenix Life
Insurance Co. 42 This was an interpleader action filed in
Iowa by the insurance company. One claimant was the
domiciliary administrator appointed in Iowa and the
other was an ancillary administrator appointed in
Connecticut. The Connecticut administrator contended
that he was immune from process outside the state of
41 Holyoke v. Union Mutual Life Insurance Co., '2'2 Hun. 75 (N.Y. 1881)
affirmed without opinion, 84 N.Y. 648.
42
91 F. (2d) 141 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 739, 58 S.Ct. 141, 8'2
L.Ed. 571.
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his appointment. The court rejected this contention and
decided that he was a proper claimant in an interpleader
proceeding outside of Connecticut, saying,
" ... But the cause of action which Cramer [Connecticut
administrator] sought to assert had never vested in the
intestate. The contract of life insurance did not become a
debt until the death of the insured, and it was not collectible
in the right of the insured .... The want of power in a personal
representative to sue or be sued in any sovereignty other than
that under whose laws he was appointed, unless authorized
by statute of the appropriate jurisdiction, does not apply to a
cause of action involving a right which did not belong to the
deceased .... " 43

The same reasoning is applied to transactions entered
into by the personal representative himself. If the right
is acquired after decedent's death, the administrator
may sue on it in his individual capacity in a state other
than the one of his appointment. 44 This has been
applied where a foreign administrator sued on a note
given to him as payee, 45 where he sued for an overpayment of estate taxes made by him, 46 where he sued
on a con tract to which he was an original party, 47 where
he sued to compel contribution by a coguarantor after
paying the obligation of his decedent who was the other
guarantor, 48 and also where a foreign executor sued
43

91 F. (2d) at 147.
Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at I 545.
45 Trotter v. White, 10 Smedes & Marshall 6o7 (Miss. 1848); Robinson
v. City Nat. Bank, 56 F. (2d) 225 (N.D. Tex. 1931).
46
Kruskal v. U.S., 178 F. (2d) 738 (2d Cir. 1950).
47 Von Lingen v. Field, 154 Md. 638, 141 A. 390 (1928).
48 Mowry v. Adams, 14 Mass. 327 (1817). In De Paris v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 7 Boyce 178, 104 A. 691, I A.L.R. 1352 (Del. 1918), the domiciliary representative of a deceased guarantor paid when the obligor defaulted. An ancillary administrator sued to compel contribution from the
co-guarantor. The court dismissed the suit saying," ... the right to enforce
contribution to Schemel [the deceased guarantor] in his life, and the pay44
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to recover proceeds of a sale of real estate made by his
agent. 49
The case where the personal representative is suing
on a con tract to which he was an original party represents one of the two situations where it can realistically
be said that he is suing in an individual capacity. A
contract made by a personal representative on behalf of
the estate is his own individual contract, and he is
personally liable on it. 5 ° Certainly, if the contract is the
individual one of the personal representative when an
action is brought against him, it should be the same
when he is suing the other party to the con tract. The
result reached can also be explained from the point of
view of the defendant in the action. Since he dealt with
the personal representative rather than the decedent as
the original contracting party, he should have the right
to expect only that personal representative to enforce
the obligation.
If the foreign personal representative has reduced
personal property to his possession in the state of his
appointment, he thereby acquires legal title to that
ment of the principal debt having been made by the widow and the children
of Schemel, they could enforce payment, either in their own names or
as administrators of Schemel; and further, that this excluded a right of
action to the plaintiff.... "
49
Moore v. Petty, 135 F. 668 (8th Cir. 1905), cert. den. 197 U.S. 623,
25 S.Ct. 8oo, 49 L.Ed. 91 I. This case involved an executor who qualified in
Pennsylvania under a will which gave him a general power of sale of the
real property of testatrix. This included land in Iowa. As is pointed out
infra Chapter IV, the foreign executor under these conditions may
make a valid conveyance of the realty. The executor hired D as his agent
to sell the Iowa land. This was an action brought in Iowa by the executor
to recover proceeds from the sale. The court permitted the action on the
theory that this was a right accruing personally to the executor from his
own transaction and was not a right of the decedent.
5
°Corner v. Shew, 3 M. & W. 350, 150 Eng. Rep. II79 (1838); Carpenter v. Hazel, 128 Ark. 416, 194 S.W. 225 (1917); Wilton v. Eaton, 127
Mass. 174 (1879).
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property. This title will be good as against any other
administrator. If he then takes the property outside the
state and it is there converted by a third party, he may
sue for its recovery. 61 Since he has title to the property
for the purposes of administration, he is said to be suing
to, vindicate that right rather than any right in the
property he secured as a representative. This is the
other instance where the executor or administrator is
actually suing as an individual. While he may be called
by the court which appointed him to account as a
fiduciary, his title to the property is good as against
anyone else until the administration has been completed.
Actually, the result in this case is a necessity in modern
administrations. The personal representative who is
attempting to conserve assets of the estate may well
have to transport them into or through other jurisdictions to obtain more advantageous sales or safer storage
places. While doing this, he ought to be protected from
interference with his property to the same extent that
other rightful holders of property are. However, there is
one old case in which it was held that the property must
have been taken outside the state against the will of the
administrator before he will be allowed to sue. 62
The exception that a foreign personal representative
can sue on a cause of action in his individual capacity is
recognized in English law. The case authority is limited
but clear on this point. The cases deal with the problem
of suit by a foreign administrator on a judgment
51 Clark v. Holt, 16 Ark. 2.57 (1855) (Suit to recover slaves who had
been removed from Tennessee by the bailee of the Tennessee administrator); Beckham v. Wittkowski & Rintels, 64 N.C. 464 (1870) (Suit by a
South Carolina executor to recover cotton which he had taken to North
Carolina to market and which had been there taken from him).
52 Kilpatrick v. Bush, 2.3 Miss. 199 (1851).
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obtained in the jurisdiction of appointment. 53 The
English courts allow such a suit on the theory that the
judgment obtained by the personal representative was
a right that did not belong to the deceased. Consequently, the personal representative who recovered the
judgment sues in his individual capacity. The English
cases have not considered most of the fact situations
decided by American courts under this exception, so
that it is not possible to say that they would reach the
same result in all similar cases. However, one Canadian
court has decided that a foreign administrator may sue
on a negotiable instrument in his possession without
being required to take out ancillary administration. 54
This is based on the theory that the debt was reduced
to possession by possession of the negotiable instrument. Thus the foreign administrator had title to the debt
and could sue to recover it as an individual.
Some writers have contended that this class of cases
does not constitute a real exception to the common-law
rule. 5 5 It is said that the personal representative acquires
only the claims of the decedent by the statute which
makes him representative of the estate. Any rights
acquired thereafter are owned personally by the personal representative because rights must vest in a living
man. Therefore, he may sue on rights acquired after the
death of the decedent in any jurisdiction as an individual.
Since the general rule only applies to actions where the
foreign administrator or executor sues in a representa53

Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341 (1863); In re Macnichol,

L.R. 19 Eq. 81 (1874).
Prescott v. Crosby, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 937·
Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at 1545; Buchanan & Myers, "The
Administration of Intangibles in View of First National Bank v. Maine,"
48 HARV. L. REv. 911 at 918 (1935).
64

55

48

FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES

tive capacity, all these cases are said to be completely
outside the rule.
The cases seem to me to be true exceptions. The rule
as stated by Story and in the numerous cases which have
followed him is broad enough to prevent all suits by
foreign personal representatives when they are brought
to collect assets of the estate. In all these cases, the
recovery will become assets of the estate in the hands of
the successful foreign personal representative. If the
policy of the rule is to protect local creditors by prohibiting foreign administrators or executors from withdrawing assets of the decedent from the jurisdiction,
these cases violate that policy. A legal order certainly
has the power to prevent a foreign personal rep res en tative from suing in its jurisdiction regardless of the
nature of the claim he is suing on. If such as is discussed
above is permitted, it must be explained as an exception
to the general rule of exclusion.
Actually, this general exception seems to cover two
classes of actions. The first concerns suits brought by a
foreign personal representative on a contract which he
made himself or to recover property which he brought
into the state. In each of these, it is unquestionably the
individual right of the personal representative on which
he is suing. Therefore the traditional explanation is
satisfactory in explaining the result. The second type of
suit involves actions on a judgment obtained by the
personal representative or on a negotiable instrument
in his possession. These are really not individual rights
of the personal representative, but rather grow out of
his representative character and are based on original
rights which the decedent had. An explanation of this
exception on the basis of suit as an individual obscures
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what seems to me to be the true explanation for all the
actions coming within this general exception.
Regardless of the explanation given, these exceptions
would have to be made on considerations of convenience
and practicality. If an ancillary administrator were
allowed to recover on a claim established by a judgment
obtained by another administrator, by a contract
entered into by another administrator, or by a negotiable instrument in the possession of another administrator, some difficult problems would be raised. The
court granting the judgment in favor of the ancillary
administrator would have to foreclose the interest ot a
person not within its jurisdiction, th~ administrator
possessing the claim, who would not have the opportunity to appear and be heard. There would be the
possibility that the Supreme Court of the United States
would adopt the "mercantile" position that the property
of the note, contract right, or judgment would be in the
administrator who originally held them and not in the
ancillary administrator. This would mean that there had
been a deprivation of property without due', process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, the court
rendering the judgment would have to consider the
possibility of the defendant being sued in another jurisdiction by the administrator having the claim. This
would raise the problem of the extent to which such a
judgment would be res judicata under the "full faith and
credit" clause of the United States Constitution. The
serious nature of these problems is even more obvious
when the foreign administrator who possesses the claim
was appointed in a foreign country. Should the debtor
enter that country, he may be sued a second time on the
note, contract, or judgment. The foreign court may well
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treat the claim as property in the hands of that administrator. Then it would refuse to recognize the recovery
against the debtor by the ancillary administrator and
would give a second recovery against him. There is no
way that the forum can bar such an action. Rather than
trying to solve these problems satisfactorily, it is simpler and safer to hold that the administrator possessing
the claim is the only person who will be permitted to
recover on that claim regardless of the jurisdiction in
which the action is brought.

(c) Suit as a matter of comity to prevent injustice
The third general exception to the common-law rule
prohibiting suits by a foreign personal representative is
made when he is allowed to sue "as a matter of comity in
the interests of justice." 5 6 Naturally, these cases involve
rather rare fact situations. In each one, however, the
decision is rested on the broad generalization that the
suit will be permitted in order to prevent Injustice.
Therefore, the cases should be considered not as a
definitive statement of a legal rule, but rather as
examples of the application of a very general principle
of equity and justice.
The leading case in this area is Kirkbride v. Van
Note. 67 A husband and wife were divorced in New York
and the wife was awarded monthly alimony payments.
She thereafter remarried. Later, the husband died
domiciled in New Jersey and an administrator was
appointed in that state. The wife brought suit in New
Jersey for back alimony from the date of her remarriage.
The administrator sought to be substituted as defendant
56
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Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. '244, 9 N.E. (2d) 852 (1937).
Ibid.
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in the New York divorce action and to apply for a
modification of the decree awarding alimony. The New
York Court of Appeals held that this application should
be granted:
"To deny [the foreign administrator] permission to appear
and apply for modification of the judgment of divorce in so
far as it directs the payment of alimony after the remarriage
of the plaintiff, would work a gross injustice, and the courts,
as a matter of comity, should permit him to make such application."58

There is another situation illustrating the application
of this principle. One individual was ancillary administrator of two English estates and domiciliary executor
of a domestic estate. Each of the estates had claims under the will in a probate proceeding in New York.
As domestic executor, this person sought a construction
of the will which was prejudicial to the interests of the
foreign estates. The English domiciliary executor sought
to intervene on behalf of the English estates. The court
permitted this intervention on the ground that "the
interests of justice will best be preserved by allowing
the petitioner to intervene." 59
Still another application of the principle occurs when
the foreign administrator sues to recover assets of the
estate, but the assets are not such as will allow an
ancillary administration. There was such a case arising
in Missouri in which the foreign executor sued to enforce
a con tract for the sale of stock. This was not such an
asset as would entitle the executor under the law of
Missouri to take out an ancillary administration. The
Federal Court of Appeals decided that the foreign
68

275 N.Y. at 251.

59

In re Chisholm's Will, 108 N.Y.S. (2d) 182 at 184 (1951).
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executor should be permitted to sue to enforce the
contract. 60 However, it must be emphasized that inability to secure ancillary administration is not sufficient in and of itself to permit suit by a foreign administrator. It must be shown in addition that there is no
other forum in which the right can be enforced or that
great injustice will follow refusal to allow suit. 61
These cases represent an encouraging trend displayed
by the courts. A rigid application of the common-law
rules will often cause great harm and injustice in the
administration of a decedent's estate. Since the courts
certainly have the power to permit such suits, whenever
a foreign administrator can show that refusal to permit
suit will cause more harm to the estate than it will
produce benefit to local creditors, he should be allowed
to sue. One example which may occur is this. The asset
in the state may be a debt owed to the decedent by a
resident. This debt may be so small that it would not
justify the expense of an ancillary administration to
recover it. It may well be that the debtor will not
voluntarily pay it to the foreign administrator, and if
he does not, this asset is virtually uncollectible. The
local creditors are not protected by the common-law
rule, since no ancillary administrator will collect the
60 Buder v. Becker, 185 F. (2d) 311 (8th Cir. 1950). "To deny the
domiciliary administrator a forum to enforce his rights in the assets, in
Missouri, of the non-resident decedent, and at the same time deny right of
ancillary administration on those assets in Missouri, would lead to taking
property without due process of law. That conclusion we avoid if possible."
61 Moses v. Wood & Selick, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 829 (1949). "Of course if
ancillary letters might be obtained, then plaintiff would be obligated to
secure them. Assuming, however, that they may not be obtained in this
case, that in and of itself is not sufficient reason for allowing suit by a
foreign executrix without them .... There is no showing in the present
case that a gross injustice will result if plaintiff is not allowed to sue in
our courts, or that plaintiff will be able '"'l P.nforce hP.r rights elsewhere."
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asset for them. On the other hand, their interests as well
as the interests of the whole estate will be better served
if the foreign administrator is permitted to sue to collect
the asset because they can participate in those assets by
filing a claim in the probate court which appointed the
foreign administrator. The court should have little
difficulty in an action brought on such a debt in determining as a jurisdictional fact whether the usual
expenses of an ancillary administration in costs and
fees plus the inconvenience of the long delay will exceed
in value the amount of the debt. If it so finds, I feel such
a suit should be permitted. A more liberal application
of the rule in Kirkbride v. Van Note to such cases would
alleviate some of the most unsatisfactory results of the
common-law rule.
(d) Miscellaneous exceptions
The three general classes of exceptions are not allinclusive of suits which may be brought by foreign
personal representatives. For example, an executor may
by the will be given authority to sell the real property
of the testator wherever located. Such an executor has
the power to make a valid conveyance to land in a state
other than the one in which he qualified as executor. 62
This is based on the theory that he is acting under a
common-law power created by the testator in the will
rather than as a statutory representative. Reasoning
from this, it has been held that a foreign executor
having such a power of sale may maintain ejectment for
the land as against a wrongful possessor. 63 This result
seems a practical necessity. The heir or devisee who
See infra Chapter IV, pp. 125-129.
Doe v. McFarland, 9 Cranch 151 (U.S. 1815); Bradley v. Burke, 67
D. & C. 239 (Pa. 1948).
62

63
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normally receives title to the land immediately on death
has no interest in this land which will enable him to
maintain an ejectment action. An ancillary administrator might be appointed in the state where the land lies
to maintain the action, but the courts of that forum
would generally say that they have no right to deal
with the land when the testator gives a power of sale
to the executor. Besides, the right to maintain ejectment might not be a sufficient asset to serve as the
foundation for an ancillary administration. The best
solution is to treat the executor who has been given a
power of sale as the devisee of the land for the purpose of
sale and consequently as entitled to maintain ejectment
against a wrongful possessor.
Another type of miscellaneous exception concerns a
stockholder's derivative action. A foreign personal
representative holding stock as an asset in the estate
may sue on that stock as the basis for a stockholder's
derivative action. 64 This rule is unquestionably sound.
Any recovery in the action will be for the benefit of the
corporation, rather than that of the estate. Such a
recovery could not be reached by local creditors of the
estate. Therefore, there is no reason for not allowing
suit by the foreign personal representative.
There is another interesting situation in this area
arising out of a New York case. 66 A Turkish citizen died
domiciled in New York leaving a considerable legacy to
his mother, a Turkish national. Thereafter the mother
died domiciled in Turkey. Under the law of Turkey,
the Sultan of Turkey became universal successor of the
estate. He sued in New York to recover from the administrator the legacy due to the mother. The New York
64
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North v. Ringling, 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 135 (1946).
The Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 213 N.Y. 429, 108 N.E. 72 (191 5).
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Court of Appeals in a four to three decision permitted
the suit. It is well established that the forum in determining the succession to movable property will look to
the law of the domicile at the date of death. 66 Under the
law of the domicile, the Sultan as universal successor
received the legal title to the claims of the decedent,
rather than occupying the position of personal representative. The forum permitted him to sue on the claim
as legal owner in the same manner as it would have
permitted a legatee to do so. This is apparently the only
case which has considered the problem of suit by a
foreign universal successor in an American jurisdiction.
The English courts have been faced with the same
problem of suit by a foreign universal successor and have
reached the same result as did the New York Court of
Appeals. 67 Such a case does not theoretically represent
an exception to the general proposition stated at the
beginning of the chapter, because the party seeking
relief was not a personal representative, but was the
legal owner.
This represents a very important problem in conflict
of laws. In civil-law systems, the administration of
estates is done by a universal successor. 68 The important
thing to remember is that immediately after the death
he is vested with legal title to decedent's property. With
the increasing mobility of population in the world
through improved transportation, and with more widespread business investment in foreign countries, there is
a growing possibility that a decedent dying domiciled in
a civil-law country will leave property in a common-law
country and his universal successor will sue for its
Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at 1030.
Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341 (1863).
68
See supra Chapter I, pp. 3-7.

66
67
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recovery. This presents an interesting problem for the
common-law court. It is committed to the rule that
title to movable property will be determined by the law
of the domicile, and under that law the universal
successor would have legal title and should be in the
same position as a legatee suing for his legacy. This was
the position taken by the New York Court. On the
other hand, the common-law court operating under
common-law rules is committed to the policy of local
administration of a foreign decedent's property to
protect domestic creditors. From the point of view of
common-law policy, the decision in the New York case
seems incorrect. The universal successor may be regarded as in a position of a legatee or owner of the
property or else he may be treated as a foreign administrator. Neither of these would generally be permitted
to sue to recover property of the decedent until there
has been a local administration and payment of domestic creditors. Even though the universal successor has
legal title to the property, the common-law court can
require that the property be subject to local administration and the payment of decedent's debts according to
the law of the forum before the foreign universal
successor will be entitled to recover it. While, however,
as a matter of legal logic proceeding from the basic
premise of the common-law policy requiring separate
administrations, the decision allowing the universal
successor to sue seems wrong, there is much to be said
for it. As will be discussed later, 69 the trend is away
from requiring unnecessary ancillary administrations,
and there has been much advocacy of a system of unified administration. The doctrine of universal succession was designed to establish a single administration
69

See infra Chapter VI, pp. 17o-179·
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by providing that the heir would continue the personality of the decedent by taking legal title to all of
his property and by being liable for all his debts. If the
civil-law countries have the policy of treating the universal successor as in the same legal position as the
decedent, the common-law courts should treat him on
the same basis, particularly since creditors residing in
common-law countries will probably receive more
protection when the decedent is represented by a universal successor personally liable for all his debts than
they would if there were a personal representative
liable only to the extent of decedent's property in his
possesswn.
2. EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE oF LocAL CREDITORS

At the beginning of this chapter, it was explained that
the real reason for prohibiting suits by foreign personal
representatives was the policy of protecting domestic
creditors. In accordance with the maxim "when the
reason ceases so does the rule itself," it would seem to
follow that when there are no local creditors, the foreign
administrator should be permitted to sue as a matter of
comity. Of course, the problem raised is how to establish
that there are no local creditors. This may be done in
more than one way. The foreign administrator may
allege and offer evidence that there are no domestic
creditors. The cases generally refuse to recognize that
such an allegation and offer of proof is sufficient. 70 This is
because such a procedure might foreclose a creditor who
had dealt privately with the deceased and has no knowledge of his death. Such a possibility is more likely when
there is no local administration to notify him. The other
70
McCully v. Cooper, II4 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82 (1896); Warren v. Globe
Indemnity Co., 216 La. 107, 43 So. (2d) 234 (1949); Petersen v. Chemical
Bank, 32 N.Y. 21 at 48 (1865).
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possible solution is to give local notice of the death and
then provide a period durin:g which the creditors may
come forward and file claims. This is, of course, the
accepted probate practice of the states in requiring
ancillary administration. Until this ancillary administration is completed, the court would have no proof
that there are no local creditors. If it is assumed that the
state is primarily interested in protecting domestic
creditors, an ancillary administration would always be
required in order to establish the existence or nonexistence of local creditors. Those cases which seem to
stand for the proposition that a foreign administrator
may sue if there are no local creditors are those where
the recovery would not be available to creditors if they
did exist, such as wrongful death actions 71 and stockholder's derivative actions. 72

3· SuiT FOR WRoNGFUL DEATH
There is a situation somewhat analogous to the cases
discussed in the preceding portions of this chapter. This
involves a suit by a foreign personal representative to
recover damages for the wrongful death of the decedent.
In the United States, with its forty-eight state jurisdictions, its highly mobile population, and its alarming
record of traffic fatalities, such a problem is a common
one.
To make the problem clear, we will consider a hypothetical case. A, a resident of Idaho, is killed in an
automobile accident in Oregon by the negligence of B,
a resident of California. C is appointed administrator
of the estate of A in Idaho. Now C sues Bin California
Gross v. Hocker, 243 Iowa 291, 51 N.W. (2d) 466 (1952); Wiener v.
Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E. (2d) 673 (1949).
72 North v. Ringling, 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 135 (1946).
71
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to recover for the wrongful death of A. Will the California court permit a foreign personal representative to
sue to recover for the wrongful death?
The answer to the question posed depends on an
additional factor. Under the accepted choice of law rule
applicable to an action for wrongful death, the law of
the place of the wrong to decedent governs. 73 Thus the
California court will look to the wrongful death statute
of Oregon. What that statute provides will determine
whether our foreign administrator in the hypothetical
case will be permitted to sue or not.
If the statute provides that any recovery will become
part of the general assets of the estate, the foreign
administrator would not be permitted to sue. 74 He
would be suing in a representative capacity on behalf
of the estate. Thus the rule discussed in the first portion
of this chapter which prohibits suits brought by foreign
personal representatives would apply. This result is
consistent with the reason for the common-law rule.
Such recovery, if part of the general assets of the estate,
would be subject to the payment of decedent's debts.
In order to protect the interests of local creditors in this
recovery, an ancillary administration would be required.
Many wrongful death statutes in the United States
contain different provisions. They provide that the
personal representative is the proper party to bring
the action, but that any recovery will go to certain
named beneficiaries without being subject to the claims
of the decedent's creditors. A typical statute of this
type has been enacted in the State of Oregon.
73

74

REsTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 391 (1934).
Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E. (2d) 412 (1945).
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"Action by personal representative for wrongful death.
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another, the personal representatives of the
decedent, for the benefit of the surviving spouse and dependents and in case there is no surviving spouse or dependents
then for the benefit of the estate of the decedent, may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might
have maintained an action, had he lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury done by the same act or omission ... " 75

This statute has been construed to mean that while the
named beneficiaries are in existence, the recovery of
damages in an action by the personal representative
goes personally to them rather than to the general
estate. 76 Thus creditors have no claim to the recovery.
Under this statute or a similar one, the majority of
modern cases would permit the foreign personal representative to recover in our hypothetical case. 77
If the beneficiaries named in the statute do not exist
so that the recovery goes to the general estate, the
foreign administrator would not be permitted to sue. 78
Also, if the foreign personal representative sues to
recover on two causes of action, one for wrongful death
under such a statute and the other for injuries to
decedent during his lifetime, he will be permitted to
sue on the first, but not on the second because such
recovery would go to the general estate. 79
Oregon Rev. Stat., sec. 30.020 (1953).
Ross v. Robbins, 169 Ore. 293, 128 P. (2d) 956 (1942).
Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F. (2d) 488 (9th Cir. 1949); Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F. (2d) 355, 162 A.L.R. 318 (2d Cir. 1952); LeMay
v. Maddox, 68 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Va. 1946); Carter v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 9 F.R.D. 477 (S.D. N.Y. 1949); Demattei v. M-K-T Railroad Co.,
282 Ky. 625, 139 S.W. (2d) 430 (1940); Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E. (2d) 673 (1949).
78 Thomas v. Richards, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 640 (1950).
79 Carter v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 9 F.R.D. 477 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
75
76
77
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The distinction must be made clear between the
action for wrongful death and the cases of suit by a
foreign personal representative discussed in the preceding parts of this chapter. Here the fund recovered
in the action will not become part of the assets of the
estate, but is the property of the named beneficiaries
who are the actual parties in interest. The foreign
administrator is really a different legal personality here.
The statute which confers the right of action also provides that the same person who is personal representative of the decedent will be the proper party to bring
the action. He is for the purposes of this action not a
personal representative, but rather a statutory trustee
for the specified beneficiaries. 8 ° Consequently, this is
not a case involving a foreign personal representative in
the strict sense of the term.
There is an interesting question which occurs when
the defendant in a suit by a foreign personal representative in a wrongful death action counterclaims for
damages done to him by the decedent. He will not be
permitted to recover on the counterclaim. 81 This is
based on the reasoning explained above. The personal
representative is merely a trustee, and the real party in
interest would be the named beneficiary or beneficiaries. Since these named beneficiaries are in no way
liable for the damages caused by decedent, a counterclaim should not be permitted in an action brought for
their benefit.
There is a problem what personal representative can
80 Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E. (2d)
673 (1949). "Suing under such a statute, plaintiff acts, not as an officer of
the foreign court appointed by it as alter ego for the estate, but as a trustee
for the designated beneficiaries, the actual and real parties in interest."
81 Natwick v. Moyer, 177 Ore. 486, 163 P. (2d) 936 (1942).
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sue to recover for wrongful death. This will depend on
the wording and construction of the applicable wrongful
death statute. If the statute permits a foreign personal
representative to recover as the statutory trustee, then
in our hypothetical case, the administrator appointed in
Idaho could sue in California to recover for the wrongful
death occurring in Oregon. If, on the other hand, the
statutory trustee is limited to a local representative,
then there must be an ancillary administrator appointed in Oregon who could sue in California to recover for wrongful death to the decedent. An ancillary
administrator may be appointed for a nonresident
decedent's estate in the state where the wrongful death
occurred even though the right of action is the only
asset on which the ancillary administration can be
based. 82 Then such ancillary administrator could sue
in any other state as a statutory trustee.
In several cases where a foreign personal representative was suing for wrongful death, the court
refused to permit the suit based on the general proposition that foreign personal representatives will not be
allowed to sue. 83 The language is broad enough to
indicate that the courts do not agree with the theory
of permitting a foreign personal representative to sue
as a statutory trustee. Examined closely, however, the
cases do not stand for so broad a generalization. In each
case, suit was brought by the foreign administrator in
the state where the wrong was committed. The court
sitting in that state held that their wrongful death
82 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 183 Ky. 428, 209 S.W. 538
(1919); McCarron v. New York Central Ry. Co., 239 Mass. 64, 131 N.E.
478 (1921).
83
Coburn v. Coleman, 75 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. S.C. 1947); Heath v.
Smyther, 19 F. Supp. ro2o (E.D. S.C. 1937).
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statute required that the proper plaintiff must be a
local administrator. Thus the result turned on the
fact that the plaintiff was not the person designated by
the wrongful death statute as statutory trustee. It
must be understood that the right of action is created
by the applicable statute, and the party to whom it
gives the right to sue is the only one who may do so.
If the statute and its construing cases hold that a local
administrator is the only proper party, then a foreign
administrator cannot sue.
4- SuiT

BY AssiGNEE oF FoREIGN

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

The common-law rule which prohibits an administrator appointed in one state from suing in another state
may not prevent him from effectively collecting assets
through the courts of a second state. If the administrator has in his possession an assignable chose in
action such as a promissory note, a mortgage, or a policy
of insurance, he may assign it to some third party.
The consideration for the assignment will be included
in the assets of the estate. The assignee will then try
to sue the debtor in the second state to collect the chose
in action. By this procedure, assets which might otherwise be available for local creditors would be drained
off into another state. Our question is whether the
courts will permit the assignee of a foreign administrator to sue on a claim on which the foreign administrator himself could not sue.
The older cases definitely hold that such an assignee
could not sue. 84 The theory of these cases is that the
Stearns v. Burnham, 5 Green!. 261 (Me. 1828) (Action on promissory
note by assignee); Cutter v. Davenport, 1 Pick. 81 (Mass. 1822) (Action on
mortgage by assignee); Thompson v. Wilson, 2 N.H. 291 (182o) (Action on
negotiable instrument by assignee).
84
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debts sued on are bona notabilia at the residence of the
debtor. The foreign administrator who held the evidence of the chose in action had no title to convey to
the assignee. The title would have to be assigned by a
personal representative appointed in the state where
the debtor resides. It is easy to see that such reasoning
was the product of a time when people remained relatively stationary and the court felt that it could be
fairly certain of where the debtor resided in order to
treat the situs of the property as located there.
The first break in the line of authority on this question occurred in a case decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1829. 86 This involved a suit in
Mississippi by the assignee of a Kentucky executor on a
promissory note. The defendant was unrepresented in
the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall delivered a
rather summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
which failed to consider the real issue involved.
The leading decision in favor of permitting suit by the
assignee of a foreign personal representative is Petersen
v. Chemical Bank. 86 This was a suit by the assignee of a
Connecticut administrator in a New York court to
recover the bank account of decedent. The New York
Court of Appeals rested its decision in favor of the
plaintiff on two propositions. First, it decided that the
rule preventing a foreign personal representative from
suing "does not attach to the subject of the action, but
is confined to the person of the plaintiff." 87 Secondly,
the title to the personal property of decedent was to be
determined by the law of the domicile of the decedent
at the date of death, which was Connecticut. Under the
85

Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. 239 (U.S. 1829).
3 2 N.Y. 21 (186 5).
87
32 N.Y. at 46.
86
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law of Connecticut, this assignment was sufficient to
pass a valid legal title in the bank account to the
assignee. Therefore, the assignee was entitled to sue in
New York as owner of the debt.
The majority of modern cases have followed the
holding of Petersen v. Chemical Bank and permit an
assignee of a foreign personal representative to sue. 88
However, the courts will not permit an assignee for
collection only to bring an action. 89 In such cases, the
recovery would be transmitted to the foreign personal
representative. Since this procedure is obviously designed to circumvent the prohibition against suit by the
foreign administrator, the courts say that the assignee is
merely the agent of the foreign administrator and will be
subject to the same disability as his principal.
When the problem is first considered, it seems very
illogical and unjust to permit an assignee to sue when
his assignor cannot. It certainly seems an easy way to
circumvent the common-law rule. It must be remembered that the disability on the assignor or foreign
administrator and, therefore, on the assignee is the
policy which attempts to retain assets in the jurisdiction in order to protect domestic creditors. The operation of the majority rule on this question does not seem
designed to protect them.
Vogel v. New York Life Insurance Co., 55 F. (2d) 205 (5th Cir.
1932) (policy of insurance); McCully v. Cooper, II4 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82, 35
L.R.A. 492 (1896) (dictum); Campbell v. Brown, 64 Iowa 425, 20 N.W.
745 (1884) (note); Owen v. Moody, 29 Miss. 79 (1855) (non-negotiable
note); Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N.Y. 21 (1865) (bank deposit);
Grigon v. Shope, 1oo Ore. 6u, 197 P. 317 (1921) (promissory note);
Solinsky v. Fourth Nat'! Bank, 82 Tex. 244, 17 S.W. 1050 (1891) (promissory note).
Contra: McCarty v. Hall, 19 Mo. 480 (185o); Hayward v. Williams,
57 S.C. 235, 35 S.E. 503 (1899).
89 Riddle v. Slack, 96 N.J.L. 412, II 5 A. 741 (1921); Thacker v. Lindahl,
48 S.W. (2d) 588 (Tex. 1932).
88
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On the other hand, there are strong reasons for
sustaining the majority rule. The compelling reason is
the pressure of the business world for the attributes of
negotiability of commercial paper. Such pressure has
created a strong policy in our system toward extending
the qualities of negotiability. One of the vital aspects of
this concept is the reliability of the chain of title.
Persons who obtain a piece of commercial paper from
a bona fide assignor who was in rightful possession
should be confident that they possess title to the
property. Another reason is the difficulty of founding
an ancillary administration on a single chose in action.
If it is relatively small in value, the expense and delay
of an ancillary administration would not be justified
and the asset would be virtually uncollectible unless
the debtor entered the state in which the personal
representative was appointed. The adoption of the
"mercantile" theory for chases in action evidenced by
an instrument enables the personal representative to
assign the chose in action, and the assignee can locate
the debtor and collect the amount due wherever he
may be found. It seems that the policy of protecting
local creditors does not outweigh the desirable features
of the majority rule.
The argument against the majority position to the
effect that the foreign administrator does not have any
title to pass is not persuasive. The forum can always
permit the assignee who has possession of the note to
sue as a matter of comity. The judgment in favor of the
assignee on the note would be res judicata under the
"full faith and credit" clause and would thus bar any
further action against the debtor by a local administrator.
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STATUTORY PERMISSION To SuE

The common-law rules regarding suits by foreign
personal representatives leave much to be desired from
the point of view of efficient administration of estates.
Often there will be several administrations, each
completely independent of the others, attempting to
deal with the assets of one man. The results will be
duplication of effort by the several administrators,
inevitable delay in integrating the results of the separate
administrations, and increased expense in the form of
court costs, attorney's fees, and administrator's fees.
It would be possible that the assets in one jurisdiction
will be too small to justify the expense and difficulty
of an ancillary administration. Since the common-law
rules make it difficult, if not impossible, for the domiciliary personal representative to collect such assets
unless they are voluntarily handed over, they might
not be included in the estate. The unsatisfactory results
of multiple administrations early prompted many states
to adopt legislation to remedy the situation.
There is no question of the power of the state to pass
legislation which will permit a foreign personal representative to sue in the state. It has been pointed out
previously that no external limitations prevent a legal
system from permitting personal representatives appointed in one state from suing in another. 90 Any rules
excluding personal representatives from the courts are
merely matters of municipal law. Since each state may
permit foreign executors and administrators to sue as a
matter of comity, 91 the legislature of the state may
90
91

See supra p. 32.
See supra p. 32.
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extend this comity to all situations in which a foreign
personal representative might want to sue. By so
doing, the statute merely puts the foreign personal
representative on the same footing as the domestic
personal representative.
The states began passing such statutes in the early
part of the nineteenth century, and enactments have
continued down to the most recent New York statute
on this subject passed in 1951. About half the states
have adopted these statutes. 92 They vary considerably
in their provisions and effects, but the main purpose
of each one is to permit foreign personal representatives
to sue in the state. A good example of such a statute is
that of Ohio:
"An executor or administrator appointed in any other
state or country may commence and prosecute an action or
proceeding in any court in this state, in his capacity as
executor or administrator, in like manner and under like restrictions as a nonresident is permitted to sue." 93

This statute is as broad in its provisions and contains as
few restrictions as any of those which have been adopted.
In those states which have not enacted such legislation, the common-law rules discussed in the preceding
portions of this chapter are still in force. As a matter of
92 62 Ala. I 5I-I 52 (I940); Ark. Stat. Ann., sec. 27-805 (I947); Colo.
Rev. Stat., sees. I sz-6-7, I 52-6-8 (1953); D.C. Code, sec. 20--505 (1951);
12 Del. Code 1561; Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 734·30i II3 Ga. Code Ann. 240;
Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 419; Burns Ind. Stat., sec. 7-753 (1953);
Kan. Gen. Stat., sec. 5~I7o8; Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 395.I7o; Minn. Stat.
Ann., sec. 573.05; Miss. Code Ann., sec. 6zz; Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat.,
sec. 507.020; Neb. Rev. Stat., sec. 3o--8o7; N.J. Stat. Ann. 3A:12-7;
N.M. Stat. Ann., sec. 31-2-9 (1953); McKinley's Laws of N.Y., Decedent
Estate Law, sec. 16o; Page's Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 2II3·75i 58 Okla. Stat.
Ann. 262; Gen. Laws of R.I., Ch. 575, sec. 26-27 (1938); S.D. Code of 1939,
sec. 35.IIo3; Wise. Stat., sec. 287.16 (1945).
93
Page's Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 2II3·75·
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fact, at least two states have by statute expressly
adopted the general common-law rule as stated by
Story. 94
The right to sue given to foreign personal representatives by these statutes may be conditioned on
fulfilling certain requirements. About half of the
statutes expressly require that the authority of the
foreign personal representative, an authenticated or
certified copy of the letters testamentary or letters of
administration, be filed in the probate court of the
county in which the action is filed. 96 Under some
statutes, the letters must be filed prior to the commencement of the action. 96 In other states, they may be
filed at any time before the hearing ;97 while in still other
jurisdictions, filing the letters at any time before judgment is sufficient. 98 Even in those states where the
statute is silent about filing letters, the foreign personal
representative would have to present an authenticated
copy during trial as proof of his right to the claim.
A half dozen of the statutes also require that the
foreign personal representative post bond before he
will be allowed to sue. If the statute requires that a
94

Deering's Cal. Code, Civil Procedure, sec. 1913; Ore. Rev. Stat.,
sec. 43.180.
9 • A typical provision is found in Minn. Stat. Ann., sec. 573.05. " ...
Before commencing such action, he shall file an authenticated copy of
his appointment as executor or administrator with the probate court of
the county in which such action is to be commenced."
96

97

Ibid.

Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co., 27 F. Supp. 219 (D. N.J. 1939).
E.g., 62 Ala. 151 (1940). "Any executor or administrator ... may
maintain suits and recover or receive property in this state:
"By recording at any time before judgment, or the receipt of property,
a copy of his letters, duly authenticated according to the laws of the United
States, in the office of the judge of probate of the country in which such
suit is brought or property received .... "
Campbell v. Hughes, 155 Ala. 591,47 So. 45 (1908).
98
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bond be posted, this must be done as a condition
precedent to suit. 99 The amount of the bond may be
only enough to cover costs100 or it may be an amount
equal to the value of the assets recovered by the foreign
administrator.l 01 The statute may make the posting of
the bond mandatory, 102 or it may rest in the discretion
of the court.l 03 The bond, if it is in the amount of the
assets which the foreign administrator recovers, will be
available to local creditors who are prejudiced by the
removal of assets from the jurisdiction. Presumably, as
long as these creditors are permitted to participate
equally with all other creditors in the payment of
claims in the jurisdiction where the personal representative was appointed, they are not sufficiently
harmed so that they could recover on the bond.
One problem raised by such statutes is which foreign
personal representative will be permitted to sue. Under
a statute like the Ohio statute quoted supra, apparently
any foreign personal representative can sue. However,
about half of the statutes limit the right to sue to
personal representatives appointed in some state or
territory of the United States. 104 Where such a statute is
in effect, a personal representative who was appointed
in a foreign country would be subject to the commonBallard v. United Distillers, 28 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. Ky. I939).
Burns Ind. Stat., sec. 7-753 (I953); Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3,
sec. 4I9.
101
62 Ala. I 5I (I94o).
102
Ark. Stat. Ann., sec. 27-805 (I947); Gen. Laws of R.I., Ch. 575,
sec. 26-27 (I938).
103
Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 4I9.
104
62 Ala. I5I (I94o); Ark. Stat. Ann., sec. 27-805 (I947); Colo. Rev.
Stat., sec. I52-6-7, I52-6-8; D.C. Code, sec. 2o-5o5 (I95I); I2 Del. Code
I 56 I; Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 734·30i II3 Ga. Code Ann. 240j Smith Hurd
Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 4I9; Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat., sec. 507.020; McKinley's Laws of New York, Decedent Estate Law, sec. I6o; 58 Okla.
Stat. Ann. 262; Gen. Laws of R.I., Ch. 575, sec. 26-27 (I938).
99
100

CAPACITY TO SUE

71

law rules concerning suits. Several statutes permit
foreign personal representatives to sue only when the
decedent was a nonresident of the state.l 05 Some of the
states either by statute 106 or by construing decisionsl 07
limit the personal representatives who may sue to
domiciliary representatives.
The function of such statutes must obviously be to
eliminate as far as possible unnecessary multiplicity of
administrations and to secure a unified administration.
Therefore, a statute which permits suits by foreign
personal representatives may well designate one personal representative who will be entitled to collect
assets of the estate which are in the jurisdiction. If
there is more than one personal representative, a
provision which permits only the domiciliary or principal personal representative to sue would seem to
accomplish the purpose of unifying the administration.
On the other hand, there is less reason for limiting
personal representatives who may sue to those appointed in the United States or its territories. The only
conceivable reason for making such a distinction is to
prevent local creditors from having to go to distant
lands with diverse legal systems in order to present
their claims. That such a policy argument is not too
persuasive is shown by the fact that a number of
statutes permit suit by an executor or administrator
from a foreign country.l 08 Whether the policy of pro106

Colo. Rev. Stat., sec. I 52-6-7, I 52-6-8 (I953); Ky. Rev. Stat., sec.
395.170 (1953); Gen. Laws of R.I., Ch. 575, sec. 26-27 (1938).
106 II3 Ga. Code Ann. 240.
107 Harrison v. Mahorner, I4 Ala. 829 (I848); New York Trust Co. v.
Riley, 24 Del. Ch. 354, I6 A.(2d) 722 (I941), ajf. 315 U.S. 343, 62 S.Ct.
508,86 L.Ed. 855, rehearing den. 315 U.S. 829,62 S.Ct. 903,86 L.Ed. 1223.
108 Miss. Code Ann., sec. 622; N.M. Stat. Ann., sec. 31-2-9 (1953);
Page's Ohio Rev. Code. sec. 2II3·75·
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tecting local creditors by separate administrations
should outweigh the policy of a unified administration
will be considered later. 109
A second problem is raised by these statutes in connection with the existence of locally appointed administrators. Should the foreign personal representative
be allowed to sue if a local administrator has already
been appointed? A few statutes provide expressly that
no such suit will be permitted if a local administrator is
already in existence.l 1 ° Colorado requires a foreign
personal representative who wants to sue to give notice
to the local administrator. If the local administrator
then does not sue, the foreign personal representative
may. 111 The rest of the statutes are silent on this problem.
Another question arises when an ancillary administrator is appointed after a suit has been begun by a
foreign personal representative. A few statutes provide
a solution for this problem. They say either that the
local administrator will automatically be substituted
as plain tiff in the action 112 or else that the local administrator may intervene if creditors will be harmed
by the removal of assets from the state. 113
The purpose of these statutes is to eliminate the
necessity for an ancillary administration in the state.
If there is an ancillary administration, there will be
all the expense, delay, and duplication which the
statute sought to avoid. Therefore, since the purpose of
109

See infra Chapter VI, pp. 17o-179·
Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. J, sec. 419; Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 395.170
(1953); Neb. Rev. Stat., sec. 3o-8o7; S.D. Code of 1939, sec. J5.IIOJ.
111
Colo. Rev. Stat., sec. 152-6-8 (1953).
112 Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 419; La Salle Nat'! Bank v. Penn.
R. Co., 8 F.R.D. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
113
62 Ala. I 52 (1940).
110
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the act cannot be accomplished, there is no reason not
to provide that, in the event of a local administration,
the assets should be collected and administered by the
administrator appointed in the jurisdiction.
There is a question as to the value of the statutes
which have been passed in the United States. They
are designed to achieve a unified administration. However, since only about half the states have enacted
such legislation, any estate of much size and consisting
of widely scattered property interests cannot have a
single administration. There will still have to be
ancillary proceedings in order to collect assets in those
states which retain the common law. Therefore, the
piecemeal legislation in this country has not accomplished its purpose. Nonetheless, the statutes serve a
valuable function of saving expense by providing a
relatively quick, easy, and inexpensive way to collect
assets in a foreign jurisdiction when the assistance of
the courts is needed.
The English have handled this problem of a legislative remedy for the common-law rules in regard to
foreign personal representatives in a somewhat different
manner. In the Colonial Probates Act of 1892, 114 a
mechanism allowing foreign personal representatives to
sue was set up. The act is a reciprocal one and only
applies to those British colonies which give the same
effect to English administrators acting in their jurisdictions.116 Any personal representative from one of the
complying colonies may apply to a probate court in
the United Kingdom to have his letters resealed by
114
116

55 & 56 Viet. c. 6.

The Colonies which have complied with the act may be found listed
in the 1954 Cumulative Supplement to Halsbury's LAws OF ENGLAND,
paragraph 371.
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that court and thereafter the letters "shall be of like
force and effect, and have the same operation in the
United Kingdom, as if granted by that court." 116
The court may require that adequate security be given
to insure the payment of debts due to creditors of
decedent residing in the United Kingdom.
The English statute is in some respects preferable to
the statutes passed in the United States which were
designed to have the same effect. After complying with
the English Act, the foreign representative is in exactly
the same position as a local administrator. This means
that not only may he sue to recover assets in the
English courts, but that debtors of the decedent residing
in England may safely turn over assets to him without
fear of possible consequences.l 17 The interests of local
creditors can be as effectively protected under this
statute as they can by a rigid application of the common-law rule. However, this legislation is subject to
certain criticisms. First, it applies only to personal
representatives from British colonies and not to those
from foreign countries. Thus in the case of a decedent
whose principal administration is in a foreign country
and who also has property in England, no unified
administration is possible for his estate under this act.
Secondly, the act does not make it clear that the
principal or domiciliary administrator is to be the only
personal representative who can take advantage of
this provision. It seems to me that the achievement of a
unified administration requires that the legislation
specify a certain foreign personal representative who
will be entitled to act in the jurisdiction. The English
tt6
117

55 & 56 Viet. c. 6, sec. 2.
For discussion of this problem, see infra Chapter V.
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scheme still seems better adapted to achieving a unified
administration than the statutes which merely give the
foreign personal representative the power to sue.

6.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES

Nearly any analysis of conflict of laws problems in
the United States must take into account not only the
separate legal orders of the various states, but the
dualism that results from imposition of a federal
judiciary on top of the state court systems. Since one
of the main sources of jurisdiction in the federal courts
is the case involving diversity of citizenship where the
amount involved exceeds $J,ooo, 118 many of the actions
which are brought by foreign personal representatives
will be tried in the federal courts. A typical case would
be that in which an administrator appointed in New
York sues a debtor of the decedent residing in Michigan
on a negotiable instrument in his possession. If the
amount of the note is in excess of $3 ,ooo, the action
will probably be filed in one of the Federal District
Courts for Michigan. In such cases, what rules of law
will the federal court apply in regard to actions brought
by foreign personal representatives?
The early federal cases decided on this point refuse to
permit suit on the general statement that in the absence
of statute the common law does not allow a personal
representative to sue outside the state of his appointment.119 It is not clear what statutory or common law
is to govern or what should be the effect of a statute
passed in the state where the federal court was sitting
118
119

139

28 U.S.C.A. 1332.

Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394 (U.S. 1869); Johnson v. Powers,

u.s. 156, I I S.Ct. 525, 35 L.Ed. 161

(1891).
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which permitted such suits. However, in the case of
Hayes v. Pratt, 120 an executor who had qualified in
Pennsylvania brought suit in a federal court in New
Jersey to compel a local administrator to account. The
Supreme Court of the United States permitted the suit
and rested its decision on the New Jersey statute which
gave foreign personal representatives the right to sue.
Apparently this decision meant that the capacity of a
foreign personal representative to sue would be determined by the law of the state in which the federal
court sits.
Any uncertainty which may have existed as regards
the law applicable in the federal courts on this question
has been cleared up by Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 121
"(b) Capacity to Sue or be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity,
to sue or be sued, shall be determined by the law of his
domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall
be determined by the law under which it was organized. In
all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined
by the law of the state in which the district court is held .... "

This rule means that the capacity of the foreign personal representative to sue will be determined by
reference to the law of the state where the federal
court is located.t22 If that law retains the common-law
rule, he will be permitted to sue in a federal court only
when he comes within one of the recognized exceptions.
If, on the other hand, that law has a statute which
147 u.s. 557, 13 S.Ct. 503, 37 L.Ed. '279 (1893).
28 U.S.C.A., Rule 17 (b).
Cooper v. American Airlines, 149 F.(2d) 355, 16'2 A.L.R. 318 (2nd
Cir. 1952); Buder v. Becker, 185 F.(2d) 3II (8th Cir. 1950); Turner v.
Alton Banking & Trust Co., 166 F.(2d) 305 (8th Cir. 1948); Reynolds v.
Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 7 F.R.D. 165 (E.D. Ky. 1945).
120
121
122
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permits foreign personal representatives to sue, he may
do so in the federal as well as in the state courts by
complying with the conditions of the statute.

7·

SuMMARY

The law in regard to capacity of foreign personal
representatives to sue is in an unsatisfactory state.
This arises both from uncertainty in many instances as
to possible results and from lack of uniformity which
makes the rules very complex. Not quite half of the
states have adopted legislative remedies for the situation and now permit foreign personal representatives
to sue. This simplifies the situation a good deal. If
a decedent leaves assets in such a jurisdiction, his
personal representative should have no difficulty in
collecting the assets there, and to that extent an ancillary administration can be avoided. In the remaining
states, the common-law rules are still in force. This is
where the uncertainty arises because so many exceptions
have been engrafted upon the rule. The foreign personal
representative will be permitted to sue in those cases
(I) where the defendant fails to object to his lack of
capacity, (2) where he sues on a cause of action as an
individual, such as on a judgment, a negotiable instrument, a contract made by him, or to recover property
which he has reduced to possession, and (3) in the
limited cases where he can show that failure to permit
him to sue will cause gross injustice. Certainly these
exceptions completely discredit the explanation for the
common-law rule that a personal representative is an
artificial creature who can have no existence outside
the legal system under which he was appointed. The
other explanation which has been given to support the
common-law rule is the policy of protecting local
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creditors. However, in view of the exceptions which
have been made and the legislation which had been
adopted, it is doubtful whether in even a majority of
the instances, creditors in the United States are protected against removal of decedent's assets from the
jurisdiction. If a rule is based on a policy which is
effectuated less than half the time, the question is
raised whether the policy is strong enough to support the
rule.

CHAPTER

III

Liability of a Foreign Personal
Representative to be Sued
I. GENERAL RuLE AT CoMMON LAw

T IS unquestionably the general common-law rule
that a personal representative cannot be sued outside the state of his appointment.l This is recognized in the United States, 2 England, 3 and the majority
of the Commonwealth countries. 4
The cases in the United States abound with statements that "a foreign executor or administrator can
neither sue nor be sued outside the state of his appointment." This connection between the capacity of a
foreign personal representative to sue and his liability
to be sued indicates the feeling of many courts that the

I

1 Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, I552 (I9r6). See
cases cited in note 3·
2 Vaughan v. Northrup, I5 Pet. I, Io L.Ed. 639 (U.S. I84I); Burrowes
v. Goodman, 50 F.(2d) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2d Cir. I93I), cert den. 284
U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. 30, 76 L.Ed. 55 I; Feldman v. Gross, Io6 F. Supp. 308
(N.D. Ohio I952); Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., I94 La. 287, I93
So. 648 (I94o); McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, I48 N.E. 556, 40
A.L.R. 792 (I925); Driscoll v. Loeb, 59 N.Y.S.(2d) 82 (I945).
3 Jauncy v. Sealey, I Vern. 397, 23 Eng. Rep. 54I (I686); Currie v.
Bircham, I D. & R. 35 (I822); Beavan v. Lord Hastings, 2 K. & J. 724,
69 Eng. Rep. 973 (I856); Cheshire, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 5I7.
4 Dorsay v. Connell, 22 New Brunswick Rep. 564 (I883); In re Voet,
[I949] New Zealand L. R. 742.
Contra: Armstrong v. Newey, I7 Viet. L. R. 734 (I89I). "In my opinion,
where a foreign administrator is within the jurisdiction of this Court, he
is liable to be sued by one the next-of-kin for an account and administration, and the rule is not confined to the case where part of the estate is
also in the colony .... "

79

So

FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES

rules are corollaries based on the same reasoning. 5 This
reasoning represents the traditional explanation that a
personal representative is the creature of the legal
order of a state and thus cannot have the power to act
outside its boundaries. That this was not a satisfactory
explanation of the capacity of a foreign administrator
to sue was seen in the preceding chapter. 6 Is it any more
satisfactory in regard to the rule respecting liability to
suit?
In order to appreciate the difference between suits by
foreign administrators and suits against them, it must
be remembered that in regard to suits by a foreign
administrator, he is the party seeking relief. The party
whom the court must compel to furnish the relief is an
ordinary defendant within the jurisdiction of the court.
The court thus has the power to give a valid judgment,
and the only question to be decided is whether the
foreign administrator is the proper party to seek the
relief. Generally, the courts have decided that he is
not in order to effectuate the policy of protecting local
creditors. This is a very different problem from the
one with which this chapter is concerned, i.e., where the
relief must come from the foreign administrator.
The problem of analysis in regard to suits brought
against foreign administrators and executors is a
difficult and complex one. One of the factors which is
largely responsible for this is the fact that the individual
who is the personal representative may be treated as
5 Typical of such thinking is the statement in Melius v. Thompson,
Fed. Cas. No. 9,405 (C.C. Mass. 1858): "He cannot sue for the personal
estate of the testator out of the jurisdiction of the power by which the
letters of administration were granted, and upon the same principle and
tor the same reason he cannot be sued or compelled to defend a suit in
any jurisdiction to which his authority as executor does Lot extend."
6 See supra Chapter II, pp. 31-32.
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two legal persons. First, he is the ordinary legal personality which always attaches to a human being. In
this personality, if he is present in any jurisdiction, he
may be personally served, and the court will then
have jurisdiction to render a valid personal judgment
against him. 7 Secondly, when he qualifies as personal
representative of a decedent's estate, he may be said
to be the legal person whom we designate as the personal representative. Thus, we have the apparent
phenomenon of two legal persons attached to one
biological person. The problem here considered arises
when the biological person enters a foreign state and is
personally served in an action based on his representative character. May the court in that jurisdiction render
a valid judgment against him as a personal representative? The courts have uniformly held that they may
not and have explained the result by the foregoing
legal schizophrenia. 8 They say that the representative
personality cannot exist outside the jurisdiction in
which he was appointed. 9 Since the person as representative was not within the jurisdiction, the court did
not obtain jurisdiction by personal service.
Actually, the division of legal personality made in
these cases is neither necessary nor valuable in analyzing
7

Beale, op. cit., supra note I at 339·
Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 287, 193 So. 648 (1940).
"While Alcus, one of the executors of the estate of Charles B. Box [who
qualified in Mississippi], is present in the State of Louisiana, he is present
here as an individual, but is not present in his official capacity as executor.
It is well settled that an executor as an individual and as an official is,
in the eyes of the law, two separate and distinct persons ... ";McMaster
v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556, 40 A.L.R. 792 (1925).
9 McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556,40 A.L.R. 792 (1925).
"The foreign administrator as the official of another sovereignty exists
only by virtue of the statute of another state and has no legal existence in
this State."
8
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the problems in this area. The individual has certain
legal qualities as an ordinary human being. With these
we are familiar. When he is appointed as personal
representative, certain other legal properties are added.
Our concern is to determine what these latter legal
qualities are by an examination of how the courts
actually treat the foreign personal representative in
various fact situations. When we have obtained a
general picture of these legal properties peculiar to the
personal representative, there is no need to personify
them. These qualities will be determined by the decision
of two courts, the first being the foreign forum which
does or does not entertain jurisdiction over the personal
representative, and the second being the home forum
or court of appointment which may be asked to give
effect to action in the foreign forum.
Theoretically, a legal order can authorize its courts to
try actions and render judgments against any person it
chooses without complying with any of the notions of
jurisdiction with which we are familiar. Such a judgment would be a valid one in the forum in which it was
rendered. 10 Thus, a state could provide that foreign
personal representatives are subject to the jurisdiction
of its courts and that valid judgments can be rendered
against them. The exceptional cases permitting such
suits indicate that such a power exists. However, the
states have not generally authorized the courts to
exercise this power, and our question is why they have
not done so.
In order to understand the problems involved, it must
10 In the United States, the "due process" clauses of the United States
Constitution would require certain minimum standards of jurisdictional
procedures such as notice reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant
of the action and an opportunity to appear and be heard.
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be understood that the administration of an estate is
essentially an in rem proceeding. 11 Its purpose is to
collect the property of the decedent, pay his debts, and
then distribute the remaining property among his
successors. The property of the decedent is the subject
matter of the administration, and the personal representative is merely the conservator of that property.
Since the personal representative in Anglo-American
law, unlike the Roman heres 12 and the universal successor in the civillaw, 13 is not personally liable for the
debts of the decedent, any liability must be satisfied
out of decedent's property.1 4 Thus even actions brought
against the foreign personal representative on personal
obligations owed to the plaintiff by the decedent partake
of the nature of an in rem proceeding because they
11 Carey, "A Suggested Fundamental Basis of Jurisdiction with Special
Emphasis on Judicial Proceedings Affecting Decedent's Estates," 24 ILL.
L. REv. 44 at 49 (1929); Lilienkamp v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. (2d) 293,
93 P.(2d) 1008 (1939); Torrey v. Bruner, 6o Fla. 365, 53 So. 337 (1910).
The statements that a probate proceeding is a proceeding in rem are
usually made in connection with certain constitutional problems such as
the requirement of notice in a probate proceeding and the question of the
extent to which parties are bound by determinations in such a proceeding.
For this purpose, the probate proceeding may be both in rem and in personam. It is in rem to the extent that all interested parties will be foreclosed from relitigating certain issues such as the validity of the will and
its admission to probate when notice is given by publication. It is in
personam to the extent that all parties who are within the personal
jurisdiction of the probate court will be bound by the decision made by
that court on any issues raised in the proceeding. Torrey v. Bruner, supra.
The discussion in the text concerning the in rem nature of an administration is not concerned with these problems, but is merely used to point
up certain problems of enforcement of judgments against a personal
representative when he is sued in his representative character and when
the object of the suit is to reach property of the estate.
12 See supra Chapter I, p. 4·
1s See supra Chapter I, p. 6.
14 Segar v. Atkinson, I H. Bl. IOJ, 126 Eng. Rep. 62 (1789); Bridgman
v. Lightfoot, Cro. Jac. 671, 79 Eng. Rep. 581 (1623); Vaughn's Ex'r v.
Gardner, 7 B. Mon. 326 (Ky. 1847); Gillet v. Hutchinson's Adm'rs, 24
Wend. 184 (N.Y. 1840).
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must be satisfied, if at all, out of some property of the
decedent.
The problems in this chapter can best be made clear
by asking what makes a judgment a valuable thing.
From a practical point of view, the creditor of a decedent who sues a personal representative in a foreign
jurisdiction is not in teres ted in securing a judgment in
and of itself, but he is vitally concerned in getting his
debt paid. In other words, he wants to know whether
the judgment can be satisfied. Therefore, our first
question in attempting to understand the rules developed in this area is whether the forum can enforce a
judgment which it renders against a foreign personal
representative.
There is no problem as to the effect of a judgment in
rem as against a foreign personal representative. The
court has the property of decedent in its jurisdiction,
and any judgment it renders as to that property will
bind interested parties, including the foreign personal
representative.
The real problem arises in cases of what would have
been an action for a personal judgment for money if
brought against the decedent in his lifetime. This is
the common action brought against an administrator
by creditors of the decedent or persons who have tort
claims against the decedent. One of the reasons for not
granting a judgment in such a case against a foreign
personal representative is the difficulty of enforcement.16 If the decedent has property in the jurisdiction,
that property might be executed on to satisfy the
judgment. However, the decedent usually has little or
no property in the jurisdiction where a suit is brought
16

Giampalo v. Taylor, 335 Pa. 121, 6 A.(2d) 499 (1939).
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against a foreign personal representative. Instead, most
of the assets of the estate will be in the state where he
was appointed and where he will have collected them.
Thus, though the forum may render a judgment against
a foreign administrator on a personal obligation of the
decedent, that judgment would be worthless unless
given effect in the state of principal administration.
Such effect will not be given. 16 The second forum is not
required to give effect to such a judgment under the
"full faith and credit" clause, because it is said that the
first court was without jurisdiction over the foreign
personal representative. 17 Since there is this practical
difficulty of enforcing the judgment, the courts, being
reluctant to grant worthless judgments, have refused
to entertain actions against foreign executors and administrators.18
This points up the fact that the analysis of cases in
this area has a dual aspect. The first is the question of
the positive law of the forum. Will it permit a suit
against a foreign personal representative? The second
aspect is that if the forum renders a judgment for
money against a foreign personal representative, will
that judgment be given effect in other states? If no
16 In re Thompson's Estate,

339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.(2d) 93 (1936).
See cases cited supra note 2.
18 In the interesting New Zealand case, In re Voet, [1949] New Zealand
L.R. 742, the court based its refusal to permit an action against a foreign
personal representative on the following statement, which it said was based
on Cheshire: "In any event, it does not seem to me that a judgment of
this Court, in such circumstances would have the essential quality of
effectiveness, and effectiveness is a paramount element of jurisdiction .... "
The statement does not seem entirely correct, because the forum may
authorize its courts to render a judgment even though it will not be
effective outside its territory. The lack of effectiveness will not defeat the
jurisdiction, but it is a strong reason why the legal system will not authorize its courts to take jurisdiction.
17
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such effect is given, then the judgment is, as a practical
matter, generally worthless.
There is a second reason for refusing to allow suits
against foreign personal representatives. This is a policy
consideration. A personal representative is an official of
the probate court which appointed him. His function is
to collect and conserve the assets of the decedent. He
works under the close supervision of that probate court,
and he must account to it for all assets collected. If the
forum renders a judgment against a foreign administrator, it will affect assets for which he must account
to the court which appointed him. The courts refrain
from granting such judgments because they would be
an interference with the activities of another tribunal.
Such a judgment might start a dangerous precedent
whereby several courts would be assuming jurisdiction
over a personal representative and telling him how to
dispose of the assets in his possession. The represen tative would be placed in an impossible position of trying
to decide which court to obey. This would cause havoc
in efficient estate administration. Rather than face the
likelihood of such consequences, the courts refuse to
entertain actions against foreign personal representatives and thus leave the plaintiff to his remedy in the
court which appointed the personal representative.
The reasoning behind this policy is clearly brought out
in the leading case on the subject, Vaughan v. Northrup.19 In that case, a debt due to the decedent from the
United States was paid in the District of Columbia to
his administrator appointed in. Kentucky. Heirs of the
decedent secured personal service on the administrator
in the District of Columbia and sued him for their
distributive shares of the estate. This suit was not
19

15 Pet.

I,

10 L.Ed. 639 (U.S. 1841).
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permitted, and Mr. Justice Story speaking for the
court said:
" ... the administrator is exclusively bound to account for
all the assets which he receives under and in virtue of his
administration to the proper tribunals of the government
from which he derives his authority; and the tribunals of
other states have no right to interfere with or to control the
application of those assets .... " 20

An administrator or executor can always be sued in
the state which appoints him. 21 Therefore, if a personal
representative appointed in one state qualifies in
another state as ancillary administrator, he will always
be liable to suit in the second state. 22 The extent of his
liability as ancillary administrator in the second state
will be limited to the assets being administered in the
ancillary administration. The common-law rules apply
only when the personal representative appointed in
one state is sued in another in which he has not qualified
as ancillary administrator.
While the general common-law proposition has been
laid down quite broadly and applied rather rigidly, there
are exceptional cases which hold that a foreign administrator or executor can be sued. While these exceptions are not so important as the ones which have
been made to the rule regarding capacity to sue, they
are still of sufficient importance to merit detailed consideration.

(a) 'Jurisdiction in rem
One of the recognized bases of jurisdiction is property
within the jurisdiction of the court. The court which has
5 Pet. at 5.
Beale, op. cit., supra note I at I 529.
Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F.(2d) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2nd Cir. 1931),
cert. den. 284 U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. 30, 76 L.Ed. 551.
20 I
21
22
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control over the property may determine the interests of
claimants in this property. If the decedent owned
property in the jurisdiction and his personal representative was appointed in another jurisdiction, may
the court determine the interests of the estate as represented by the foreign personal representative in that
property?
Clearly there is no problem if the property of the
decedent had its situs in the jurisdiction at the time of
his death. The court has jurisdiction to determine title
to that property. 23 Thus, in a true proceeding in rem
such as a libel in admiralty or a confiscation of contraband, the interest of the estate could be foreclosed
even though its only representative were a foreign
appointed executor or administrator. Likewise, a
mortgage given on land owned by the decedent could
be foreclosed by the courts where the land lies and the
interests of the estate as represented by the foreign
executor or administrator cut off. 24 Also, it has been
held that the forum will assume jurisdiction in an
action brought against a foreign personal representative
to rescind a sale of stock in a domestic corporation. 25
The result in this situation is based on the theory that
the stock had its situs as property in the state of
incorporation, and the court may base its jurisdiction
on its control over this property. Such cases do not
represent situations where jurisdiction is being sought
directly or personally over the foreign personal repre23
Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Lilienfield, 132 F.(2d) 887), 145 A.L.R.
612 (4th Cir. 1943); Feldman v. Gross, 106 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Ohio 1952);
Piper v. Hayward, 127 N.Y.S. 240 (19II).
24 Bowery Sav. Bank v. Meadowdale Co., 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 22 (1942);
Callanan v. Keenan, 142 N.Y.S. 561 (1913).
25 Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Lilienfield, 132 F.(2d) 887, 145 A.L.R.
612 (4th Cir. 1943); Holmes v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 359, II4 N.E. 841 (1916).
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sentative. The only basis needed for jurisdiction is
control over the property, and any control exercised
over the interests of the foreign personal representative
is only incidental. The only requirement related to
foreign personal representatives would be that the
requirements of procedural due process are complied
with. 26
One interesting problem concerning the jurisdiction
of the court to entertain an action in rem in regard to
movable property arises where the property is brought
into the state by a foreign personal representative after
the date of the decedent's death. Most cases permit the
court to take jurisdiction based on this property. 27 This
result seems incorrect. The court unquestionably has
the power to make the adjudication, but it should
refrain from doing so. The foreign personal representative got title to the property when he took possession
of it in the state of his appointment, and he will be
required to account for it in the probate court of that
26 The foreign administrator should have an opportunity to appear
and be heard so that the estate can be represented at the trial. Also,
there should be a means of notice reasonably designed to inform him of
the action. The ordinary service by publication should be sufficient. It
has uniformly been held that such notice is adequate in the normal proceeding in rem, and it has been held a number of times that such notice
is sufficient in a probate proceeding. See supra note I I. Some doubt as
to the adequacy of this notice is raised by the case of Mullane v. Central
Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1949). This involved an
accounting of a common trust fund composed of a number of small trusts.
The Supreme Court held that notice by publication was not sufficient as
to the beneficiaries of the trust to constitute due processs. Such notice
was adequate to beneficiaries with unknown addresses, but those whose
place of residence was known would have to be notified by mail. This
requirement might possibly be extended to actions involving a decedent's
property when there is an attempt to cut off the interests of heirs and
beneficiaries under a will.
27
In re Paine's Estate, 128 Fla. 151, I74 So. 430 (I937); Baker v.
Smith, 3 Metcalf 264 (Ky. I86o); Fugate v. Moore, 86 Va. I045 (I89o).
Contra: Brownlee v. Lockwood, 20 N.J.Eq. 239 (I869).
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state. If the forum does adjudicate as to this property,
it will interfere with the activities of the tribunal to
which the foreign personal representative must account.
The policy of not interfering with the probate court
that appointed the foreign personal representative,
which is responsible in part for the rule prohibiting
suits brought against foreign executors and administrators, should apply here. Once a personal representative has reduced property of the decedent to his possession and has become obligated to account for it,
that property should have the same immunity from
suit outside the state as is enjoyed by the foreign executor or administrator.
Another interesting problem is raised in connection
with actions quasi-in-rem. May a person who has a
personal cause of action against a decedent attach
property of the decedent in a state where there has been
no administration and recover a valid judgment to be
satisfied out of that property? It would seem that the
state has that power under the doctrine developed in
Pennoyer v. Ne.ff. 28 There is some American authority
which seems to permit such a suit. 29 However, in the
case of Courtney v. Pradt, 30 which was a garnishment
action to satisfy a judgment for money against the
decedent where the defendant in the garnishment
action was a foreign executor, the court refused to
permit the action. It said that since defendant, who
was a foreign executor, could not be sued in the jurisdiction, debtors of the estate could not be garnished. This
28

95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565

(I 877).
Gribbel v. Henderson, 151 Fla. 712, 10 So.(2d) 734 (1942), a.ff.
153 Fla. 397, 14 So.(2d) 8o9; Allen v. Wilhoit, 122 Kan. 387, 252 P. 226
(1927).
ao 160 F. 561 (6th Cir. 1908).
29
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seems to me to be the correct result in all attachment
and garnishment proceedings brought against a foreign
personal representative. The purpose of such claims is
in reality to collect personal obligations. They are not,
despite the language of the courts to that effect, 31 to
determine interests in property. The property is
actually to satisfy a personal judgment whether it is
attached at the commencement of the action or executed on after judgment. If the estate as represented
by the foreign administrator is not subject to suit in
the jurisdiction even if he is personally present, it
seems to me improper to subject any property or debts
of the estate to the payment of such obligations without
an ancillary administration in the state and the appointment of a local administrator to administer the
assets.
There is another argument against the quasi-in-rem
procedure against a foreign personal representative.
Most states will not permit an attachment or levy of
execution to be made against a decedent's property
when the estate is a domestic one, 32 but instead will
require that the claimant present his claim to the
probate court and receive equal payment with other
creditors. It is very probable that the forum will construe its attachment statute as not permitting the
attachment of a decedent's property, even when the
only administration on the estate is in a foreign jurisdiction. The purpose of the accepted probate practice
in each state of requiring local administrators to collect
all the assets of decedent and then pay all the claims
against the estate is to carry out the policy of paying
all decedent's creditors equally. To permit an action
31
32

E.g., see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877).
See cases cited Chapter I, note 74·
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quasi-in-rem by attachment or garnishment gives the
creditor or tort claimant a preference over other
creditors. It would seem preferable to require that the
plaintiff file his claim in the court which appointed the
personal representative and thus share equally with
decedent's other creditors, or if the state insists on
retaining decedent's property in the state to protect
local creditors, the claimant should be required to have
an ancillary administration taken out and present his
claim to the ancillary administrator along with any
other local creditors.
One argument may be raised in favor of the quasi-inrem procedure, and, for that matter, it might justify
any action against a foreign personal representative. A
plaintiff who has a tort claim which must be tried or a
contract claim which has to be proved may find it
inconvenient to establish his claim in the state of
administration. It may be impossible for him to transport his witnesses or other evidence to the place of
domiciliary administration, but he can establish his
claim conveniently in the forum if he can get jurisdiction by attaching property or garnisheeing a resident
debtor of decedent. This sort of forum non conveniens
contention is not too convincing, since some inconvenience in establishing claims against an estate must
accrue to all parties who have dealt with a person who
dies. Henceforward, the problem is to find property
of the decedent to satisfy claims and on which to base
jurisdiction. If there is no property in the convenient
state, jurisdiction cannot be obtained by attachment
or garnishment. If there is property there, an ancillary
administration can be obtained by the claimant, and he
can then present his claim to the ancillary administrator.
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From the foregoing discussion, it should be apparent
that the state has the power to subject any of the
decedent's property within its territory to the payment
of any claims against the decedent. However, this power
should not be exercised. The only jurisdiction in rem
which the forum should assume in the absence of an
administration in the state would be when it is necessary
to determine the title to some res in the jurisdiction.
This will always have to occur in the case of real
property in the state, because no other forum can
determine that question. It will also occasionally be
necessary in regard to personal property in replevin
actions. In such cases the foreign personal representative
is only a party to the extent that the estate has some
claim in the property which may be foreclosed.

(b) Fraudulent removal of assets from the state
of administration
In certain situations, foreign personal representatives
have been held subject to the jurisdiction of the forum
in proceedings which partake both of the nature of the
proceeding in rem and the action in personam. When a
personal representative is appointed in a foreign jurisdiction, he may collect the assets there, and if they are
movables, such as cash, securities, or jewelry, he may
take them into another state. This possibility seems to
occur more often when the personal representative is
not a resident of the state which appointed him, which
is probably one of the major reasons why so many
states have passed statutes which require the personal
representative to be a resident. 33 As long as the foreign
personal representative remains in another state, the
probate court which appointed him as personal repre33

See supra Chapter II, p. 34·
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sentative will not have any effective control over him
as regards the assets of the estate. Under the doctrine
of Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry/ 4 the court which appointed him may retain personal jurisdiction over the
personal representative and thus could render a personal judgment against him which would have to be
given effect in the state where the personal representative now resides. However, the court of appointment would have difficulty in determining the personal
liability of a nonresident executor or administrator
without having an accounting and a finding as to the
extent to which the assets have been dissipated. In
many situations, the heirs, beneficiaries, or creditors
will require quicker relief in order that the assets are
not wasted, and the only court which can furnish that
relief would be those of the state into which the personal representative had removed the assets. In such
cases, a court of equity may require the foreign personal
representative to account. 36 It certainly has the power
to do this. There are the assets within the jurisdiction
on which the court can impress a trust. More particularly, the court will have personal jurisdiction over
the individual who is personal representative. It will
treat him as a trustee who has mismanaged trust funds,
and he will be required to account as a trustee. This
individual can be forced to perform the required acts
by the contempt power of the equity court.
There are limitations on the exercise of this jurisdiction. The foreign personal representative must have
removed the assets of the estate from the state of
228 U.S. 346, 33 S.Ct. 550, 57 L.Ed. 867 (1913).
Falke v. Terry, 32 Colo. 85, 75 P. 425 (1903); In re Paine's Estate,
128 Fla. 151, 174 So. 430 (1937); In re Appleton's Estate, 81 D. & C.
85 (Pa. 1951); Tunstall v. Pollard's Adm'r, 2 Leigh I (Va. 1840).
34

35
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administration into the forum. If the assets are still in
the control of the original probate court, it can remove
the recalcitrant personal representative and appoint a
new administrator. This is an adequate remedy, and the
equitable remedy which is extraordinary will be refused.36 Also, there must be evidence of some fraudulent
conduct on the part of the personal representative.
Even though he has removed the assets from the state
of administration, there is no danger to heirs and
creditors as long as he is willing to obey the instructions of the court which appointed him. Conversion of
the assets to his own use or waste of the assets would
certainly be sufficient grounds to secure this equitable
remedy. In such events the court of equity in the forum
will treat the personal representative as the holder of
trust funds who has violated the trust and will require
him to account for those funds.
(c) 7urisdiction by consent

There is no question that an ordinary individual by
making a general appearance in an action brought
against him confers jurisdiction on the court by consent.
May a foreign personal representative by a general appearance confer jurisdiction on the forum to render a
judgment against him? The majority of cases say that
he cannot, 37 although there is respectable authority
which will permit the foreign executor or administrator
Falke v. Terry, 32 Colo. 85, 75 P. 425 (1903).
Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F.(zd) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2nd Cir. 1931),
cert. den. 284 U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. 30, 76 L.Ed. 551; Jefferson v. Beall, II7
Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (1897); Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324, 19 S.W. 966
(1892);Sloan v. Sloan, 21 Fla. 589 (1885);Judyv. Kelley, I I Ill.2II (1849);
In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.(2d) 93 (1936); Shrader v.
Petty, 91 N.Y.S.(zd) 864 (1949)
36

37
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to appear and thereby waive his objection to the jurisdiction.38
The reasoning which supports the rule as regards
jurisdiction based on appearance by an individual is
this. The defendant had the opportunity to stay outside
the state or to object to the jurisdiction of the court by a
special appearance at the beginning of the action. If he
elects to try the action on its merits, has a fair trial, and
judgment goes against him, he should be estopped from
denying the jurisdiction of the court. To hold otherwise
would allow him to speculate on the outcome of the
trial, and this would be unfair to the plaintiff. Does this
reasoning apply with equal force to an appearance made
by a foreign personal representative?
It must be remembered that the foreign personal
representative as a representative personality is far
different from an individual as such. He represents the
estate which is under the control of the foreign tribunal
which appointed him. The consent of the representative
when he appears in court is not to bind himself individually, but is an attempt to bind the estate so that
the judgment may be satisfied out of property in the
control of the appointing court. Thus, the important
consent to obtain is that of the court which controls the
assets of the estate. This must be obtained when the
judgment entered against a consenting foreign administrator is presented in the state of administration
as a claim against the estate. It is extremely significant
that every case which has treated appearance by a
foreign administrator or executor as conferring jurisdiction has been in the forum where the action was
38
Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215, 12 S.Ct. 440, 36 L.Ed. 130 (1892);
The Newark Sav. Inst. v. Jones Ex'rs, 35 N.J.Eq. 406 (1882); Giampalo
v. Taylor, 335 Pa. 121, 6 A.(2d) 499 (1939).
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originally brought, 39 whereas in every case where the
judgment rendered against a consenting foreign representative has been presented in the state of administration, that court has refused to give effect to it. 40
The majority rule is the preferable one. This is for the
same reasons for which judgments against foreign
personal representatives generally are not granted, i.e.,
the ineffectiveness of the judgment outside the forum
and the potential interference with the activities of the
tribunal which is administering the estate. The forum
should refuse to entertain such a suit and instead leave
the plaintiff to his remedies in the courts of the state
where the administration is being had.
This type of case frequently arises when a personal
action has been begun against a nonresident defendant,
and the defendant dies before the court can render
judgment in the case. A personal representative is appointed in the state where the decedent was domiciled
when he died, and it is sought to substitute him as
defendant in the action. The personal jurisdiction which
the forum had over the decedent ceases at his death, and
it is necessary to substitute the personal representative
before a valid judgment can be rendered which will be
satisfied out of the decedent's property. Therefore, the
court must secure jurisdiction over the personal representative who was appointed in another jurisdiction.
An effort to do so by service by publication is not adequate,41 nor would personal service in the state confer
jurisdiction. 42 One alternative would be for the personal
See cases cited supra note 38.
Jefferson v. Beall, II7 Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (I897); Judy v. Kelley, II
Ill. 2I I (I 849); In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 4Io, 97 S.W.(zd) 93
(I936).
41
Giampalo v. Taylor, 335 Pa. I2I, 6 A.(2d) 499 (I939).
42 See cases cited supra note 8.
39
40
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representative to appear and defend the action, but it
has generally been held that an appearance in the action
is not sufficient to bind the foreign administrator in a
suit begun against his decedent. 43
Thus far, we have been considering the case where
judgment has been rendered against the defendant
foreign representative when he appears in the forum,
and the effects of such a judgment. Will the result be
the same when the plain tiff sues a foreign personal
representative who makes a general appearance, and
then judgment is rendered for the defendant representative? Will this judgment serve as a bar in the
state of administration on the same cause of action?
In the case of 'Jasper v. Batt, 44 the Supreme Court of
Arizona held that the plaintiff was bound by a judgment in favor of the defendant who was a foreign
executrix. At first blush, this result seems highly
illogical. The defendant would not generally be bound
by the judgment, but the plaintiff is. It must be remembered that the foreign representative is appearing
as the representative of the foreign tribunal administering the estate, while the plaintiff appears as an
individual. Although the defendant cannot bind the
estate, that is no reason why the plaintiff cannot bind
himself. The plaintiff knew that the defendant was a
foreign administrator and thus was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court even if the action were defended. If he insisted on trying the action in the forum,
had a fair trial, and the verdict was against him, he
should be estopped from denying that the court he chose
was without jurisdiction. This is the principle on which
43

II

Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324, 19 S.W. 966 (1892); Judy v. Kelley,

Ill. 211 (1849).
44

76 Ariz. 328, 264 P.(2d) 409 (1953).
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res judicata is founded. A party who has had a fair
adjudication of his rights should not be entitled to have
the matter relitigated if he is dissatisfied with the result.
There is another type of consent problem involved
in actions against a foreign personal representative. If
the personal representative brings an action in a foreign
jurisdiction under one of the common-law exceptions
discussed in the previous chapter 45 or under a statute
which permits such a suit, 46 is he subject to a counterclaim filed by the defendant? It has been held that both
when he sues for a partnership accounting 47 and when he
sues on ajudgment, 48 the foreign personal representative
is subject to counterclaims filed against him. 49 This
is because by filing suit he has consented to all the
procedure of the forum in connection with that proceeding, which may include counterclaims. 50 If the
forum is going to force the defendant to give relief to a
foreign administrator suing on behalf of the estate, the
defendant ought to be entitled to have his rights as
against the estate determined in the same action, if
consistent with the procedure of the forum. There is no
See supra Chapter II, pp. 35-54·
See statutes listed supra Chapter II, note 92.
47 Lacker v. McKechney, 252 F. 403 (7th Cir. 1918).
48 Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 166 F.(2d) 305 (8th Cir.
1948).
4 9 The permitting of recovery on a counterclaim in an action brought
by a foreign personal representative in this situation must be distinguished
from the result when the defendant counterclaimed in the action brought
for wrongful death discussed supra p. 61. In the cases discussed in this
chapter, the action is brought by the foreign administrator in his representative capacity and it is proper to permit any claims by the defendant
against the estate to be the basis of a counterclaim. In the action for
wrongful death, the real party in interest is not the estate represented by
the foreign administrator, but rather the specified beneficiaries, and
they are not responsible for the damages done by decedent so as to be
liable on a counterclaim.
50
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 38 S.Ct. 454, 82 L.Ed. 649 (1938).
4

•
46
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authority which has considered the case where a counterclaim was so large that it could not be offset against the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff administrator and
then that counterclaim was sued on in the state of
administration as a judgment against the personal
representative. It seems that effect should be given to
such a judgment based on a counterclaim. The personal
representative works under the close supervision of the
court which appointed him, and if that court authorizes
him to collect assets by bringing actions in the courts of
other jurisdictions, it ought to be prepared to recognize
any judgment rendered in that proceeding against the
personal representative.
(d) Statutory Consent

There is another type of consent problem which is
quite interesting. This arises under the nonresident
motorist acts. These acts, which have been passed in
all the states of the United States, 51 provide that any
nonresident motorist who uses the highways of a state
will be deemed to have appointed a specified state
official to be his process agent in any action brought
against him arising out of an accident which occurred
while using the highways of the state. 52 Service on the
51

See annotation at 18 A.L.R.(2d) 544·
An example of such a statute appears in the Annotated Laws of
Massachusetts, Ch. go, sec. 3B:
"The operation by any person, by himself or his agent, of any motor
vehicle, whether registered or unregistered, and with or without a license
to operate, on any way, or private way if entrance thereto was made from
a way, or in any place to which the public has a right of access, in this
commonwealth, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such
person of the registrar, or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful
attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or
proceeding against him, or his executor or administrator, growing out of
any accident or collision in which he or his agent may be involved while
operating a motor vehicle on any way, or private way if entrance thereto
52

LIABILITY TO BE SUED

IOI

designated agent plus actual notice by registered mail
to the nonresident defendant is sufficient to give
personal jurisdiction in a tort action arising from an
automobile accident. This type of statute was held
constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States as it relates to individuals. 53
In the United States, with its highly mobile population and high rate of traffic fatalities, there will be many
automobile accidents in which a nonresident driver,
who dies as a result of the accident, is at fault. His
personal representative will be appointed in the state
of his domicile. Some of the nonresident motorist acts
provide that the appointment of a service agent arising
out of the use of the highways of the state binds not
only the nonresident motorist, but his personal representative as wel1. 54 Can a state, on the basis of service
under such a statute, entertain an action against the
foreign personal representative of the deceased motorist? The cases are split rather evenly on this question. 66
The leading case which has held that a foreign
was made from a way, or in any place to which the public has a right of
access, in this commonwealth, and such operation shall be a signification
of an agreement by such person that any such process against him, or his
executor or administrator, which is served upon the registrar or his successor in office shall be of the same force and validity as if served upon
him personally .... "
53 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927).
54 See language in Mass. statute, quoted supra note 52.
55 Those cases which hold that a foreign personal representative is not
subject to jurisdiction under such a statute are: Knoop v. Anderson, 71
F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947); Rigutto v. Italian Terrazzo Mosaic Co.,
93 F. Supp. 124 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Buttson v. Arnold, 4 F.R.D. 492 (E.D.
Pa. 1945); Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.(2d) 522 (1943).
Those cases which hold that a foreign personal representative is subject
to jurisdiction under such a statute are: Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792,
171 S.W.(2d) 287 (1943); Plopa v. Du Pre, 327 Mich. 66o, 42 N.W.(2d)
777 (1950); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.(2d) 876, 18 A.L.R.
(2d) 537 (1950).
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personal representative was subject to jurisdiction
under a nonresident motorist act was a decision by the
New York Court of Appeals in Leighton v. Roper. 66
This case involved an automobile accident occurring in
New York in which plain tiff was seriously injured.
The driver at fault was an Indiana resident. Plaintiff
filed an action for damages and served the Indiana
administrator of the deceased driver in compliance with
the Nonresident Motorist Act of New York, part of
which provided:
"A nonresident operator or owner of a motor vehicle or
motor cycle which is involved in an accident or collision in
this state shall be deemed to have consented that the appointment of the secretary of state as his true and lawful
attorney for the receipt of service of process shall be irrevocable and binding upon his executor or administrator.
Where the nonresident motorist has died prior to the commencement of an action brought pursuant to this section, service of process shall be made on the executor or administrator
of such nonresident motorist in the same manner and on the
same notice as is provided in the case of a nonresident
motorist .... " 57
The personal representative appointed in Indiana appeared specially and moved to vacate the service. The
court held that the service was valid and that the
foreign personal representative was subject to the
jurisdiction of the New York courts. It based its
decision first on the proposition that a foreign administrator can consent to be sued, which is not a
generally accepted principle. 68 Then it argued that the
agency created by the decedent did not die with him,
56
•7
68

300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.(zd) 876, 18 A.L.R.(zd) 537 (1950).
McKinley's Laws of N.Y., Vehicle and Traffic Law, sec. 52.
See supra pp. 95-98.
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because it was for the benefit of third persons and
because the legislature had made the agency irrevocable
under the state police power. Therefore the agency,
even after the death of the principal, continued to bind
the personal representative. Whatever the quality of
this argument may be, it must be conceded that New
York has the power to entertain such a proceeding
against a foreign administrator.
In the opinion, the New York Court of Appeals
recognized the limitations on this jurisdiction when it
said:
"What effects the Indiana courts will be required to give
any judgment rendered in this action under the 'full faith and
credit' clause of the Federal Constitution, we need not now
consider.' '59

However, this question which they "need not now
consider" represents the crux of the matter. If there
were property of the decedent in the state, this type of
proceeding would probably be unnecessary. It is only
when a state seeks to impose on a nonresident personal
liability which must be enforced elsewhere that the
service on an agent based on statutory consent is important. Therefore, the vital question is what effect such
a judgment would have in the state of administration
where it can be enforced. Since all the cases which have
considered the question of the effect to be given to a
foreign judgment based on consent by a personal
representative appointed in the forum have refused to
give any such effect, 60 a fortiori, no effect would be
given to a judgment based on statutory consent. There
is no decision on this question under the "full faith
59
60

300 N.Y. 443·
See supra p. 97·
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and credit" clause, so that the Supreme Court of the
United States might say that the state of administration
is required to give effect to such a judgment. The real
question to be decided there would be whether the
forum obtained jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment against the foreign personal representative
by such service in order to bind the estate. It would
seem that the decision should be that no such jurisdiction was obtained and consequently that thejudgment
is not entitled to full faith and credit. If personal
service on the representative in the jurisdiction or
actual consent by the representative is not sufficient to
give personal jurisdiction, it is difficult to see how this
type of service is adequate to do so.
(e) Effect of revival statues

In connection with a previous section in this chapter
which discussed actions brought against a foreign
personal representative with his consent, the problem
was raised as to cases where a personal action was commenced against the decedent, he died during the trial,
and it was sought to substitute his foreign personal
representative as a defendant. It was seen that the
foreign administrator could not consent to such a substitution.61 The same problem is raised in connection
with revival statutes. A typical one is the following:
"No cause or right of action shall be lost or destroyed by
the death of any person, but it shall survive in favor of or
against the executor or administrator of any such deceased
person. No civil action or proceeding shall abate by reason of
the death of any party thereto, but it may be continued by or
against the executor or administrator of such decedent ... in
case of the death of any party defendant, the plaintiff, within
61

See supra pp. 97-98.
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one year thereafter, may have a writ of scire facias against
such decedent's executor or administrator to show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against him .... " 62
To make the problem clear, a hypothetical case will
be posed. A, a resident of Connecticut, is injured in an
automobile accident occurring in New York by the
negligence of B, a resident of Rhode Island. A secures
personal service on B in Connecticut and commences
a personal action for damages against him. Before the
case can come to trial and judgment, B dies and C is
appointed his administrator in Rhode Island. Under the
law of New York, such a cause of action does not survive
the death of the defendant, but the Connecticut survival
statute provides that in such suits, the cause of action
survives the death of the defendant and may be continued against his personal representative. May the
Connecticut court substitute C, the Rhode Island
administrator, as defendant in this action and render a
valid judgment against him?
There are two issues raised by this fact situation. The
first is a choice of law problem. Which law should
govern the survival of this cause of action, New York
or Connecticut? There is no decision which squarely
decides the question, but the dictum in Orr v. Ahern 63 is
helpful. That case involved a fact situation like the
hypothetical case posed, except that the death of the
wrongdoer occurred before the action was commenced:
also it is not clear where the personal representative was
appointed, so presumably it was in Connecticut. The
actual decision in the case held, first, that the cause of
action was created by the law of the place of the wrong
62

63

Gen. Stat. of Conn., sec. 8337 (1949).
107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 691 (1928).
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to the plaintiff, which is a well-established proposition.64 Then it said that this law, the law of New
York, provided that in the event of the death of the
wrongdoer, the cause of action ceased to exist. Thus
when the action was filed in Connecticut, there was no
cause of action to sue upon.
In the opinion, however, the court indulged in some
dicta which touch on our problem. It said that if the
action had been commenced against the wrongdoer
prior to his death, the Connecticut revival statute
would control instead of the New York law, and the
personal representative could be substituted as defendant. This was based on two arguments. First, the
revival of an action once it is commenced is a question
of remedies rather than a question of substantive rights,
and consequently it is determined by the law of the
forum. 65 Secondly, it was said that once the action was
commenced in the Connecticut courts, a right was
created in the forum which could not be destroyed by
the law of another state. 66 Thus, it would appear that
the Connecticut court would construe its revival
statute to apply to the hypothetical case posed and
would permit substitution of the personal representative as party defendant. Although the court was probREsTATEMENT, CoNFLICT oF LAws, sec. 384 (1934).
107 Conn. at 176. "The locus delicti determined the existence of the
cause of action. The locus fori determined the remedy. The place of the
injury could not, by legislative or judicial action taken subsequent to our
acquiring jurisdiction, take away our jurisdiction over the cause of action
which was good when we assumed it .... "
66 107 Conn. at 178. "A statute of revivial ... does not revive a right of
action which has ceased in its place of origin; it revives an action for a
right which arose in a foreign jurisdiction, but while the right still existed
in that jurisdiction the action to secure the right was begun in another
forum. The right which the action thus sought to secure became a right
in the jurisdiction of the forum as soon as its courts had assumed jurisdiction of it .... It then existed by force of the law of the forum."
64

66
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ably treating the problem of a domestic personal
representative, nothing in its languge would indicate
that it would not apply the same rules in the case of a
foreign personal representative.
It seems to me that the dicta in Orr v. Ahern are
incorrect as to the choice of law problem. In regard to
the actual issue in the case, the survival of the cause
of action prior to the commencement of the action, the
court decided that survival is a question not of remedy
but of the substantive right, and applied the foreign
law. The Connecticut court seems to feel that the
mere commencing of the action changes the situation.
Still the question of revival of a suit as well as survival
of a cause of actions as necessary a part of the cause of
action as any element necessary to establish it. The
plaintiff must have a cause of action at the time of
judgment as well as when the action is commenced.
This cause of action depends for its existence on New
York law, since the Connecticut court never contended that Connecticut law would create a cause of
action on an automobile accident occurring in New
York. If the New York law creates the cause of action,
that law should determine when the cause of action
ceases to exist. It seems to me that the question of
revival of a cause of action should be determined by the
same law that determines whether there is originally a
cause of action.
The dicta in the case of Orr v. Ahern may be treated
as applying their revival statute only to domestic
representatives. There is no question of their power to
do this. The more serious problem is whether the court
should construe such a revival statute to apply to
foreign personal representatives. There is a fairly
strong argument which can be made in favor of such a
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construction. After the commencing of the action, the
plaintiff may have spent a great deal of time and money
in prosecuting his claim. It seems highly unfair that
due to the death of the defendant domiciled in another
state, he should lose the money and effort already
expended and have to relitigate the matter completely
in a foreign forum. Also, it may be inconvenient or
even impossible for him to transport his witnesses and
other evidence to that forum for the trial against the
personal representative. However, the uniformity of
the cases applying the general common-law prohibition
against suing foreign administrators plus the decisions
holding that a foreign personal representative cannot
consent to jurisdiction in an action begun against the
decedent 67 would indicate that the probabilities are
very great that a court would construe its revival
statute so as not to permit reviving an action against
a foreign personal representative.
Assuming that the court does construe its revival
statute so as to permit the substitution of a foreign
personal representative and the rendering of a judgment against him, this raises the second problem of
what effect this judgment will have in the state of administration, Rhode Island. That court would not have
to treat it as a judgment against its personal representative because it would consider the Connecticut court
as being without jurisdiction over him. 68 Therefore, it
would not be required to give full faith and credit to
this adjudication. Should it, however, permit the
judgment to be presented as a claim in the probate
proceeding? There seems to be no serious objection to
67
68

See supra pp. 95-97.
In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.(2d) 93 (1936).
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allowing it as a claim. If the Connecticut court has
properly notified the personal representative, given
him an opportunity to appear and defend the action,
and the trial has been a fair one, there is no reason for
requiring the plaintiff to relitigate these same issues in
a Rhode Island court before his tort claim can be presented as a claim against the estate. It would seem that
the Rhode Island court cannot be required to give
any effect to this adjudication, but as a matter of convenience such effect should be given once the matter
has been adjudicated.

(f) Obligations incurred after decedent's death
In the preceding chapter, it was seen that a foreign
personal representative who acquired a right after the
death of decedent could sue on that right in any jurisdiction, based on the theory that he was suing as an
individual rather than as a representative. 69 Now the
question is whether the reverse of this proposition is
true. Is a personal representative, who by contract
acquires obligations after the death of decedent, liable
to be sued in any jurisdiction on such obligations? The
case authority, which is scanty, holds that he is liable
in any jurisdiction. 70
The only case which has squarely decided the question is the old New York case of Johnson v. Wallis. 71
A judgment had been rendered in New York. That
judgment was assigned to decedent, who was domiciled
in New Jersey at the date of his death. His executors
See supra Chapter II, pp. 44-45.
Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 91 F.(2d) 141 (8th
Cir. 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 739, 58 S.Ct. 141, 82 L.Ed. 571; Gates v.
McClenahan, 124 Iowa 593, 100 N.W. 479 (1904) (dictum); Johnson v.
Wallis, II2 N.Y. 230, 19 N.E. 653, 2 L.R.A. 828 (1889).
71 II2 N. Y. 2 o, 1 N.E. 6
9
53 , 2 L.R.A. s2s (1889).
3
69
70
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qualified in New Jersey and then contracted to sell the
judgment to plaintiffs. This was an equity action in
New York to compel the New Jersey executors specificially to perform the contract to sell the judgment.
The New York Court of Appeals granted this remedy
saymg:
"In this case, therefore, the defendants [New Jersey
executors] were owners of the judgment and could lawfully
contract for its sale. Having done so they were liable on that
contract which could be enforced against them because they
made it, and it did not derive its existence from any act or
dealing of their testator." 72

The suit was brought in equity to compel the foreign
executor to do a physical act, namely the assigning of
the judgment. Since the forum had personal jurisdiction
over the executor, it had the power to compel him to
do the act by its contempt powers. In addition, the
action really concerned title to a res in the jurisdiction
of the forum, the New York judgment, and the forum
could determine the parties to the judgment without
interfering with assets in the control of a foreign tribunal.
The more important problem occurs in the action
brought for a money judgment. If the foreign executor
or administrator creates a con tract obligation after the
death of his decedent, may he be sued on that obligation
to recover a money judgment? The answer to this
question should depend in large measure on whether the
judgment in such an action will be satisfied out of
property of the estate or out of the representative's own
property? It is uniformly held that a personal representative who contracts on behalf of the estate after
72

II2 N.Y. at 2JJ·
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the death of decedent is individually liable on that
contract. 73 Since the liability is against the personal
representative as an individual and it will be satisfied
out of his own individual property,7 4 then there is no
objection whatever to permitting an action against
him in any court which has personal jurisdiction over
him. This does not really represent an action against a
foreign personal representative as such, but is an action
against the individual who happens also to be the
personal representative. It is only in those actions for a
money judgment where some liability must be enforced
out of property of the estate under control of the probate
court administering the estate that it can be said to be
improper to allow an action against a foreign administrator.
Thus it will be seen that actions by a foreign administrator on a right acquired after decedent's death
and an action against a foreign administrator on an
obligation created after the death present analytically
different problems. The first is merely an action to
73
Christian v. Morris, 50 Ala. 584 (1874) (Suit against executor on a
promissory note he gave plaintiff); Taunton v. Taylor, 37 Ga. App. 695,
141 S.E. 511 (1928) (Action to recover money loaned to administrator);
Phelps v. Exchange Bank of Commerce, I8I Okla. 145, 73 P. (2d) 137
(1937) (Action on lease made to administrator); Allen v. Armfield, 190
N.C. 870, 129 S.E. 8or (1925) (Action on lease made by administrator);
Dahlberg v. Brown, 16 S.E.(2d) 284, 198 S.C. I (1941) (Action by certified
public accountant against administratrix for services performed in connection with estate taxes.
74 If the claim is a legitimate one because the contract was necessary
in the administration of the estate, the personal representative will be
reimbursed when he makes his final account from estate funds. Permitting
the personal representative to be sued on such a contract in a forum other
than the one in which he was appointed does not interfere with the control
of the appointing tribunal over him. That court still has complete control
over all estate funds in the hands of the personal representative and has
the opportunity to pass on the legitimacy of the claim when it decides
whether to reimburse the personal representative or not.
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collect an asset of the estate, and the problem is whether
the asset should be collected by a foreign or a local administrator. In the second situation, the solution is
determined by the nature of the liability. Since the
action is to impose individual liability on the foreign
personal representative, he can be sued in any state
which has personal jurisdiction over him. It is only in
the latter situation that it can accurately be said that
a foreign personal representative appears as a party to
an action in the forum in an individual rather than in a
representative capacity.
(g) Executor de son tort

The concept of executor de son tort as developed in
the ecclesiastical and common-law courts of England
was defined as follows:
"If one, who is neither executor nor administrator, intermeddles with the goods of the deceased, or does any other act
characteristic of the office of executor, he thereby makes himself what is called in the law, an executor of his own wrong, or
more usually an executor de son tort." 15

The executor de son tort will be required to account
for all the assets of decedent which come into his possession, and he will be personally liable for all damages
which result to the heirs from his intermeddling. 76 This
concept was developed to deal with the situation of a
relative or friend of the decedent who had possession of
his property and who would attempt to administer
that property without securing authority from a probate
court.
75 Williams, THE LAw OF ExECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, IJth Ed.,

27 (1953).
76

Roggenkamp v.

ggenkamp, 68 F. 6o5 (C.C. Neb. 1895).
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A couple of cases, however, have applied the doctrine
to suits brought against foreign personal representatives.77 The fact situation involved in these cases was
that in which the foreign personal representative was
being sued in a jurisdiction other than the one in which
he was appointed, and he appeared and defended the
action. The judgment against him was not based on
consent, but rather on the theory that since he was
acting outside his authority by defending the action and
thereby intermeddling in the local affairs of decedent,
he would be treated as an executor de son tort. Assuming that the liability this judgment creates is an
individual one to be satisfied out of the representative's
own property, the result is not an improper one from
the conflicts point of view. However, one of the cases
held that a judgment granted in a foreign court against
an executor qualified in the forum based on the theory
of an executor de son tort could be satisfied out of the
assets of the estate in the hands of the executor. 78
This holding seems incorrect. The assets of the estate
should not be subject to satisfying a judgment based on
the personal representative's individual wrongdoing.
The doctrine of executor de son tort has largely gone
out of favor in American jurisdictions. This is because
the doctrine is a harsh one which punishes close relatives and friends who have possession of decedent's
property and who attempt to care for it and to handle
decedent's affairs in the period between his death
and the time that probate can be obtained. Some states
have abolished it by statute79 or decision. 80 It has also
77

Jasper v. Batt, 76 Ariz. 328, 264 P. (2d) 409 (1953); Davis v. Connelly's Ex'rs, 4 B. Mon. 136 (Ky. 1843).
78 Davis v. Connelly's Ex'rs, 4 B. Mon. 136 (Ky. 1834).
79 An example of such a statute is 61 Ala. Code IIJ: "Executor de son
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been somewhat limited by the proposition that a later
grant of letters of administration to the person will
ratify any actions done by him as executor de son tort
which would be proper if they had been done by a
properly appointed personal representative. 81 It is very
unlikely that the doctrine will play an important role
in future decisions in this area.
2. STATUTORY LIABILITY To SuiT

The rule prohibiting suits brought by foreign personal representatives and the rule refusing to permit
suits against foreign personal representatives are
entirely different analytical problems. However, many
legal thinkers and judges have treated them as corollaries or reverse statements of the same proposition.
With this attitude therefore, it is not surprising that
in those states which adopted statutes permitting
foreign personal rep res en ta tives to sue, 82 there would be
some attempts to pass statutes which made foreign
personal representatives liable to suit. A very interesting
and instructive example of this occurred in New York.
New York first adopted this statute as an amendment
tort only liable to representative; exception.-No person is liable to an
action, as executor of his own wrong, for having taken, received or interfered with the property of a deceased person, but is liable to the executor
or administrator for the value of all the property so taken or received, and
for all damages caused by his act to the estate of the deceased; but the
provisions of this section must not be construed so as to prevent any
creditor from maintaining a suit against any one in possession of property
fraudulently transferred by such deceased person."
80
Barasion v. Odum, 17 Ark. 122 (1856); Bowden v. Pierce, 73 Cal.
459, 14 P. 302 (1887); Ansley v. Baker, 14 Tex. 6o7 (1855).
81
Roggenkamp v. Roggenkamp, 68 F. 6o5 (C.C. Neb. 1895); Nance v.
Gray, 143 Ala. 234, 38 So. 916 (1904); Shawnee Nat. Bank v. VanZant,
84 Okla. 107, 202 P. 285, 26 A.L.R. 1349 (1921).
2
8 See supra Chapter II, note 92.
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to the Code of Civil Procedure in 191 I. 83 It was twice
amended in 1925. 84 In its final form, in the well-known
Decedent Estate Law, sec. r6o, it was as follows:
"Foreign executor or administrator may sue or be sued. An
executor or administrator duly appointed in any other state,
territory or district of the United States or in any foreign
country may sue or be sued in any court in this state in his
capacity of executor or administrator in like manner and
under like restrictions as a nonresident may sue or be sued, if
within twenty days after any such executor or administrator
shall commence, or appear in, any action or proceeding in any
court in this state or within twenty days after he shall be
required or directed by summons or otherwise to appear
therein, there shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the
court, in which such action or proceeding shall be brought or
pending, a copy of the letters testamentary or letters of
administration issued to such executor or administrator duly
authenticated as prescribed by section forty-five of this chapter; in default whereof all proceedings in such action or proceedings may be stayed until such duly authenticated copy
of such letters shall be so filed .... "
This section first came before the New York Court of
Appeals in Helme v. Buckelew. 85 Judge Cardozo wrote
the opinion, which is a good discussion of the general
rules concerning suits by and against foreign personal
representatives and of the problems which such a
statute raises. It was his conclusion that the statute
"removes disabilities, but does not terminate immunities."86 This construction meant that the statute
as regards suits against foreign executors and administrators merely adopted the legal and equitable
Laws of New York, 134th Session (191 1), Chapter 631.
Laws of New York, 148th Session (1925), chapters 253 and 603.
85 229 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E. 216 (1920).
86 '2'29 N.Y. at 37'2.
83

84
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rules then in force with some minor changes in modes
and effects of proof. Therefore, no suit would be permitted under this construction against a foreign personal representative, with the exception that equity
might take jurisdiction to dispose of some res within the
jurisdiction. 87 If one feels that the legislature intended
what its words clearly indicate, then the opinion appears as an interesting and important example of
judicial legislation.
This statute had been construed earlier in a case
decided in a Federal District Court by Judge Learned
Hand. 88 He had come to the conclusion that the
statute should be "read only as opening the courts of
New York to suits against executors in those cases
where the law of the domiciliary state allows it." 89
He also intimated. that a sweeping construction which
permitted any suit against a foreign personal representative would be unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. Thus two of the ablest judges ever
to sit on an American bench refused to give any but
the narrowest construction to what appears to be very
clear language. This indicates that they both felt the
statute would be unconstitutional unless construed
narrowly as Judge Hand indicated, or that there were
strong policy reasons which prevented them from
widening the scope of the forum's control over foreign
personal representatives.
The constitutionality of the statute finally came up
for review before the New York Court of Appeals in
McMaster v. Gould. 90 The case involved an attempt to
229 N.Y. at 371-372.
Thorburn v. Gates, 225 F. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 191 5).
225 F. at 617.
90
240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556, 40 A.L.R. 792 (1925), affirming judgment on rehearing 239 N.Y. 6o6, 137 N.E. 214, 40 A.L.R. 792.
87

88
89

LIABILITY TO BE SUED

II7

substitute a foreign executor as defendant in a personal
action brought against the decedent. The court held
that the statute in its wording would apply to such a
case where the foreign executor or administrator was
sued in personam and there was no res in New York.
This application was held to be unconstitutional under
the fourteenth amendment. The court argued that a
foreign personal representative is not present within
the state so that jurisdiction can be obtained over him
unless he is acting within the state in his fiduciary
capacity in connection with some res. If the foreign
personal representative were not present in the state,
then a judgment in personam rendered against him
would be without jurisdiction, and the rendition of a
judgment against a defendant without jurisdiction
over him deprives him of property without due process
of law. This decision was responsible for the action
of the New York legislature which, shortly after it was
handed down, repealed Decedent Estate Law, sec.
160. 91 This not only excluded suits against foreign
personal representatives, but also actions brought by
them. Thus New York returned to the common-law
rules regarding actions which involved foreign personal
representatives until 1951, when it re-enacted that
portion of the statute which permitted them to sue. 92
The history of the experience of New York with this
statute raises two problems. The first is whether such a
statute is unconstitutional. The second is whether such a
statute is desirable, assuming that it is constitutional.
The constitutional issue is a complex one. The problem
raised in the McMaster case was whether the forum
can render a judgment in personam against a foreign
91
92

Laws of New York, 149th Session (1926), chapter 66o.
Laws of New York, 174th Session (I95I), chapter 522, sec.

I.
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personal representative without violating the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
decision on this question turns on whether the forum
has secured jurisdiction over the foreign personal
representative. If a judgment is rendered without
jurisdiction over the defendant, it will presumably
violate the due process clause. 93 Assuming that the
forum does render such a judgment and that such judgment does not violate the fourteenth amendment, then
there is the problem whether the state which appointed
the personal representative is required to give full faith
and credit to such a judgment. This question will also
turn on the decision as to whether the forum rendering
the judgment had jurisdiction over the foreign personal representative. Therefore, the pivotal question
on both issues would seem to be whether the forum
had jurisdiction. The determination that the court
rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction so
that the judgment was without due process to the
defendant would solve the problem, because no court
could be required to give that judgment full faith and
credit. If, however, the court is treated as having
jurisdiction so that the judgment does not violate the
due process clause, this does not necessarily mean that
the court which appointed the administrator or executor must give that judgment full faith and credit,
98 The Supreme Court of the United States decided in York v. Texas,
137 U.S. 15, II S.Ct. g, 34 L.Ed. 6o4 (18go), that the rendition of a judgment without having jurisdiction did not violate the due process clause until an attempt was made to levy an execution on defendant's property.
In a later case, Riverside & Dan River Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189,
35 S.Ct. 579, 59 L.Ed. 910 (1915), the Supreme Court decided that the
mere rendition of a money judgment without jurisdiction violated the
due process clause. In this decision, the holding in York v. Texas was not
mentioned.
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because the jurisdiction required under each clause
need not be the same. 94
The first problem is whether a judgment against a
foreign personal representative under such a statute
as that of New York violates the due process clause.
The answer to this question turns on whether the rule
prohibiting suits against foreign personal representatives is regarded as the result of a lack of jurisdiction 95
or whether it is considered a rule based on policy and
convenience. 96 The fact that the equity court will
compel a foreign personal representative to account, 97
that some states permit service on foreign representatives under nonresident motorist acts, 98 and that some
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United
States, 99 will permit foreign personal representatives to
consent to suit would argue that this rule is not based on
lack of jurisdiction. It is difficult to say that a court can
never obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign
executor or administrator and still permit these exceptions. Thus it would seem to follow that the New
York Court of Appeals was wrong because courts do
have jurisdictional power to render a judgment against
a foreign personal representative, and this means that
Carey, "A Suggested Fundamental Basis of Jurisdiction with Special
Emphasis on Judicial Proceedings Affecting Decedent's Estates," 24
ILL. LAw REv. 44 at 83 (1929).
95 This position was adopted in: Thorburn v. Gates, 225 F. 613 (S.D.
N.Y. 191 5); McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556, 40 A.L.R.
792 (1925), affirming judgment on rehearing 239 N.Y. 6o6, 137 N.E. 214,
40 A.L.R. 792.
96 This approach was taken by the lower court in Helme v. Buckelew,
181 N.Y.S. 104 at uo (1920). Also in Craig v. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R.
Co., 2 Ohio N. P. 64 (1895), and by Carey, supra note 94 at 88.
97
See supra pp. 93-95.
98
See supra pp. 1o0-10499 Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215, 12 S.Ct. 440,36 L.Ed. 130 (1892).
94
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such judgment would not violate the due process clause.
There will be no definite answer to this problem until
the Supreme Court of the United States has an opportunity to pass on it. But the writer feels that the
only limitations the fourteenth amendment places on
this type of action would be the requirements of procedural due process.
The other constitutional question seems to be the
more important one. That is whether a judgment in
personam rendered against a foreign personal representative under a statute like that passed in New York
is entitled to full faith and credit in the state of appointment. Once again, we cannot be positive about the
decision in such a fact situation until the Supreme
Court of the United States passes on the question.
As has been seen, the courts with few exceptions refuse
to entertain an action against a foreign personal representative. While they may be said as a matter of
abstract theory to have the jurisdictional power to
entertain these actions, they have uniformly refused to
do so. As will be discussed below, there are strong
reasons why this jurisdiction should not be exercised.
Therefore, the full faith and credit clause should not be
extended to force courts who themselves refuse to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign personal represen tatives to give effect to judgments rendered in another
state against an executor or administrator appointed in
the forum. This may be explained on the ground that the
foreign tribunal was without jurisdiction to render such
a judgment, since as a matter of fact all courts refuse to
take jurisdiction in the case of an action for a money
judgment against a foreign personal representative.
The fact that the forum is not required to give full faith
and credit to such a judgment does not mean that it
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may not do so. Presumably, the claim of the plaintiff is
a legitimate one. If the trial resulting in the judgment
had been a fair one and the foreign representative had
an opportunity to present any defense on behalf of the
estate, permitting that judgment to be a claim in the
administration of the estate would eliminate the
necessity of relitigating the question.
Assuming that such legislation is constitutional,
there is another and actually more basic problem raised
by the New York legislation. That is whether such
legislation is wise from a policy point of view. There
seem to me to be two reasons opposed to the adoption
of such a statute.
The purpose of the adoption of statutes permitting
suits brought by foreign administrators, which provision appeared in the same section as the New York
legislation under discussion, was to achieve a more
unified administration. Yet the statute passed in New
York permitting suits against foreign administrators
has quite the opposite effect. A unified administration
requires not only the elimination of multiple administrations, but the supervision of a single court.
When other courts enter judgments which must be
satisfied out of the assets of the decedent, they interfere
to that extent with the administration of the estate by
the one court; this tends to make the administrator
subject to the direction and supervision of more than
one court. Such a situation is not at all satisfactory
when the purpose of the suit could be achieved by
sending the creditor to the court of administration to
present his claim and have it satisfied.
The other argument against such a statute is that it
tends to give the plaintiff a preference over other
creditors of the decedent. If he is awarded a judgment,
he may be able to satisfy that judgment out of property
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in the state 100 even though this conflicts with the
established probate practice of permitting all creditors
to participate equally in decedent's property. This
problem seemed to disturb Judge Cardozo in Helme v.
Buckelew and was in part responsible for the result in
that case. 101 In order to insure this equality of payment,
the forum should tell the plaintiff that he must present
his claim in the court which is administering the assets
and has appointed the personal representative or, if the
state insists on a local administration, that he must
cause an ancillary administration to be had in the forum
and then present his claim to the ancillary administrator.
3· SuMMARY
In short, on the general problem discussed in this
chapter, it seems that the general rule which prohibits
suits against foreign personal representatives is quite
satisfactory in achieving the most efficient administration. Any necessary relief can be given to a person
having a claim against the estate by sending him to the
state of administration to present his claim or by requiring an ancillary administration in the forum. The
only exceptions which should be made are ( r) when the
forum is determining title to a res in the jurisdiction,
(2) when it is causing a fraudulent personal representative to account for assets removed into the forum, or
(3) when it is enforcing the individual liability of the
representative. There is no worthwhile purpose to be
achieved by changing these rules by statute, but, on the
contrary, such statutory changes tend to decentralize
and hamper efficient administration.
100

When a decedent's estate is being administered locally, the cases
do not permit a claimant to attach or levy an execution on decedent's
property, supra Chapter I, note 74·
101 229 N.Y. at 37!.

CHAPTER

IV

The Foreign Personal Representative and Immovable Property
N ANGLO-AMERICAN law, decedents' estates are
subject to the "split system of succession." This
means that the rules determining the succession to
immovable or real property are different from those relating to personal property. This distinction between
movable and immovable property is also vital in problems of administration. The rules governing control of
real property by a foreign personal representative are
quite different from those dealing with the personal
property of the decedent. This is the result of two general legal propositions. The first relates to succession.
The succession to real property is determined by the
law of the place where the land lies. 1 The second is that
title to land cannot be transferred except in accordance
with the law of its situs. 2 Since these questions can best
be determined by a court sitting in the same jurisdiction as the land, and since courts are more jealous of
their control over real property within the jurisdiction
than over movable property, the general rule is that
real property can be administered and sold only by a
personal representative appointed in the state where it
is situated. Any exception to this proposition must be
made by the law where the land lies. 3 If that legal system refuses to recognize the validity of the acts of a
foreign personal representative in attempting to ad-

I

1
2

3

RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 245 (I934).
RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 220 (I934).
Clarke v. Clarke, 278 U.S. I86, 20 S.Ct. 873, 44 L.Ed. I028 (I899).
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minister the land, neither heir nor purchaser can rely
with confidence on any transactions with him.
It must be remembered that at common law title to
real property passes immediately on death to the heirs
or devisees, and the only time that the administrator or
executor deals with the realty of decedent is when it is
necessary to sell it in order to pay claims against the
estate. 4 Thus, the only problem with which we are concerned is whether the foreign personal representative
can make a conveyance of immovable property lying
in the forum. If he can make such a conveyance, the
consideration will be included in the estate and he will
have effectively collected the asset. Naturally, the determination of the validity of such a transfer will arise
after the transaction has taken place. Usually, there
will be an ejectment action brought by or against a
person claiming under the foreign personal represen tative. Then the problem is how the forum will treat the
conveyance. It it is held to be void, the purchaser does
not receive any title, since the law of the forum is the
only one which can determine title to immovables
within its jurisdiction. This result causes the innocent
purchaser to suffer. However, that suffering is not
such as should cause the legal order to change its rules
in this situation. Today purchasers of real property, or
at least the business institutions which finance such
purchases, insist almost uniformly that legal advice be
obtained as to the validity of the title held by the
vendor. Such advice should make it abundantly clear
what limitations there are on the power of a foreign
personal representative to make a conveyance of immovables in the jurisdiction.
4 See

supra Chapter I, p.

20.

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
I. SALE oF LAND BY A FoREIGN ExECUTOR WHo HAs A
PowER oF SALE

Only one exception has been made at common law to
the requirement of a local administration in respect to
land. It is generally held that an executor appointed in
a will which gives him the power to sell decedent's real
property and who qualifies as an executor in another
state may make a valid conveyance to land lying in the
forum.• It is said that the power an executor has to
convey foreign lands was not given by the court which
appointed him, but was created by the testator in the
will. This is treated as a common-law power given to
the executor. The only function of the qualification as
executor is to determine the person who has the power,
and the exercise of that power is completely independent
of the administration in the foreign state. This is one
of the few remaining situations where it is important to
distinguish between the executor and the administrator
as regards applicable legal rules. The only personal
representative who can exercise this power to convey
foreign lands is the executor, and then only when he has
been given in the will itself the power to sell the real
property owned by decedent.
Before the foreign executor can exercise the power of
sale given to him in the will, that instrument must be
established as the valid will of the testator in the state
where the land lies. This may mean that the will must
5 Bacharach v. Spriggs, I73 Ark. 2so, 292 S.W. I so (I927); McMillen
v. Bliley, I I 5 Colo. 575, I77 P.(2d) S47 (I947); Niquette v. Green, 8I Kan.
569, 106 P. 270 (I9Io); Plenderleith v. Edwards, 328 Ill. 43I, I 59 N.E.
780 (I928); Green v. Alden, 92 Me. I77, 42 A. 358 (I898); Crusoe v.
Butler, 36 Miss. ISO (I858); Newton v. Bronson, IJ N.Y. 587, 67 Am.
Dec. 89 (1856); Hoysradt v. Tionesta Gas Co., I94 Pa. 25I, 45 A. 62
(I899); Illinois Steel Co. v. Konkel, q6 Wise. 556, IJI N.W. 842 (I9II).
Contra: Keith v. Proctor, II4 Ala. 676, 21 So. 502 (I896).
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be probated in that jurisdiction. However, it is very
common now for a state to have a statute providing that
a will which has been probated in a foreign state may
be filed in the county in which the land lies and that
after this has been done, it can affect title to the realty. 6
While one case held that a deed from a foreign executor
conveys a good title to local land which will be protected by a subsequent recording/ the majority of cases
construe such statutes to mean that a deed from a foreign executor is not a valid conveyance unless, prior to
its execution, the foreign will is recorded pursuant to
such a statute. 8
These decisions point up one of the most important
inroads on the traditional attitude of the requirement
of ancillary administrations. Land, by virtue of its fixed
location in the jurisdiction, should represent the article
of property which is most likely to require a local administration. The common-law approach is that land
descends to the heir or devisee without being subject to
an administration unless it is necessary to subject the
realty to payment of decedent's debt. The procedure
by which this would be done normally is a local administration at the situs of the land. Yet these decisions make
it possible for a testator, by appointing an executor and
giving him a general power of sale, to provide an oppor6 Such a statute is found in Gen. Stat. of Kansas (1949), sec. 59-801:
"Authenticated copies of wills, proved outside of this state according to
the laws in force in the place where proved, relative to any property in
this state, may be admitted to probate and record in the probate court of
any county in this state where any part of such property may be situated;
and such authenticated copies so admitted and recorded shall have the
same validity as wills proved in this state in conformity with the laws
thereof.... "
7 Crusoe v. Butler, 36 Miss. 150 (1858).
8 Plenderleith v. Edwards, 328 Ill. 431, 159 N.E. 780 (1928); Niquette
v. Green, 81 Kan. 569, 106 P. 270 (1910).
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tunity for the domiciliary executor to collect all the
assets of real property owned by him wherever they
may be located. The modern view is that the executor
derives his authority from the appointment by the
probate court, just as does the administrator. 9 Therefore, his power over any property located in other jurisdictions should generally be as limited as is that of the
administrator. The authority which the executor exercises over the foreign land may come from the will. It is
possible to say, as the courts have done, that the
executor with a power of sale is in the same position as
the devisee for the purposes of sale, and he will be able
to sell the real property without having a local administration. However, it must be remembered that the
forum can subject this realty to a local administration
to insure that decedent's local creditors are paid before
any heir or devisee is entitled to the enjoyment and
control of the land. Since the forum permits a foreign
executor having a power of sale to sell the realty without an administration at the situs, it must be regarded
as an exception and indeed an important one to the
general requirement of a local administration on all of
decedent's property left within the jurisdiction.
An executor having the power of sale may make a
contract to sell real property located in another state.
That contract will be specifically enforced in the court
in which the executor qualified. He will be compelled to
execute a deed, just as equity has always compelled a
defendant over whom it has jurisdiction in personam
to perform specifically a contract for sale of foreign
9 Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F. (2d) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2nd Cir. 1931),
cert. den. 284 U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. JO, 76 L.Ed. 551; In re Van Vleck's Estate,
123 Iowa 89, 98 N.W. 557 (1904).
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land. 10 The efficacy of such a conveyance in passing title
will have to be determined by the law of the state where
the land lies. Generally, the state will treat the deed by
a foreign executor as valid. 11
There is a question as to who can exercise the power
of sale conferred in the will. If the executor appointed
in the will does not qualify, or qualifies and later dies
before making a conveyance, can the administrator appointed as his successor exercise the power and make a
valid conveyance to foreign land? An interesting
Pennsylvania case is the only one which has considered
the precise problem. That case held that a successor appointed in New York to an executor with power of sale
could make a valid conveyance to Pennsylvania land. 12
It based the decision on the argument that the New
York appointment was merely to fix the person who had
the power of sale conferred in the will, and that the
New York decree itself did not affect tide to Pennsylvania realty. In deciding this question from a conflicts
point of view, those cases which have determined
whether the successor to an executor having a power of
sale could make a valid conveyance to land located in
the state wherein he was appointed should be helpful.
These cases generally hold in the situation where a
power of sale is coupled with an interest, such as
managing the property, or if the power of sale amounts
to a direction to sell, then the successor to an executor
may exercise the power. 13 However, if the power of sale
is a mere naked power, or if the power is one of personal
10 Bacharach v. Spriggs, 173 Ark. 250, 292 S.W. I 50 (1927); Newton v.
Bronson, IJ N.Y. 587, 67 Am. Dec. 89 (1856).
11
See cases cited supra note 5·
12
Hoysradt v. Tionesta Gas Co., 194 Pa. 251, 45 A. 62 (1899).
13 Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. 2JJ, 12 L.Ed. IJO (U.S. 1847); Ex parte
White, 118 Miss. 15, 78 So. 949, L.R.A. 1918E 1065 (1918).
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confidence and trust, the general common-law rule is
that the successor cannot exercise the power.l 4 Many
states have adopted legislation which permits the administrator appointed as successor to an executor having a power of sale to exercise the power .15 It is very
likely that the decision in a case where an administrator appointed in a foreign jurisdiction attempts to exercise a power of sale given by the testator to an executor named in the will by conveying lands located in
the forum will turn on the same factors. Since this is a
question relating to the transfer of title to land, the law
which determines the right of the successor to make
a conveyance will be that of the forum in which the
land lies, rather than of the place of his appointment.
If that law so provides, the foreign administrator will
be permitted to give a valid deed if the power is coupled
with an interest, is a direction to sell, or there is a statute
which permits his exercise of the power. Otherwise, the
land will have to be conveyed by an ancillary administrator appointed locally. It has also been held that the
power of sale given to a foreign executor may be of such
a personal nature that it can be exercised by that foreign executor to the exclusion of a locally appointed
ancillary administrator. 16
14
Keel v. First Nat. Bank of Pikeville, 271 Ky. 745, 113 S.W.(2d) 33
(1938); McMillen v. Bliley, II5 Colo. 575, 177 P.(2d) 547 (1947).
15 A typical one is the following: 47 Ala. 90 (1940). "Where lands are
devised to one or more executors, or a naked power given by the will to
sell, the survivor or survivors, where there are more than one named in
the will, and the acting executor or executors, when any one or more of
them dies, resigns, or refuses to act, or is removed by a court of competent
authority, and also an administrator with the will annexed, has the same
interest in, and power over such lands for the purpose of making sale
thereof, as the executors named in such will might have had. Unless the
contrary clearly appear by the terms of the will it shall be presumed that
the power or trust imposed is not a personal trust or confidence."
16
McMillen v. Bliley, II5 Colo. 575, 177 P.(2d) 547 (1947).
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2. STATUTES AFFECTING SALE oF LAND BY A FoREIGN
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

Nearly a third of the states have passed statutes
which deal directly with the problem of sale of real
property in the forum by a personal representative appointed in another jurisdiction. These statutes take
one of two general forms. The first is merely an adoption
of the common-law rule by the legislature. Typical of
this type of legislation is the following:
"When by any foreign will, filed and recorded in this State,
as authorized by the four preceding articles, power is given
an executor or trustee to sell any real or personal property
situated in this State, no order of court shall be necessary to
authorize such executor or trustee to make such sale and
execute proper conveyance, and whenever any particular
directions are given by a testator in any such will respecting
the sale of any such property situated in this State, belonging
to his estate, the same shall be followed unless such directions
have been annulled or suspended by order of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 17

Such a statute would require that the personal representative making the conveyance must be an executor or
trustee named in the will and must have been given a
power of sale in the instrument itself. This is nothing
more than a restatement of the rule at common law and
adds little to our picture.
Some states have adopted statutes which represent a
rather radical departure from the common-law rules
relating to a sale of real property by a foreign personal
representative. The changes made by such legislation
17 Vernon's Tex. Civil Stat., Art. 8305. The following are similar statutes: Colo. Rev. Stat., sec. I 52-6-4; Smith-Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 429i
Iowa Code Ann., sec. 633·35; Gen. Stat. of N.C., Ch. zS, sec. 37; Code of
Va., sec. 64-139, 64-140 (1950).
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can best be made clear by giving an illustrative statute.
The enactment in Ohio is a good example:
"When an executor or administrator is appointed in any
other state, territory, or foreign country for the estate of a
person dying out of this state, and no executor or administrator thereon is appointed in this state, the foreign executor or
administrator may file an authenticated copy of his appointment in the probate court of any county in which there is real
estate of the deceased, together with an authenticated copy
of the will. After filing such copies, he may be authorized,
under an order of the court, to sell real estate for the payment
of debts or legacies and charges of administration, in the
manner prescribed in sections 2127.01 to 2127.43, inclusive
of the Revised Code." 1 8

It will be noticed that this authority is given not only to
foreign executors, but to foreign administrators as well.
Also, it does not require a power of sale to be conferred
in the will. Nevertheless, such statutes contain rather
important restrictions on the power of sale of local lands
by a foreign personal representative. It is generally required that the domiciliary administration be elsewhere,
since the normal provision is that the decedent not be
domiciled in the jurisdiction when he died. In order to
sell the land, a court order or license must be obtained.
Usually, such authority can be given only when it is
necessary to sell the land to pay debts of the decedent
or the expenses of administration.
Such statutes as these mark an extremely important
trend away from the rather rigid common-law theory.
Actually, this type of statute is fairly well drafted to
provide a unified administration of decedent's real
18
Page's Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 2129.25. The following are similar
statutes: II3 Ga. Code Ann. 2404; Burns Ind. Stat., sec. 7-951; Ann.
Laws of Mass., Ch. 202, sec. 32; Rev. Stat. of Neb., sec. 3o-II34 (1943);
Rev. Laws of N.H., Ch. 358, sec. 12 (1942).
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property. The limitation on sale for debts and administration expenses only is not at all harmful, because the
only reason an administration needs control of the
property is to satisfy claims against the decedent. It is
not nearly so necessary actually to collect real property
as it is movable property, since land will always be
available if it is needed for the payment of claims. Title
to the land passes automatically to the heirs or devisees
without having to pass through a personal representative, so that an administrator has no need to deal with
realty in a foreign jurisdiction unless there are debts and
expenses to be paid. Although most statutes are not
clear on this, they should permit only the domiciliary
personal representative to administer the local realty in
order to specify a single administrator for all the property. If this type of statute were adopted in each of the
forty-eight states, the problem of multiple administrations of real property would be solved.
3· AssETS ARISING FROM AN OIL AND GAs LEASE
The large-scale development of the oil and gas industry in the last hundred years has created a host of
legal problems. The property interest in oil and gas is an
anomaly. Because of this, much confusion has developed
in regard to applicable legal rules. A brief discussion of
the problems a foreign personal representative will have
in collecting the assets arising from oil and gas interests
will indicate this difficulty.
Oil and gas are minerals found below the surface of
the earth. Because of the propensity of these minerals to
move while underground and the difficulty involved in
locating their situs as property until they have been reduced to posession by removal from the ground, there
has been a serious theoretical dispute whether the
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interest in oil and gas should be classified as realty or
personalty. 19 It is, however, generally treated as an
interest in land. 20 This mineral interest can be separated
from the surface ownership and may itself be divided
into a number of fractional interests. 21 The almost universal method of utilizing this mineral interest, because
of the expense involved in drilling wells and setting up
transportation systems, is for the owner to lease his
mineral interest to an oil company which does the actual developing.22
The oil and gas industry in its early days experimented with a number of different types ofleases, but in
recent years the lease has become fairly well standardized, with a few variations in form. 23 The lease will
have a definite primary term, normally of five years,
during which the lessee or oil company may extend the
lease from year to year by paying delay rentals. The
clause may be of the "drill or pay" variety, under which
the lessee must drill during the primary term or pay
rentals during that term until production starts. If the
lessee fails to pay the delay rentals or to drill, the lessor
or owner of the mineral interest may forfeit the lease.
With this type of clause, a "surrender" clause is included which gives the lessee power to surrender the
lease during the primary term. On the other hand, the
clause may be of the "unless" type. Under this clause,
19

Summers, THE LAw OF OIL AND GAs, sec. 152 (1938).
Morris, "Oil and Gas Interests in Decedents' Estates," TRUSTS AND
EsTATEs, Oct. 1954, 890.
21 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, Vol. 2, sec. 10.6 at 516.
22 An excellent discussion of the problems of obtaining and continuing
oil and gas leases in relation to personal representatives, both domestic
and foreign, written from the point of view of an oil company attorney
will be found in Morris, supra note 20.
23 Summer, op. cit., supra note 19, sec. 292. A good general discussion
of the modern oil and gas lease.
20
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the lessee must pay a specified delay rental each year to
have the lease continue for the next year throughout
the primary term. If the delay rental is not paid, the
lease terminates automatically. If, however, during the
primary term, there is a well drilled and oil or gas is produced, the lease will thereafter continue as long as
there is production in paying quantities. From the time
production begins, the delay rentals cease and the
lessor is compensated with royalty payments which will
be the value of a fraction, usually one-eighth, of the
oil produced. Thus under an oil and gas lease, the lessor
will be entitled to receive from the lessee either delay
rentals or royalties. On the death of the lessor, will his
personal representative appointed in one state be permitted to collect royalties and delay rentals paid on an
oil and gas lease in another state?
The oil and gas lease is generally regarded as an
interest in land, and consequently the delay rentals and
royalties are usually treated as analogous to rents and
profits from land. 24 Therefore, the rules which determine
who is entitled to receive rents and profits from land
should determine who is entitled to receive delay rentals
and royalties on oil and gas property owned by the decedent.
The rule at common law was that land went directly
to the heirs and devisees and they were entitled to
receive the rents and profits from the land. 25 In those
states where the common law is still applicable, it
would seem that the personal representative has no
right to collect rents and royalties arising from an
oil and gas lease.
However, many states have passed statutes which
24

Morris, supra note

2o

at 891.

25 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,

Vol. 3, sec. 14.6, 14.7.
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give the personal representative control over decedent's
real property and the right to collect the rents and
pro:fits. 26 Under such statutes, the royalties and rentals
should be paid to the personal representative. Frequently, however, the personal representative will be
appointed at the decedent's domicile, but the oil and
gas lease will cover property in another state. As a
general rule, the oil companies do not pay the rentals
and royalties to a foreign domiciliary representative,
but instead insist on the appointment of an ancillary
administrator in the state where the lease is located
whom they will pay. 27 The problem is very analogous
to the case of voluntary payment of a debt to a foreign
personal representative. As we shall see in connection
with that problem, most courts would treat the payment as a valid discharge, 28 but there is enough doubt
as to the result that the only completely safe course for
a debtor in the absence of statutory protection is to
pay only a local administrator. This same doubt exists
as to the validity of payments of royalties and rentals
to a foreign personal representative, and the oil companies will not take the risk. Therefore, it is very un26

A typical statute of this type is found in Kansas:
"The executor or administrator shall have a right to the possession
of all the property of the decedent, except the homestead and allowances to
the surviving spouse and minor children. He shall pay the taxes and collect
the rents and earnings thereon until the estate is settled or until delivered
by order of the court to the heirs, devisees, and legatees. He shall keep in
tenantable repair the buildings and fixtures under his control and may
protect the same by insurance. He may by himself, or with the heirs or
devisees, maintain an action for the possession of the real estate or to
quiet title to the same." Gen. Stat. of Kan., sec. I s-401 (1949).
Among the states which are large oil and gas producers and have
adopted similar statutes are the following: Deering's Cal. Code, Probate,
sec. 581; N.D. Rev. Code, sec. 30-1304 (1943); 58 Okla. Stat. Ann. 290;
S.D. Code, sec. 35.IIOI (1939); Wyo. Comp. Stat., sec. 6-1309.
27
Morris, supra note 20 at 894, 898.
28
See infra Chapter V, pp. ISI-163.
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likely that a foreign personal representative will ever
have the opportunity to collect the assets of decedent
which arise out of oil and gas leases in the absence of
legislation expressly providing for this situation.
One problem may be briefly considered in connection
with oil and gas leases, which shows graphically the unfortunate consequences of traditional legal thought as
to the authority of personal representatives. One type
of oil and gas lease which is in common current use is
that which contains the "unless" clause. The lease is
extended from year to year during the primary term by
the payment of a specified delay rental, usually on a per
acre basis. This rental must be paid before the year
expires or the lease will terminate automatically. 29 If
the lessor dies during the term, there is a serious problem as to who should be paid the delay rental in order to
keep the lease alive.
If the lessor under an "unless" lease dies domiciled in
a state other than the one in which he owned the lease,
there are three possible recipients of the delay rental.
The lessor may pay the heirs or devisees of decedent, he
may pay the domiciliary personal representative, or he
may pay an ancillary administrator appointed in the
state where the oil and gas lease is located. The problem
which is raised should be distinguished from the collection of assets discussed in the next chapter. The delay
rentals are not assets to which the estate is entitled. It is
entirely in the discretion of the lessee whether they are
to be paid or not. Therefore, this is not a fund to which
local creditors are entitled, and the rules designed to
protect them by limiting the authority of a foreign
personal representative to act in the forum should not
29

Summers, op. cit., supra note 19, sec. 288.
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be used in determining the result. The real problem is
the question of extending the oil and gas lease. What
acts are sufficient to constitute an effective extension?
Since an oil and gas lease is treated as an interest in
land, this question will be determined by the law of the
state in which the oil and gas lease lies. The problem is
to determine what sort of payment that state will treat
as adequate to extend the lease.
It is frequently true that the lease will be a very
valuable piece of property to an oil company and they
will want to take every possible precaution to protect
themselves. I have been told that in order to insure that
the lease on oil property which is likely to be highly
productive will be extended, an oil company may make
double or even triple rental payments. This seems unnecessary. However, the seriousness of the problem is
obvious when the lessor dies shortly before the end of
the period during which payment may be made. The
lessor must act rapidly and be sure that the right party
is being paid. It would seem that the forum, in deciding
whether the payment was satisfactory to extend the
lease, should only be concerned with the question of
whether the payment was made in good faith and to a
person entitled to represent the decedent. 30 The forum
30 This would seem to follow from the cases which have held that a
payment in good faith by the lessee which through inadvertence does not
reach the lessor in time will not cause the "unless" lease to terminate.
Gloyd v. Midwest Refining Co., 62 F.(2d) 483 (wth Cir. 1933); Brazell v.
Soucek, 130 Okla. 204, 266 P. 442 (1928). However, probably the majority
rule and one adopted in recent cases is that time is of the essence in an
"unless" lease and failure to pay the rental on time or payment to the
wrong bank will cause the lease to terminate. Keeler v. Dunbar, 37 F.(2d)
868 (5th Cir. 1930); Ellison v. Skelly Oil Co., 206 Okla. 496, 244 P.(2d)
832 (1952) (where fault was attributable to lessee although done in good
faith). The problem discussed in the text does not deal with time of payment, but the proper party to receive payment and the courts should be
more likely to adopt the minority rule.
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should not decide the payment was invalid on the basis
that the rule designed to protect local creditors prevents a foreign personal representative from acting in
the jurisdiction. The oil company should be protected
either if it pays the money into the court which is
handling the principal administration to be distributed
by it to the proper party, or if it seeks an ancillary administration in the forum and pays the delay rentals
into the local court on behalf of that administration.

CHAPTER

v

Collection of Assets by a Foreign
Personal Representative
ANY of the activities that an executor or administrator performs outside the state of his
appointment are done without resorting to the
courts. As we have seen previously, the duties of the
personal representative are to collect the assets, to
conserve and keep them safely, to account for them to
the court of administration, to pay or bar all claims
against the property of the decedent, and to distribute
the assets left to persons entitled to the succession according to the decree of the probate court.! All of these
functions with one exception can be performed in the
state of appointment and consequently raise no problems within the scope of this work. However, many of
the assets which a personal representative must collect
will be found located in states other than that of administration. In order to collect these assets, he may
have to bring suit. The questions arising out of such
actions were discussed in Chapter II. On the other hand,
he may be able to collect these assets without bringing
an action. This may be accomplished by transferring the
title of decedent's property in another state to a third
person and accounting for the purchase price of the
property to the court which appointed him. He may be
able to enter another state, take possession of decedent's
movable property, and remove it to his jurisdiction.
He may also persuade a debtor or bailee of the decedent

M

1

See supra Chapter I, pp.

21-24.
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to deliver the assets to him voluntarily. This chapter
will consider the problems raised by efforts of a personal
representative to collect property belonging to the
decedent in states other than the one in which he was
appointed when there is no need to apply to the courts
for assistance.
It must be conceded that the state has the right not
to permit any property within its borders belonging to
decedent to be removed by the foreign personal representative.2 This has resulted in the general common-law
rule which prohibits foreign personal representatives
from suing to collect assets. Such a rule, as we have seen,
is merely a matter of the positive law of the particular
state and may be relaxed in any situation which that
legal order feels proper. Thus, the foreign personal
representative may be permitted to sue as a matter of
comity. 3 He may also be allowed to remove property of
the decedent from the jurisdiction by comity. 4
Actually, it is not realistic to speak of a state's not
permitting a foreign administrator to remove decedent's
property. If he sells property within the jurisdiction to
a third party for which he receives a consideration, the
purchase money can be included in his account as an
asset. Similarly, if he persuades a bailee willingly to
deliver him personal property, or if a debtor voluntarily
pays a debt owed to decedent, such assets will then be
included in the inventory of the personal representative
2 Duehay v. Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co., I05 F.(2d) 768, I'24 A.L.R.
I'268 (D.C. Cir. I939). "No state need allow property of a decedent to be
taken from within its borders until debts due [local] creditors have been
satisfied ... ; Hensley v. Rich, I9I Ind. 294, IJ'2 N.E. 632, IS A.L.R.
III8 (I9'2I)."
3
See supra Chapter II, pp. 50-53.
4
Swan v. Bill, 95 N.H. I 58, 59 A.(2d) 387 (I948); In re Brown's Estate, '2I Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.(2d) 346 (I944).

COLLECTION OF ASSETS
and will be administered by him. The real problem is
how the state in which the assets were collected will
treat the transaction. If the transfer of property is
treated as invalid, then the purchaser from the foreign
personal representative will not receive title and the
property if still within the jurisdiction may be administered by a locally appointed administrator. If the delivery of a chattel or the payment of a debt is treated as
being improper, a local administrator may recover the
value of the chattel or the debt from the person who
surrendered it to the foreign administrator. This will
give the local administrator a fund to administer in the
state similar to the assets which were taken out of the
state. Such a result places an innocent party who dealt
with the foreign personal representative in the unfortunate position of paying twice. This procedure does
not prevent the state which appointed the foreign representative from administering the assets obtained in
what the forum regards as a void transaction, but it
does insure that the same assets will be locally administered for the benefit of local creditors.
Since the activity of the foreign personal representative does not directly involve litigation, the determination of questions involving collection of assets must be
decided "after the fact." If the transaction concerns the
validity of a conveyance of property by a foreign executor, there may be a replevin action brought by or against
the person claiming through the foreign administrator,
and the effect of the transfer will be determined in that
proceeding. If the situation involves the delivery of
movable property or the payment of a debt to a foreign
personal representative, the problem will be whether
such delivery or payment will be a bar to a subsequent
action brought by a local administrator. The fact that
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the question is being litigated after the parties have attempted to change their legal relations and that an
innocent party will suffer if the attempt is treated as
void has undoubtedly influenced the decisions on these
questions.
In this area, the courts have naturally had some difficulty in rationalizing the results of the cases. They are
committed to the theory that the personal representative is a creature of the state which appointed him and
that he can have no existence outside its territory.
This theory was developed in the cases dealing with
suits by or against foreign executors or administrators. 5
If this theory is applied logically to the situations discussed in this chapter, the transaction with the foreign
personal representative respecting property of the
decedent having a situs within the forum will be treated
as void. As one might expect, the courts have been unwilling to reach this result. It is in this area that the
concept of the artificial personality of the foreign representative limited to the state in which he was appointed is most unsatisfactory in explaining the results
in the cases.
Another important point to notice is whether the
foreign personal representative who collected the asset
was a domiciliary representative or an ancillary administrator. One of the explanations usually given in
the cases is that the domiciliary representative takes
title to all the personal property of decedent wherever
located, 6 and the fact that he cannot sue to recover
property does not mean that he cannot give a valid
acquittance when he collects the property in those
5 See

discussion supra Chapter II, pp. 30-3 I.
In re Nolan's Estate, 56 Ariz. 366, ro8 P. (zd) 39I (r94o); In re
Brown's Estate, ZI Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.(zd) 387 (I944).
6
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states. 7 This concept seems based on two reasons. The
first is an idea which is expressed in the older cases,
viz., that the ancillary administrations are subordinate
to the domiciliary and their only purpose is to administer the assets located in the jurisdiction and then to
transmit the remainder to the domicile for distribution. 8
This doctrine has gone out of favor, and the tendency
is to treat the ancillary and domiciliary administrations
as completely independent of one another and supreme
within their respective jurisdictions. 9 The second reason, and a more forceful one, is that the succession to
movable property is determined by the law of decedent's
domicile at date of death 10 and it is this same law which
appoints the domiciliary representative. 11 Since the law
of the domicile will treat the representative it appoints
as having title to all the personal property of the decedent, subject to the right of local administration in
other states, the courts in those states treat the domiciliary representative as having title to personal property
in their jurisdictions until a local administrator is appointed. Needless to say, this theory that a domiciliary
representative has title to personal property located in
other states is in direct conflict with the notion that a
personal representative is a creature of the state that
Wilkins v. Ellett, I08 U.S. 256, 2 S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718 (r88J).
Cureton v. Mills, IJ S.C. 409, 36 Am. Rep. 700 (1879).
9 Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 164 F. 817, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 553
(8th Cir. 1908); Voyles v. Robinson, 151 Miss. 585, r8 So. 420 (1928);
State ex rei. Finley v. District Court, 99 Mont. 200, 43 P.(2d) 682 (1935).
10 RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 303 (1934).
11 A third reason is given in the case of In re Brown's Estate, 2I Del.
Ch. 562, 52 A.(2d) 387 (1944). "This is because the domiciliary administrator is generally looked upon as being more closely connected with the
persons interested in the estate of the decedent than a foreign representative would be ...." I personally fail to understand how the connection of
a domiciliary representative is any closer to decedent's heirs or creditors
than that of an ancillary administrator.
7

8
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does not exist outside its territory. Although modern
cases tend not to differentiate between a domiciliary
representative and an ancillary one as respects legal
power, some cases still distinguish between the legal
effect of a collection of assets by the one or by the
other, and therefore this is an important distinction to
bear in mind.
1.

DuTY TO CoLLECT AssETS

A preliminary problem concerns the duty to collect
assets outside the state of appointment. It would be expected that courts which generally hold to the theory
that the personal representative is an artificial personality that does not exist outside the state of appointment would conclude that there is no obligation on him
to perform acts in other states. However, the majority
of cases which have decided the question have held that
a personal representative does have a duty to collect
assets located in other jurisdictions.1 2 This duty is difficult to describe precisely and will depend largely on
the facts of the particular case.
Generally, the personal representative must make an
effort to collect a debt due the decedent even though he
may not be able to sue to recover the debt. 13 This is
based on the theory that the law presumes that men
will pay their just debts.H This duty also applies to the
12 In re Brown's Estate, 21 Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.(2d) 387 (1944); Shultz
v. Pulver, I I Wend. 363 (N.Y. 1833); Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417,
28 Am. Rep. 330 (1878); Shinn's Estate, 166 Pa. 121,30 A. ro26, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 656 (1895); Welsh v. Welsh, 136 W.Va. 914, 69 S.E.(2d) 34
(1951).
Contra: Bowman v. Carr, 5 Lea 574 (Tenn. 188o); Farmer's Bk. of
Woodland Mills v. Vinson and Williams, 9 Tenn. App. 51 (1928).
13 Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 28 Am. Rep. 330 (1878).
14 Shultz V. Pulver, II Wend. 363 (N.Y. 1833). " ... [the debtor] was
abundantly able, and with the means in his hands and in the case of an
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collection of the personal property of decedent in other
states. 15 If a suit is needed to collect the asset and the
law of that jurisdiction prohibits him from bringing an
action as a foreign personal representative, he may be
required to secure ancillary administration himself or
through an agent.1 6
The standard of duty which will be applied is that
of the reasonably prudent businessman. Thus, it was
held in the case of Shinn's Estate 17 that the investment
of estate funds by a personal representative in mining
property owned by the decedent in a foreign jurisdiction, which was a highly speculative venture and which
greatly depreciated in value, was a violation of his duty
and that he was personally liable for the funds invested.
In the same case, however, it was held proper for him
to pay off a debt owing to a foreign creditor when the
decedent had pledged with the creditor collateral greatly
exceeding in value the debt and thereby securing for the
estate the asset consisting of the collateral which had
been pledged. It seems proper to make necessary expenditures out of estate funds to collect foreign assets
providing the expenditures are such as a reasonably
prudent businessman would make. 18
honest debt, we are not to presume that a suit would have been necessary.
The law will not presume that mankind in general refuse to pay their
honest debts when they have abundant means till compelled by its process;
nor is the fact so."
15 Shinn's Estate, r66 Pa. I'2I, 30 A. ro26, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895).
16 In re Brown's Estate, '21 Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.(2d) 387 (1944). Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, '28 Am. Rep. 330 (r 878): "Whether administrators in this State should take out ancillary administration, or try
to do so, in the State of a nonresident debtor, must depend upon the circumstances of each case ... in determining this latter point, the magnitude of the debt, the solvency of the debtor, the distance and probable
expense, were to be considered."
17
r66 Pa. r2r, 30 A. 1026,45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895).
18 Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 2.8 Am. Rep. 330 (r 878); Shinn's
Estate, r66 Pa. I'2I, 30 A. ro26, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895).
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A question might be raised whether a personal representative should be treated as having a duty to collect
assets in a jurisdiction where there is an ancillary administration. The only case I have found dealing with
the issue holds that there would be no duty to collect in
such a situation.t 9 Certainly, one of the factors which is
important in determining whether a duty exists is the
likelihood of collecting the asset. The personal representative would not be permitted to sue and would not
have much of a chance to persuade a debtor or bailee to
deliver the asset to him in the face of an ancillary administration. Also, one of the main reasons for imposing
this duty is to prevent assets from being lost to the
estate through failure to be collected. If there is an ancillary administration, it is more reasonable to place
the duty to collect assets within that jurisdiction on
the local administrator. Consequently, there should
be no duty on a personal representative to collect assets
in a jurisdiction where an ancillary administration has
been gran ted.
This question of a duty to collect may arise in two
ways. The court which appointed the personal representative may compel him on application of an heir or
creditor to make an effort to collect the foreign asset. 20
However, if he is unwilling to do so, the court will probably remove him and appoint a more enthusiastic administrator.21 This result is based on the difficulty of
supervising the administrator's attempts to collect in a
foreign jurisdiction and of determining whether those
efforts were sufficient. The more common way to place
such a duty on a personal representative is to charge
19

20
21

Grant v. Reese, 94 N.C. 720 (1886).
Welsh v. Welsh, 136 W.Va. 914, 69 S.E.(2d) 34 (1951).

Ibid.
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him in his account with the foreign asset he should
have collected. 22 This method is subject to the criticism
that the administrator or executor would undoubtedly
have made satisfactory efforts to collect the asset if
he were informed prior to the filing of his final account
that he was to be treated as responsible for that asset.
Of course, he could escape this uncertainty as to his
duty by applying to the court which appointed him for
an order clarifying his duty in regard to the collection
of specified foreign assets.
In older times when the concept that a personal
representative was a legal creature limited to the territory of the state which created him was prevalent and
when the population was sufficiently immobile so that
most of decedent's property would normally be located
in one state, it was easy to say that there was no duty.
However, today the property of a decedent's estate
will often be widely scattered. In collecting such property, it is recognized that there are many instances
where a personal representative may sue in a foreign
jurisdiction to collect assets, and that in many other
situations the personal representative may receive the
asset from a holder who surrenders it voluntarily and
this will be a valid discharge of the obligation. Under
these circumstances, the personal representative should
be placed under a duty to make some effort to collect
foreign assets. It is impossible to define this duty with
any accuracy. It will depend on the size of the asset
and the expense involved in collecting it. If the expense
equals or exceeds the value of the asset, there would
naturally be no duty to collect. Also, the personal repre22 This was done in: Shultz v. Pulver, II Wend. 363 (N.Y. 1833);
Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 28 Am. Rep. 330 (1878); Shinn's Estate, 166 Pa. 121, 30 A. 1026, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895).
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sentative must have some reasonable means of discovering the existence of the asset. He must make a reasonable inquiry, but he need not conduct exhaustive
investigations outside the state of administration in the
hope of discovering collectible assets. It would seem
that a duty to collect should exist only if in the course
of the reasonable conduct of the administration he
comes across a note or other record showing the existence of this asset or he is informed by some reliable
party in interest. If the collection requires an ancillary
administration, he should be required to take out the
administration himself or see that someone else does to
the end that the asset is not lost to the estate.
2. CoLLECTION OF CHATTELS

It is possible that an estate of much size where the
assets are located in several jurisdictions will consist in
large part of movable chattels. If the chattels are easily
transported, such as vehicles, jewelry, or securities, the
foreign personal representative may take possession
and remove them into the state of administration. If
the assets are not in the control of any one in the forum,
the foreign administrator can accomplish this without
any difficulty. Once he has the assets in his possession
in the state of his appointment, he will be required to
account for them to the probate court there. There is
little that the forum in which the assets were located
can do about the removal. If the property is in the
control of a custodian or bailee, the foreign personal
representative must persuade the person having control
to deliver the chattels to him. If that person refuses to
do so, the foreign personal representative would not be
permitted to sue him because of the general commonlaw prohibition against such suits unless he brings him-
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self within one of the recognized exceptions or there is a
statute permitting such an action. If he can convince
the bailee or custodian to surrender the chattel to
him, he has effectively collected it.
An analogous problem based on the same principle
concerns the case of stock certificates held by a foreign
personal representative in a domestic corporation. He
generally will not be permitted to sue to force the corporation to issue new certificates to him. 23 However, if
the corporation voluntarily issues new share certificates
to the foreign personal representative, it will be protected in an action brought by a subsequently appointed
local administrator to compel the corporation to issue
the stock to him.24
The case authority dealing with this problem is
limited because it is difficult to litigate the question of
a foreign personal representative's right to collect chattels. If they are not voluntarily delivered to him, he is
barred from seeking relief in the courts of that state.
About the only way that such a question could arise
would be for the foreign personal representative to
collect and remove assets of decedent located in the
forum. Then a local ancillary administrator would be
appointed and sue either the foreign administrator 25 or
the bailee who delivered the chattel to him for conversion.26 The cases which have considered the question
See supra Chapter II, p. 42.
Union Trust Co. v. Pacific T. & T. Co., 31 Cal. App. 64, 159 P. 82o
(1916).
25 Morrison v. Hass, 229 Mass. 514, II8 N.E. 893 (1918). In this case,
an executor who qualified in New York collected assets of decedent in
Massachusetts. An administrator appointed subsequently in Massachusetts sued the executor for conversion. The court gave judgment for the
defendant on the ground that he was entitled to collect assets in Massachusetts as long as he did not have to resort to the courts to do so.
26 The decisions which hold that a corporation which issues new share
23

24
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hold that a foreign personal representative is entitled
to collect personal property of decedent located in the
forum. 27
Some states have adopted statutes which permit
foreign personal representatives to collect the personal
property of decedent located in the jurisdiction and
which protect the person who delivers the property to
him. An illustrative example occurs in the statutes of
Alabama:
"Any executor or administrator who has obtained letters
testamentary or of administration on the estate of a person
who was not, at the time of his death, an inhabitant of this
state, in any other of the United States, and who has not
obtained letters of administration thereon in this state ...
may maintain suits and recover property in this state ... 28
"A delivery of property or the recovery of judgment,
under the provisions of section I 51 of this title, is a protection to the defendant, or to the person delivering the property,
to the extent of such judgment, or the value of such property."29
These statutes usually require that the foreign personal
representative file his letters of appointment and post a
bond before he collects the property.
There is a problem whether an ancillary administrator as well as a domiciliary representative is entitled
certificates to a foreign personal representative may not be sued by a local
administrator, plus the cases which state generally that a foreign administrator or executor has the right to collect personal property, would
indicate that a bailee is not liable to a local administrator for assets which
he delivered to a foreign personal representative.
27 In re Nolan's Estate, 56 Ariz. 366, 108 P.(2d) 391 (194o); Coca-Cola
v. New York Trust Co., 22 Del. Ch. 344, 2 A.(2d) 290 (1938) (collection
of shares of stock); Morrison v. Hass, 229 Mass. 514, II8 N.E. 893 (1918);
Swan v. Bill, 95 N.H. I 58, 59 A.(2d) 346 (1948) (taking possession of a
leasehold); Potter v. First Nat. Bank, 107 N.J.Eq. 72, 151 A. 546 (193o);
Valentine v. Duke, 128 Wash. 128, 222 P. 494 (1924).
28 61 Ala. I 51 (1940).
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to collect the chattels of the decedent located in other
states. Nearly all of the cases which have discussed the
issue deal with collections by the domiciliary personal
representative. Since the explanation generally given is
that, as domiciliary representative, he receives title to
all of the decedent's personal property, wherever located,30 it might be that the courts would not reach the
same result if the collection were by a foreign ancillary
administrator. Of course, if the property can be removed
from the forum by the ancillary administrator, he has
effectively collected it. The court which appointed him
is probably not likely to order him to return the property
to the state from which it was taken. The only remedy
the forum has would be against a bailee who surrendered
the property to the ancillary administrator.
The case authority on this question is limited and
therefore not completely conclusive. It is advisable for
a person having control of decedent's property to protect himself by refusing to deliver it to a foreign personal representative unless he is sure that there will be
no legal reaction against him. If the law of the particular
jurisdiction is not certain by virtue of a clear decision
or a statute permitting such collections, it would be
wiser to deliver the property only to a local administrator, unless the foreign personal representative can
obtain a court ruling showing that he is entitled to the
assets.
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By far the most litigated, discussed, and important
question in this area of the collection of decedent's
29
30

61 Ala. 155 (1940).
See supra p. 142.
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assets concerns the effect of voluntary payment by a
debtor of decedent to a foreign personal representative.31 Most estates which are probated will have some
assets consisting of debts due to decedent. Since the
orthodox theory is that a simple debt will be treated
as property at the place where the debtor is, 32 and since
debtors and the deceased creditor as human beings in a
modern society move about freely and frequently, it is
very likely that the situs of the debt at the time of the
probate proceeding will be in a state other than the
jurisdiction in which the administration is being had.
Therefore, one of the earliest problems a personal representative will face is this one of collecting debts owed
to the decedent by persons residing in other states.
Unless the personal representative has a negotiable
instrument or note representing the debt, or there is
statutory permission, he will generally not be permitted
to sue the debtor in that jurisdiction. Thus, the only
means of collection would be to persuade the debtor to
pay the debt to him voluntarily.
Obtaining voluntary payment from a debtor of the
decedent residing in a foreign jurisdiction is not so
difficult or infrequent an occurrence as might be imagined. A great majority of debtors are quite willing to
31 This problem has been discussed in several articles. The first two
listed suffer somewhat in their explanation of the cases because of their
emphasis on the completely sovereign aspect of each state as the controlling factor, but they are good discussions of the problems raised by voluntary payment and the case authority.
Beale, "Voluntary Payment to a Foreign Administrator," 42 HARV.
L. REv. at 597 (1929); Mersh, "Voluntary Payment to Foreign Administrator", 18 GEo. L. JoURNAL 130 (1930); Basye, "Dispensing with Administration", 44 MrcH. L. REv. at 410 et seq. (1945).
A good collection of the cases dealing with the major problems will be
found in the annotation at Io A.L.R. 276.
32 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S.Ct. 625, 49 L.Ed. 718 (r88J).
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discharge any obligations they may have and will pay
the debt on demand. A substantial number of the cases
involve payment of deposits by a bank. The bank is
certainly willing to pay, and to a large extent its business reputation is dependent on prompt and voluntary
payment. Furthermore, the debtor does not ordinarily
want to go through the delay of waiting for an ancillary
administrator to be appointed so that payment can be
made to him. Certainly if, as frequently must happen,
the debtor is without legal advice, he is likely to regard
the foreign personal representative as the proper party
to discharge the obligation and will pay him without
realizing the legal consequences of the representative's
place of appointment. Once the payment has been
made, and this will frequently happen, our problem is
whether such payment discharges the obligation of the
debtor so that he will not be liable to a second recovery
against him in an action by a local administrator.
The problem can be a complex one, and the solution
in each instance will depend on several varying factors.
Such facts as whether the foreign personal representative was a domiciliary or an ancillary one, whether
there were any creditors of decedent in the forum,
whether there was an ancillary administrator appointed
in the forum at the time of payment, and whether the
debt was evidenced by a note or negotiable instrument
will be important factors in determining whether the
voluntary payment to the foreign administrator or
executor will operate as a valid discharge to the debtor.
In order to make the effect of these factors clear, it will
be necessary to consider a number of hypothetical situations which illustrate the various problems. In these
hypothetical cases, D will be the debtor of decedent,
F, the foreign personal representative to whom the
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debt is paid, and A, the ancillary administrator appointed in the state where D resides.
The first situation to be dealt with is one which does
not actually come within the scope of this work, but it
should be considered because it has influenced the
thinking of the courts in solving the problems treated
in this section. D enters the state where F was appointed. IfF gets personal jurisdiction over D and obtains a judgment against him, that judgment will be a
bar to any action brought by A on the same debt in the
state where D resides. 33 When the judgment is rendered,
the debt merges into the judgment and that judgment
is the individual property of F. In a subsequent action
brought by A, this judgment will be res judicata under
the "full faith and credit" clause of the United States
Constitution. Similarly, if D enters the state where F
was appointed and while there voluntarily pays him the
debt in good faith, that payment will be a bar to a subsequent action by A. 34 This is based on the idea that F
has the right to collect any assets of decedent which can
be found in the jurisdiction in which he was appointed,
and he has collected the asset to the exclusion of any
other personal representative when it is voluntarily
paid to him there. Naturally, the courts which have had
to treat the problem of the effect of voluntary payment
to a foreign administrator see little but a technical distinction between that problem and the situation where
payment is made in the state where the administrator
was appointed. Thus in the cases discussed in this section, one of the reasons always given for the result is
the analogy with the result in the case where the debtor
Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256, z S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718 (r88J).
Wilkins v. Ellett, ro8 u.s. zs6, '2 S.Ct. 64I, '27 L.Ed. 7I8 (I88J);
Riley v. Moseley, 44 Miss. 37 (187o).
33
34

COLLECTION OF ASSETS

ISS

enters the state where an administrator was appointed
and there pays him.
The next hypothetical case represents the strongest
situation for treating voluntary payment to a foreign
personal representative as a valid discharge of the
obligation. F is the domiciliary representative. He enters
the state where D resides, and D voluntarily pays the
debt to him. There are no local creditors in the state,
and at the time, there is no ancillary administrator.
The cases have generally held that such voluntary
payment when there is no ancillary administration and
no domestic creditors are prejudiced will constitute a
valid discharge of the debt. 35 There is some authority
to the effect that if there are local creditors at the time
of the payment who are prejudiced by the removal of
assets from the jurisdiction, D will be liable in an action
brought on the same debt by .A. 36 This test of prejudice
to local creditors has been criticized because "The effect of the payment is left to the subsequent determination of fact unknown when the payment is made;
namely, the existence of unsatisfied creditors." 37 This
35 Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256, 2 S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718 (1883);
Selleck v. Rusco, 46 Conn. 370 (1878); Citizens' Nat. Bk. v. Sharp, 53
Md. 521 (1879); Schluter v. Bowery Sav. Bank, II7 N.Y. 125, 22 N.E.
572, 5 L.R.A. 541 (1889); McCully v. Cooper, II4 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82
(1896) (dictum); Gardiner v. Thorndike, 183 Mass. 81, 66 N.E. 633 (1903)
(dictum).
Contra: Crohn v. Clay County Bank, 137 Mo. App. 712, II8 S.W. 498
(1909); Young v. O'Neal, 3 Sneed 55 (Tenn. 1855); Vaughn v. Barrett,
5 Vt. 333 (I8JJ).
36 Klein v. French, 57 Miss. 662 (188o); Wolfe v. Bank of Anderson,
123 S.C. 208, II6 S.E. 451 (1922).
See also: Richardson v. Neblett, 122 Miss. 723, 84 So. 695, 10 A.L.R.
272 (1920). Voluntary payment to a foreign personal representative was
held not to be a discharge because he had failed to comply with the
statutory requirement of filing his letters before he received the payment.
37
Mersh, supra note 31 at 146.
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criticism points up the undesirable feature of the common-law rule, i.e., the fact that a debtor, when he pays
the foreign personal representative, can never be positive that such payment will be a valid discharge. Still,
under the state of the common-law decisions in the
United States, it is probable that a majority of the
courts would turn their decision on this factor of whether
the payment operated to the prejudice oflocal creditors.
If at the time of the voluntary payment by D to F,
there is an ancillary administrator, A, appointed in the
state where D resides, does the payment discharge D's
obligation? The few cases which have considered this
question have held that if the payment were made in
good faith and with no knowledge of the existence of the
ancillary administrator, it would be a bar to a subsequent action brought by A. 38 The leading case on this
point isMaas v. German Savings Bank. 39 D, a New York
bank, voluntarily paid a deposit of decedent to F,
the domiciliary representative appointed in New Jersery. A had previously been appointed administrator
in New York, and he brought this action against D to
recover the deposit. It was conceded that there were no
creditors of decedent in New York and that the payment was made in good faith and without knowledge of
the appointment of the plain tiff. The New York Court
of Appeals held that the voluntary payment was a valid
discharge as long as it was made in good faith. It was
contended that the bank had constructive notice of the
ancillary administration because A's appointment was
made in the prescribed manner with notice and was a
matter of court record. However, the court held that
38 Compton v. Borderland Coal Co., 179 Ky. 695,201 S.W. 20 (1918);
Maas v. German Savings Bank, 176 N.Y. 377, 68 N.E. 658 (1903).
39
176 N.Y. 377. 68 N.E. 658 (190J).
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actual notice of the appointment of a domestic administrator would be necessary before there would be a sufficient lack of good faith to destroy the validity of the
payment.
The foregoing discussion has presupposed that F, to
whom the payment was made, was the domiciliary
personal representative. The early cases dealing with
the problems of voluntary payment usually rationalized
the result on the theory that the domiciliary administrator or executor takes title to all of the decedent's
personal property, wherever located, and this includes
choses in action such as debts. 40 While he might be
unable to sue to recover this property, his title is such
that he can give a good discharge to the debtor even
though the payment occurred outside the state of his
appointment. Now the ancillary administrator has not
been treated as receiving title to any of the decedent's
assets other than those located in the jurisdiction where
he was appointed. So our next problem is whether
voluntary payment by D to F when F is an ancillary
administrator will be a bar in a subsequent action
brought by A. The leading case on this question is
Wilkins v. Ellett. 41 D, a resident of Tennessee, paid
there to F, an administrator appointed in Alabama,
a debt which he owed decedent. Later A was appointed
administrator in Tennessee and brought this action to
recover the debt. In a previous case involving the same
fact situation, 42 where the trial court found that decedent's domicile was in Alabama and consequently that
F was a domiciliary representative, the Supreme Court
This theory has been rather vigorously criticized in Beale, supra note
31 at 59g-6o4.
41
I08 u.s. 256, 2 S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718 (188J).
42
Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740, 19 L.Ed. ss6 (U.S. I869).
40
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of the United States had held that the payment was a
valid discharge. The case was retried and the lower
court found that decedent was domiciled in Tennessee,
so that F was to be treated as ancillary administrator.
The Supreme Court still held that the payment was a
good discharge of the obligation. It based the result
largely on the decision in the previous case, saying that
it was immaterial whether F was an ancillary administrator or not. While it is difficult from the viewpoint of
theory to fit this case in with those involving payment
to a domestic representative, the cases decided since
have followed the holding in Wilkins v. Ellett. 43 The
courts seem more concerned with reaching a result
which will protect the debtor from having to pay twice
than one which will fit into a neat, logical pattern of
explanation.
The discussion thus far has assumed that the payment was of a simple con tract debt. Another factor
which can complicate the problem and may cause a different result is the existence of a negotiable instrument
or promissory note as evidence of the debt. It is generally held that F who has the note representing the
debt is entitled to receive the payment if the debtor
is willing to make payment. 44 This result is the same
as in the normal case involving voluntary payment by
the debtor to a foreign personal representative. One
case has held, however, that if the note is held by A,
the local administrator, voluntary payment by D to F
43 Morrison v. Berkshire Loan & Trust Co., 229 Mass. 519, II8 N.E.
895 (1918); Carr v. Prudential Ins. Co., 27 N.Y.S.(2d) 349 (1941).
44 McNamara v. McNamara, 62 Ga. 200 (1879); Thorman v. Broderick,
52 La. Ann. 1298, 27 So. 735 (1900); Goodlett v. Anderson, 75 Tenn. 286
(1881).
Contra: Bull v. Fuller, 78 Iowa 20 (1889); Mcllvoy v. Alsop, 45 Miss.
365 (1871).
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will not protect him in an action brought later on the
note by /./.. 45 In view of the tendency of modern courts
to adopt the "mercantile theory" in regard to commercial paper which holds that the debt is property
where the note is, 46 it is likely that any modern court
would hold that the only personal representative entitled to collect the asset would be the one in possession
of the note. Therefore, a debtor should not feel safe in
paying a foreign personal representative unless he can
surrender the note which evidences the debt.
A question may be raised whether there is any legal
obligation on the debtor to pay a foreign personal representative when he demands payment. This is not an
easy question to have litigated, because generally the
foreign administrator who demands payment is not entitled to go to court to collect the debt. However, in
states where the foreign personal representative is permitted to bring an action, the question has been decided, and the courts have held that there is no duty
on a debtor to pay a foreign personal representative. 47
He is entitled to wait and pay an ancillary administrator appointed in the jurisdiction, who can unquestionably give a valid discharge of the obligation. One of the
cases reached this result in spite of a statute aimed at
protecting debtors who make such voluntary payments.
It held that such a statute merely removed from the
debtor certain restrictions and did not impose on him
an obligation to pay. 48 This result seems strange. It
45

Amsden v. Danielson, I9 R.I. 533, 35 A. 70 (I896).
See supra Chapter II, pp. 4I-43.
47 Cameron v. Riggs Nat. Bank of Wash., 53 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. I943);
Joy v. Swanton Sav. Bank, III Vt. 106, IO A.(2d) 216 (I940).
48 Joy v. Swanton Sav. Bank, III Vt. 106, IO A.(2d) 2I6 (1940):
"It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature by the passage of the
statute in question intended to remove from a certain class of debtors, to
46
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unquestionably is sound to say that there is no duty
to pay an obligation to a foreign personal representative who cannot sue to collect the debt. A legal duty
presupposes that the right-holder can resort to the
courts to compel the obligor to perform his duty. However, in those situations where states have adopted
statutes permitting foreign administrators to sue, this
permission must mean that the foreign administrator
can sue to collect obligations owing to decedent and
the court must give judgment in favor of the plaintiff
if such obligation is owing. It would seem that the only
proper construction of such a statute would be that the
debtor is obligated to pay when sued, and satisfaction
of a judgment against him or payment under threat of
suit should be a discharge of his obligation.
Many of the obligations owed to decedent which
might be voluntarily paid to a foreign personal representative will be secured by some security arrangement
such as a mortgage. May a foreign executor or administrator who has the power to discharge a simple debt
also discharge mortgages? This will, of course, depend
on the law of the forum in which the mortgaged property lies. It would seem to follow as a logical extension
of the rule that if a foreign personal representative can
discharge a debt voluntarily paid to him, he might also
discharge a mortgage securing that debt. There is some
case authority to support this position 49 and legislation
which has adopted the principle. 5 ° Certainly, any dissome extent at least, the restrictions imposed on them by the above rule
of law [the common-law rule in Vermont that voluntary payment to a
foreign personal representative is not a valid discharge] ... Nothing can
be drawn from the act to show that it was intended to impose upon such
debtors the absolute duty of paying over on demand .... "
49 Dexter v. Berge, 76 Minn. 216, 78 N.W. IIII (1899).
60 See infra p. 164.
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charge of the debt which is recognized by the law governing the release of the mortgage would mean that the
remedies on the mortgage would no longer be available,
even to a local administrator.
As might be expected, there has been a great deal of
difficulty in satisfactorily explaining the result in cases
involving voluntary payment. Beale, who is the foremost exponent of the traditional theory concerning the
territorial limitation of a personal representative's authority, has developed a very complicated explanation."! When D has made a voluntary payment to F,
the forum in which D resides can compel him to pay
.A, the domestic administrator, a second time. However, if F is the domiciliary administrator and there
are no local creditors in the forum, .A, after he has administered the estate in his hands, will transmit the
assets including the second payment by D to F for distribution. Now the estate in the hands ofF will contain
two payments made by D. He will be entitled to recover the amount of his first payment from F on a
theory of unjust enrichment. In order to avoid this circuity of action, the forum will treat the first payment
as an equitable discharge and will not permit a second
recovery by the domestic administrator. This reasoning is a logical and adequate, although involved, explanation of the majority rule that payment to a domiciliary representative when there are no local creditors
will be a valid discharge, but it does not explain the
cases which go further and hold that payment is valid
if made to a foreign ancillary administrator or when
there are local creditors. Also, this explanation has
never actually been used by the courts as an explana51

Beale, supra note 31 at 6os, 6o8.
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tion for their decisions, nor does it seem accurately to
reflect the true motivations for the result.
The result can be explained much more simply in
terms of an almost instinctive reaction as to what is
just in this situation. The courts seem to realize that
the concept of separate administrations does not reflect the attitude of the layman in dealing with a decedent's estate. The debtor in the creation of the debt
dealt with one person, and when he made the payment
of that debt to a valid legal representative of the decedent in good faith, he thought he was to be discharged.
This payment will create assets of the estate which will
be available for the payment of claims and distribution
to heirs. The fact that the asset is in the hands of a
foreign, rather than a local, personal representative
may mean that the interests of local creditors may not
be so well protected, but the debtor is also a local citizen who is entitled to some protection from the forum.
Usually, the creditors will have been lax in not securing
an ancillary administration before payment was made.
Certainly, it is obviously unjust enrichment to require
the debtor to pay a second time and thus double the
assets available for the payment of debts. For these
reasons, the forum, which can as a matter of comity
recognize the authority of the foreign personal representative, will treat the payment to him as a valid
discharge.
The state of the decisions at common law as related
to the varying fact situations makes it impossible to
state categorically what the law is. A debtor may be
fairly safe in relying on payment to a foreign domiciliary representative when he is sure there are no local
creditors and no local administration as a discharge of
his debt which will bar a subsequent action by a local
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administrator. If he is not sure about the existence of
local creditors, or if there is an ancillary administration,
or if his obligation is evidenced by a promissory note
which the foreign personal representative does not possess, the only completely safe course for the debtor is
to refuse to pay any but a local administrator or to
wait until the foreign representative has obtained a
court order directing him to pay.
4-

STATUTES AFFECTING VoLUNTARY PAYMENT TO A
FoREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

The uncertainty which the common-law rules raise
as to the effect of a voluntary payment to a foreign
personal representative was bound to produce legislative activity in an attempt to work out a more satisfactory situation. Certainly the banks and insurance
companies who occupy the position of debtors to persons who will frequently die domiciled in a jurisdiction
other than the one in which they are located would agitate for legislative remedies. 62 As a result, over half of
the states in this country have adopted statutes in one
form or another which deal with the effect of a voluntary payment to foreign personal representatives or a
delivery of personal property belonging to decedent.
The statutes vary considerably in their provisions, but
they fall roughly into two classes.
The first group of statutes are those which provide
that a foreign personal representative has the power to
62 The influence of banking circles in motivating this type of legislation
is very evident in the statute passed in Georgia, I IJ Ga. Code Ann. 2406:
"Such foreign executor or administrator may transfer the stock of any
bank or other corporation in the State standing in the name of the decedent, and check out deposits made by him and dividends declared on his
stock, first filing with the bank or corporation a certified copy of his appointment and qualification."
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release mortgages and liens. A typical one is the following:
"When an executor or administrator has been appointed
in any other state or foreign country of the estate of a person
not a resident of this state at the time of his decease, and no
executor or administrator thereon be appointed in this state,
or when a guardian of a minor has been appointed in any
other state or foreign country, such foreign executor, administrator or guardian upon filing and recording in the
recorder's office of the county in which the mortgage held
by the estate of such deceased person or minor is recorded an
authenticated copy of his appointment, may execute satisfaction or deeds of release of a mortgage upon property
situate in this state as and with like effect as executors,
administrators and guardians appointed in this state." 53
Six states have adopted statutes of this nature. 54 All of
these require the foreign personal representative to file
his letters for record before he can release the mortgage. While the statutes do not expressly provide that
any voluntary payment to a foreign personal representative made in good faith will be a valid discharge,
by implication any statute which provides that a foreign personal representative may discharge the security
for a debt gives him the power to collect and discharge
the debt.
The second, and by far the more numerous variety of
statute, provides specifically that the payment of debts
and delivery of personal property of decedent to a foreign personal representative will be a valid acquittance.
The following is a representative statutory provision of
this type:
Arizona Code, sec. 62-5II (1939).
Arizona Code, sec. 62-5u (1939); Gen. Stat. of Conn., sec. 7116
(1949); Idaho Code, sec. 15-813; N.D. Rev. Code, sec. 35-0125 (1943);
58 Okla. Stat. Ann. 262; Ore. Rev. Stat. 86.130.
53
64
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"A payment by a resident or citizen of this state to a
fiduciary appointed in another state of, or on account of, a
debt due to his decedent, ward or trust, made before letters
are granted in this state, shall be as valid and effectual as if
made to a fiduciary duly appointed in this state. The foreign
fiduciary may, before letters are granted in this state, release
and discharge real or personal estate from a mortgage, judgment or other lien or encumbrance held by his decedent,
ward or trust, with like effect as if he had received letters in
this state." 55
Statutes similar to this have been adopted in a large
number of states. 56 These statutes usually require that
the foreign personal representative must file his letters
before he will be entitled to collect decedent's debts and
give a valid discharge for them. Some of the statutes
require that the debtor wait a specified period, either
three months 57 or six months, 58 after the death of the
decedent, and if by that time there is no domestic personal representative appointed, he may safely pay a
foreign executor or administrator. A number of the
statutes provide that payment will be a valid discharge
only if the debtor had no knowledge at the time of the
55

N.J. Stat. Ann. 3A:13-1.
61 Ala. I 5I, I 52 (I940); I2 Del. Code Ann., I 562; Fla. Stat. Ann., sec.
734.30; II3 Ga. Code Ann. 2406; Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 4I6;
Gen. Stat. of Kan., sec. 59-1707; Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 395.170 (1953);
Rev. Stat. of Me., ch. 154, sec. 89; Ann. Code of Md., Art. 93, sec. 83
(limited to transfer of stock and payment of public bonds); Ann. Laws of
Mass., ch. 204, sec. 3; Miss. Code, sec. 622 (I942); Vernon's Ann. Mo.
Stat., sec. 466.oio; Rev. Laws of N.H., ch. 353, sec. 28; N.J. Stat. Ann.,
3A:13-1; Ore. Rev. Stat., sec. I I6.185 (limited to debts or personal property not exceeding $500 in value); Gen. Laws of R.I., ch. 575, sec. 25, 26;
Code of S.C., sec. 19-6oo; Vt. Stat., sec. 8746, 8777, 9189 (limited to payment to foreign domiciliary personal representative); Code of Va., sec.
64-I23 (I95o); Wise. Stat., sec. 235.56 (1953); Wyo. Comp. Stat., sec.
66-135 (I945).
57 Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 734.30; Ore. Rev. Stat., sec. ri6.I85.
58 Rev. Stat. of Me., ch. 154, sec. 89; Ann. Laws of Mass., ch. 204, sec.
3; Rev. Laws cf N.H., ch. 353, sec. 28.
56
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existence of a domestic representative if he had already
been appointed, and a few say that payment is valid
only if there is no local representative. The statutes do
not generally make the distinction between payment to
a domiciliary or ancillary administrator, nor between
the existence or absence of local creditors that the
common-law rules do. Thus the statutes make important modifications on the common-law rules. They also
have the virtue of making the law more certain. In a
state where such a statute has been passed, a debtor
who is assured that the conditions of the statute have
been complied with can make a voluntary payment to
a foreign personal representative with confidence that
he will not have to pay it a second time.

5·

DEBTS DuE TO DECEDENT FROM THE UNITED STATEs

A special problem is raised because of the dual nature of government in this country. Over the fortyeight separate legal systems operating in mutually exclusive geographical areas is imposed one federal legal
system which is coextensive in territory with all the
states. When a personal representative is appointed in
one of the states, he derives his authority from that
legal order, and most of his activities are confined
within its geographical limits. The United States as a
legal entity exists in the terri tory in which the personal
representative was appointed and also in each of the
forty-seven other states. When the United States owes
a debt to the decedent, there is a problem where the
debt is to be collected and by which personal representative. This problem first came before the Supreme
Court of the United States in Vaughan v. Northrup 59
69

IS Pet. I, Io L.Ed. 639 (U.S. I84I).
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The United States owed a debt to decedent for military service in the Revolutionary War. The defendant
was appointed his personal representative in Kentucky
and came to the District of Columbia and collected the
sum from the Treasury of the United States. While there
he was sued by heirs of the decedent for their distributive shares. The case was decided in an opinion written
by Mr. Justice Story, who always speaks with great
authority on matters of conflict of laws. In the course
of the opinion, he said:
"The debts due from the government of the United States
have no locality at the seat of government. The United
States, in their sovereign capacity, have no particular place
of domicile, but possess, in contemplation oflaw, an ubiquity
throughout the Union; and the debts due by them are not
to be treated like the debts of a private debtor, which constitute local assets in his own domicile. On the contrary, the
administrator of a creditor of the government, duly appointed in the state where he was domiciled at his death, has
full authority to receive payment, and give a full discharge
of the debt due to his intestate, in any place where the
government may choose to pay it; whether it be at the seat
of government, or at any other place where the public funds
are deposited." 60

Thus it seems that a personal representative has the
authority to collect debts due from the United States
anywhere he can persuade the Treasury of the United
States to pay him.
There is a further problem which arises when there
is more than one personal representative. The Supreme
Court has held that the United States "may in their
discretion, exercised through the appropriate officers,
ao 15 Pet. (U.S.) at 6. Quoted with approval and followed in: United
States for the use of Mackey v. Coxe, 18 How. 100, 15 L.Ed. 289 (1855);
Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U.S. 654, 3 S.Ct. 417, 27 L.Ed. 1068 (1883).
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pay a debt, due to the estate of a deceased person,
either to the administrator appointed in the State of
his domicile, or to an ancillary administrator duly appointed in the District of Columbia .... " 61 This places
the decision as to which personal representative should
be paid solely in the discretion of the Treasury officials.
As a matter of legal reasoning, such a result seems
proper. However, the discretion should always be exercised in favor of the domiciliary personal representative. This is the principal administration and is the one
toward which all unifying movements should be made.
The United States should have no interest in protecting
a group of creditors in a specific locality and should
lend the weight of its authority to unifying the administration by paying any funds it owes the decedent
to the domiciliary representative. To pay them to any
other administrator would increase the problems of
multiple administrations.

6. SuMMARY
A foreign personal representative can enter the jurisdiction and there take possession of movable chattels
to be removed to the state of his administration. Similarly, if the asset is a debt owed by a resident of the
forum, he may persuade the debtor to pay it to him
voluntarily. These assets will have been effectively collected as far as the foreign personal representative is
concerned. The important problem then becomes how
the forum will treat the transaction as regards the
bailee or debtor who delivered the assets to the foreign
administrator. The great majority of cases will reach
the conclusion that such delivery was proper so as to
61 Wyman v. Halstead,
(I88J).
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prevent a second recovery by a subsequently appointed
local administrator. Over half of the states have statutes which expressly make valid the delivery of chattels or the payment of debts to a foreign administrator.
In those states which retain the common law, the most
unfortunate feature of the rules is the uncertainty as to
legal consequences. A bailee or debtor in such a jurisdiction who surrenders assets to a foreign personal representative can rarely be sure that he has been discharged of his obligation.

CHAPTER

VI

The Unified Administration
I. THE NECESSITY FOR A UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION

HE general rule from which all discussion must
start is that a personal representative who is appointed in one jurisdiction has no authority per
se to act in any other. This is the result of two theories.
The most likely explanation for the development of
the rule was the extremely influential concept of the
sovereign character of each legal order. The rule was
developed in the ecclesiastical courts of England, where
quite probably each archbishop was jealous of the
power of the other and therefore would not permit the
other's appointees to act in his jurisdiction. 1 The rule
was popularized in the legal world by Story, who
founded his system of conflict of laws on a sovereigntycomity theory. We have seen that a modern writer like
Beale will still explain the rules as the result of the
lack of power of a legal order to make its law by its
own force operate in other jurisdictions. 2 This theory,
in order to be a satisfactory explanation, presupposes
that the other states, because they are not compelled
to do so, will refuse to recognize that the laws of that
state do have force in their jurisdictions. As a matter
of fact, these other jurisdictions frequently recognize
the operative force of the law of the first state in their
territories, and this forms the basis of those rules
generally classified in the field of conflict of laws. In

T

1
2

See supra Chapter I, pp. 15-16.
See quotation, supra Chapter II, p. JI.
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many situations involving foreign personal representatives, effect is given to the law of another state. This
should cause us to realize that the important point of
view of analysis is not that of the state which appointed
the personal representative, but rather the state in
which the personal representative attempts to perform
some action and which must determine whether that
action is proper. Therefore we have to turn from the
logical-legal explanations of a Beale and consider the
question from the attitude of the forum. Why has the
forum adopted the general rule excluding foreign
executors and administrators? What exceptions has it
made to this general rule? Why were these exceptions
made? Should the exceptions be extended further?
Should the general rule be abolished altogether?
The real and only justification for the general rule
limiting the authority of the foreign personal representative to the territory of the appointing state is the
desire to protect local creditors. In the vast majority of
cases, the only purpose which a foreign executor or administrator can have in wanting to act in the forum is
to collect decedent's assets. If he is permitted to do so,
the local creditors can no longer satisfy their claims out
of property located in the jurisdiction. Story pictured
the undesirable consequences of permitting the removal of decedent's assets when he wrote:
Persons, domiciled and dying in one country, are often
deeply indebted to foreign creditors, living in other countries,
where there are personal assets of the deceased. In such
cases it would be a great hardship upon such creditors to
allow the original executor or administrator to withdraw
those funds from the foreign country, without the payment
of such debts, and thus to leave the creditors to seek their
remedy in the domicile of the original executor or adminis-
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trator, and perhaps there to meet with obstructions and
inequalities in the enforcement of their own rights from the
peculiarities of the locallaw." 3

In order to protect the local creditor's interest, the
forum as a general rule has required that decedent's
property located in the jurisdiction be administered
there, and after all local creditors have been paid the
proceeds will be transmitted to the principal administration for distribution. Therefore, in weighing the
desirability of a unified administration against the current requirement of separate administrations, on one
side of the scales must be placed the interests of local
creditors in local assets.
Notwithstanding the necessity of caring for local
citizens who have claims against the estate, many exceptions have been made in favor of permitting action
in the state by a foreign personal representative. Thus
we have seen that there are many situations where a
foreign personal representative is permitted by common law or legislation to sue, 4 that he may be allowed
to sellland,O and is generally permitted to collect movable chattels and debts located in the forum. 6 This
indicates a rather extreme dissatisfaction with the
operation of the general rule. So the next logical question is, why have the courts and legislatures in general
been so willing to make the exceptions?
The result of applying the general rule is to require
an ancillary administration in the state where the
property is located. Such an administration is quite
3

Story, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2nd Ed., sec.

5I2 (I84I).
See supra Chapter II, pp. 35-54·
supra Chapter IV, pp. I:l5-I28.
6 See supra Chapter V.

4

5 See
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expensive. There will be the added cost which will
always arise from duplication of effort, and more particularly there will be court costs, attorney's fees, and
administrator's fees. This added expense must be paid
out of the assets of the estate. The expense will diminish
the amount of the property available for distribution
to the heirs, devisees, or legatees of the decedent. They
are as entitled to protection, not only from the domiciliary court, but all courts, as is any group or class of
creditors. The heirs and beneficiaries of the decedent
should be entitled to demand as inexpensive an administration of the estate as is possible to insure that
they will receive more of the decedent's property.
However, if the estate is insolvent, the added expense
of various ancillary administrations would mean that
there is less of decedent's property available to pay
decedent's claims. Treating the estate as a whole and
the decedent's creditors as a single group, the application of the rule harms the very class it was designed to
protect. Therefore, on the other side of the scales we
can place the interest of the heirs and legatees and also
the creditors as a general class in having as inexpensive
an administration as possible so that there will be more
assets for the payment of claims and for distribution.
Another point which argues against the ancillary administration is the time factor. The general practice is
that the ancillary administration will follow the established probate proceeding of the state, and after all the
claims have been paid and the administrator has made
his final accounting, the remaining assets will be transmitted to the principal or domiciliary administration
for distribution. This means that the domiciliary administration must be kept open until various ancillary
administrations are concluded. This problem of co-
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ordinating the various administrations may prolong the
principal administration for months and will thus delay
the distribution of property. The law should have a
definite policy in favor of not tying up property for
lengthy periods of time and for seeing that the dependents of decedent get clear title to his property as
soon as possible. Thus another factor to be weighed
against the general rule is the delay in the conclusion
of probate proceedings caused by ancillary administration.
Another important fact which militates against
separate administrations is the uncertainty as to the
proper personal representative with whom to deal. If a
third party resides in the domiciliary state, he may
deal with the domiciliary personal representative with
confidence that any transactions will be valid. Likewise,
if the party resides in a state where an ancillary administration has been taken out, he may carry out any
transactions with the ancillary administrator. However, if he lives in a state in which there is no ancillary
administration, he can never be sure that a later administration will not be taken out and therefore can
never rest assured that in transactions begun with the
decedent a completion with the domiciliary representative will be treated as valid in the state where he resides. Since third parties, regardless of where they live,
have created contractual obligations with the decedent
as a single person, they ought to be entitled in the
event of his death to look to a single person to whom
they will perform. Therefore, it is important to achieve
certainty and unity in the successor or personal representative of the decedent.
Another factor which is becoming of more importance
in the conditions of our modern society is a necessity
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for a unified policy of conservation and management of
an estate. Many estates today, even moderate-sized
ones, are made up largely of business enterprises and
interests spread over a number of states which the
decedent has held and managed as integrated property.
The value of such an estate will depend largely on the
market values of the property interests, which will be
higher when operated in an integrated fashion. Such
an estate on decedent's death can only be satisfactorily
managed as a whole if advantages are to be taken of
fluctuating values and continued business operation. If
the estate is managed by several administrators completely independent of one another, the value of the
estate may decline sharply. Therefore, another reason
against having ancillary administration is the necessity
for a unified management of the estate.
Thus we see that in deciding the factors pro and con
on this question, on the side of the separate administrations there is the desire to protect local creditors.
In favor of some program of unified administration, we
have (1) the desire to eliminate expense, (2) the prevention of delay, (3) the necessity to achieve certainty
as to decedent's representative, and (4) the avoidance
of multiple management of integrated assets. Since
these various factors may not be of equal weight in
reaching an answer, there should be a brief consideration of how important it is today to protect local
creditors by requiring an ancillary administration.
When Story wrote, it was not clear whether a jurisdiction might discriminate against a foreign creditor by
refusing to pay his claim until all claims presented by
creditors residing in that state were paid. If a local creditor residing in the forum can be made junior to all claimants who are citizens of the state where domiciliary ad-
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ministration is being had, or if the domiciliary state can
refuse to pay any but resident creditors, there is much
force in arguing the necessity for an ancillary administration in the forum. In deciding this question, the
practice of the states in their treatment of foreign
creditors is much more important than their theoretical
power to discriminate against the foreign claimants.
This problem has been largely resolved in this country
by the decision in Blake v. McClung. 7 This involved a
receivership in Tennessee of an English corporation
which was insolvent. There was a Tennessee statute
which gave a priority in the distribution of the corporation's assets to Tennessee creditors over those residing
in other states. The Supreme Court of the United States
held that this statute was unconstitutional under the
"privileges and immunities" clause. 8 In the opinion,
the court said:
"We adjudge that when the general property and assets
of a private corporation, lawfully doing business in a State,
are in course of administration by the courts of such State,
creditors who are citizens of other States are entitled, under
the Constitution of the United States, to stand upon the
same plane with citizens of such State, and cannot be
denied equality of right simply because they do not reside in
that State, but are citizens residing in other States of the
Union.'' 9

While the case deals with the administration of insolvent
corporations, the case is very analogous to the administration of a decedent's estate, and the result would be
the same if a state attempted to give a preference to its
172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165, 43 L.Ed. 432 (1898).
United States Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 2. "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."
9 172 U.S. at 258.
7

8
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own citizens having claims against a decedent's property
over creditors from other states.
While the above decision does not prevent discrimination against foreign corporations having claims, 10
and certainly does not prevent foreign countries from
giving priorities to their nationals over claimants from
the United States, it is unlikely that a creditor of decedent will be discriminated against among the class of
creditors to which he belongs if he files a claim in a
foreign estate administration. So the only real difficulty
involved is the inconvenience in presenting a claim in a
foreign jurisdiction. In the time of Story, this' was a
real problem. Today, however, with our almost instantaneous communication systems and our very rapid
transportation facilities, there is little real inconvenience
involved in presenting a claim in the administration
being had in a foreign tribunal.~ Certainly, this slight
inconvenience and the expense involved do not outweigh the interest of the heirs and other creditors in
having a unified administration.
Even if there were discrimination against a creditor
in a foreign jurisdiction in exceptional cases and also
some little inconvenience in presenting and collecting
his claim, a very forceful argument can be made in
favor of unified administration. In modern societies, a
party dealing with other persons must take many
risks. If the other party is insolvent, he may not be
10
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165, 43 L.Ed. 432 (1898),
held that a foreign private corporation was not a citizen within the meaning
of the privileges and immunities clause and therefore could be discriminated against in favor of local creditors. There has been some doubt
thrown on this position by cases decided later by the Supreme Court of
the United States which hold that a private corporation is a citizen within
the privileges and immunities clause. See: Kentucky Finance Corporation
v. Paramount Auto Exchange, 262 U.S. 544, 43 S. Ct. 636, 67 L.Ed. II12
(1923).
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able to enforce fulfillment of the obligation. The contract may be unenforceable because of impossibility of
performance. Another risk which the party can be
made to take is that if the other party dies, he will be
left to whatever remedies are provided him by the
domiciliary administration in collecting his debts.
Certainly a nondomiciliary forum is just as interested in
achieving a system of speedy, unified, and inexpensive
administrations as it is in protecting local creditors.
This can only be accomplished if it will refrain from
requiring an ancillary administration and will recognize
the foreign domiciliary personal representative in all
matters, in the hope that the foreign jurisdiction will
reciprocate by treating its domiciliary administrations
in the same manner. If the only way to bring this about
is to send the local creditor to the domiciliary administration in another jurisdiction, there is no really
serious objection to that. The multitude of legislation
which has this effect indicates that the states have no
real qualms about refusing to protect local creditors if
they will receive fair treatment in the state of principal
administration.
It should be abundantly clear by now that the writer
is completely in favor of a single unified administration
on a decedent's estate. It seems to me that the advantages to be gained so greatly outweigh the desire
to protect local creditors that there can be little serious
debate. This is the view which has been reached by the
vast majority of the writers who have considered the
problem. 11 The really important question is how to
Basye, "Dispensing with Administration," 44 MrcH. L. REv. 329
at 409 (1945); Cheatham, "The Statutory Successor, the Receiver and the
Executor in Conflict of Laws," 44 CoL. L. REv. 549 (1944); Hopkins,
"The Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees," 53 YALE L. J. 221
(1944); Niles, "Model Probate Code and Monographs on Probate Law:
11
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achieve what is generally regarded as the highly desirable result of a unified administration.
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR A UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION

In order to achieve a unified administration, there
must be some changes made in the present law. This is
obvious from the number of ancillary administrations
which are still necessary to administer a large estate.
Before we decide the best means of bringing about these
changes, it is important to determine what is necessary
to achieve the unified administration and to what extent these requirements are met by the present law.
The first obvious requirement is that the personal
representative must be subject to the control of only
one court. If any case involving the property of the
estate or raising questions about the management of
that property, he should be answerable only to the
court which appointed him. As was seen in Chapter
III, this is the general result under the existing law.
With few and relatively unimportant exceptions,
foreign tribunals will not assume jurisdiction over
personal representatives in any matter touching their
representative character. Consequently, this raises no
problems.
A second essential is that there be only one administration on each estate. This may seem a truism, but
there is a serious question whether a single administration on a decedent's estate is completely desirable. The
single administration presupposes the designation of
one jurisdiction as the only one which can administer
A Review," 45 MicH. L. REv. 321 at 339 (1947); Note, "The Capacity
of Executors and Administrators to Sue in a Foreign Jurisdiction," 50
CoL. L. REv. 518 at 523 (1950).
Contra: Buchanan & Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in
View of First National Bank v. Maine," 48 HARV. L. Rev. 9II at 950
(1935).
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decedent's property. The obvious state to select is the
domiciliary one. However, there are instances where
the domiciliary state is not the best jurisdiction in
which to hold the administration. If a decedent were
domiciled in Michigan at the date of his death, but all
of his property consisted of a business operated in
New York and all of his creditors and debtors resided
there, it would be very unsatisfactory to attempt to
administer that estate wholly in Michigan. To attempt
to lay down a standard which provides that the state
where the most property is located or where the majority of the parties are found is to be the place where
the single administration is to be held would lead to the
unfortunate result of so uncertain a criterion that the
states would be fighting over which one was entitled
to administer the assets.
One solution to this problem is to retain the principle
of separate administrations and try to eliminate only
undesirable and unnecessary ancillary administrations. The way to accomplish this seems to be to leave
the matter in the discretion of the probate court to
whom the parties apply for ancillary administration.
If the domiciliary personal representative can show
that only a small portion of the decedent's estate is in
the forum and only a few of the heirs and creditors in
relation to the total number are present there, the probate court should have the jurisdiction to refuse to
grant the administration. Such a provision appears in
the Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act.
"The [probate court] may deny the application for ancillary letters if it appears that the estate may be settled
conveniently without ancillary administration. Such denial
is without prejudice to any subsequent application if it
later appears that ancillary administration should be had." 12
12

Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act, section 3·
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This must be accompanied by legislation which gives
the foreign domiciliary representative the power to
perform all the functions of administration in the
forum. If such discretion were wisely exercised by the
courts, the worst features of the separate administrations could be eliminated.
Such a solution does not seem satisfactory to me,
however. Two of the reasons previously given for the
necessity of the unified administration were the need
for management of integrated business interests by a
single personal representative and the need to achieve
certainty as to the personal representative so that
obligors of the decedent could deal with him with
confidence. As long as there are ancillary administrations, such policies cannot be completely effectuated.
Further, leaving the matter in the discretion of the
various probate courts with such a broad standard of
decision may well mean that the courts in many localities will require that there be ancillary administrations in nearly as many situations as it is required
under the present law.
I feel that it is necessary to provide for one administration on an estate. Since the succession to movable
property is determined by the law of the domicile 13 and
since the administration there is always regarded as
the principal one by Anglo-American courts, the
domiciliary administration should be selected as that
single administration. It is true that frequently a substantial part of the property and a majority of the
decedent's creditors will be located in other jurisdictions. This does not present an insurmountable barrier
to the unified administration. Let us take the extreme
hypothetical case posed before. A decedent was domi13 REsTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec.

303 (1934).
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ciled in Michigan, but his property, a going business,
and all the parties were in New York. If New York
were to permit the personal representative appointed
in Michigan to perform the functions of administration
in its jurisdiction, the problem could be handled adequately. The Michigan court could authorize the
personal representative to manage the business property
in New York. It could require him to follow the same
procedure for the payment of claims in New York as
he does in Michigan. He would give notice in New
York of the administration and be available there at
specified times over a designated period to receive
claims against the estate. The claims, after having
been approved by the probate court at the domicile
in Michigan, could be paid in New York. Such a procedure, while following closely an ancillary administration, does not mean that the domiciliary representative
has to subject himself to the procedure and control of
each legal order in which the decedent left property.
Such activity in other jurisdictions could be handled
by the personal representative himself or by an agent.
The personal representative should be required to
follow this procedure only in those states where the
decedent left a substantial portion of his property and
where a number of creditors are who would be inconvenienced by having to come to the domiciliary forum
to present their claims. Such a procedure would adequately handle the rare situation where it would be
better to have a nondomiciliary forum as the place of
unified administration. It will also enable the creditors
in those jurisdictions where it is most common and
profitable today to require an ancillary administration
to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner.
The third necessity for a unified administration is
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that the domiciliary representative be treated as
having title to all of the decedent's property wherever
located for purposes of administration. This will require that the states forego their right to require an
ancillary administration which gives title of the property within the jurisdiction to the local administrator.
While this will be a substantial difference in the probate law of Anglo-American states, it is not a revolutionary or startling change. There are many analogous
situations where a fiduciary in much the same position
as a personal representative, such as a universal successor, statutory receiver, or trustee, is treated as
having title to property in other jurisdictions.
As was pointed out in the first chapter, the universal
successor who performs the functions of administration
in civil-law systems takes title to all of the decedent's
property. This title will be recognized even by common-law courts as to property in their jurisdictions. 14
It the universal successor can be treated thus, it is
difficult to see why the domiciliary personal representative cannot be.
Secondly, a statutory receiver is said to have title to
the property of a corporation wherever it may be. The
receivership is strikingly similar to a probate administration, and the receiver is very much akin to the
personal representative. 15 When a business is insolvent,
he takes over and manages all its property, frequently
operates the business, and then pays the assets at the
14
The Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 213 N.Y. 429, 108 N.E. 72 (191 5);
Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341 (1863).
15 The similarities between the personal representative and the statutory
receiver are noted and a strong argument is made for the treatment of the
personal representative in a similar fashion to the statutory receiver in
Cheatham, "The Statutory Successor, the Receiver and the Executor in
the Conflict of Laws," 44 CoL. L. REv. 549 (1944).
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conclusion of the receivership in equal shares to the
creditors. He is a fiduciary conserving the property for
the benefit of the corporation's creditors. Originally,
the receiver was appointed by a court of equity and
was said to be limited to the territory of the appointing
court, just as a personal representative is. 16 This result
is based on the same theory, i.e., that an appointee
cannot have authority to act outside the jurisdiction
ot the court which appointed him. It was also justified
on the same policy, that the state wanted to protect
local creditors of the corporation by requiring an ancillary receivership on the corporation's property in the
jurisdiction. It became obvious that this was totally
unsatisfactory when a large nation-wide corporation
went into receivership and had to be operated. So it
was held that in the situation where the receiver was
appointed in pursuance of a statute of the state of incorporation which made him an assignee of the corporation's property, he had title to that property which will
be recognized in other states.17 According to Beale,
"Other states will recognize this succession (so like the
French doctrine of univeral succession on death), and will
give this statutory receiver all movables of the corporation
within the state, and will allow the statutory receiver to sue
on a claim due to the corporation." 18

It is difficult to see how a statute of a state can be
more effective in assigning title to the property of a
corporation than a decree of a court created by the same
legal order, but certainly the result, although not too
16 Standard Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Cooper & Griffen, 30 F.(2d) 842
(W.D. N.C. 1929).
17 Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 222, 26 L.Ed. 337 (188o); Clark v. Willard,
292 U.S. 112,54 S.Ct. 615,78 L.Ed. n6o (1934).
18 Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, I570.
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logical, is a necessary and desirable one. If the statutory
receiver can take title to all the property of a corporation organized in the state, it is hard to understand why
the personal representative cannot take title to all the
property of a decedent domiciled in the jurisdiction at
his death. Of course, this depends on the attitude of
the nondomiciliary states in which the decedent left
property, but if they are going to recognize the title
of a foreign statutory receiver, they ought to be prepared to do so with a foreign personal representative.
Also, a trustee is a similar fiduciary who has always
been treated as having title to the trust res regardless
of its location. 19 This may be because the common law
never distinguished between the personalities of a
trustee and of an individual as was done with the receiver and the personal representative. 20 In the modern
English legislation, principally the Administration of
Estates Act of 1925, 21 it has been provided that the
personal representative holds the property of the
estate as a trustee. This raises the problem whether
such a provision will be treated as vesting title to all of
the decedent's property, wherever it may be located, in
the English executor or administrator in the same way
19 Shirk v. City of La Fayette, 52 F. 857 (C.C. D.Ind. I892); Roby v
Smith, I3I Ind. 342,30 N.E. I093 (I89I).
2
°Cheatham, supra note IS at 553-554.
21 "Subject to the powers, rights, duties and liabilities herein-after
mentioned, the personal representatives of a deceased person shall hold
the real estate as trustees for the persons by law beneficially entitled
thereto ...." 9 Halsbury's STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 2nd Ed., 7I6 (Land
Transfer Act, I897· 6o & 6I Viet. 65, sec. 2).
"On the death of a person intestate as to any real or personal estate,
such estate shall be held by his personal representatives(a) as to the real estate upon trust to sell the same; and
(b) as to the personal estate upon trust to call in sell and convert into
money such part thereof as may not consist of money .... "
9 Halsbury's STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 2nd Ed., p. 734 (The Administration of Estates Act, I925. I 5 Geo. 5 c. 23, s. 33).
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as was done with the statutory receiver or as an ordinary
trustee. This depends not so much on the wording of
the English legislation as it does on the effect given it
by the courts of other jurisdictions as to property located there. I feel that such a provision will not change
the rules discussed in this book. The nondomiciliary
courts will be inclined to say that the legislation as to
the nature of the personal representative applies only
to property within the jurisdiction of the English
Parliament and that it cannot enlarge the control of
an English personal representative over property outside England.
Two things are required on behalf of the nondomiciliary states in addition to refraining from requiring
ancillary administrations in order to place title in the
domiciliary representative. The foreign domiciliary
personal representative must be permitted to collect
all the assets of the decedent located in the jurisdiction
and to give a valid discharge to all obligations satisfied
to him. Secondly, he must have the power to bring any
necessary actions in the courts of the state to compel
an obligor of the decedent to perform the obligation
to himself and to recover property of the decedent
from wrongful possessors. Nearly half of the states have
legislation permitting such suits 22 and over halt have
statutes providing that a foreign personal representative
can give a valid discharge to a person who pays a debt
or surrenders property of the decedent to him. 23 In
those states, little change is necessary. Our problem is
to secure changes in the states which retain the common law and to work out a uniform system throughout
the nation. By no means should such attempts at uni22
23

See supra Chapter II, note 92.
See supra Chapter V, pp. I6J-I66.

UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION

187

formity and unity in the administration of a decedent's
estate be limited to the United States, but it is here
that the problems caused by the separate administrations are the most frequent and pressing.
3·

MEANS OF AcHIEVING THE UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION

This area of the administration of decedents' estates
points up more than any other the unsatisfactory results of the forty-eight separate private law systems
we have in this country. The United States is by
population, customs, and geography one nation. The
state boundaries are unquestionably artificial. Therefore, the population and its movable property are
extremely fluid. And yet that population and property
are governed by widely differing legal systems depending on their location at any given time. This condition
gives rise to a multitude of conflict of law problems
which are often bewildering and frequently difficult of
solution. It is this situation which has made the United
States the cradle for much of modern conflict of laws.
There is nothing inherently necessary in maintaining
the states as separate legal institutions. The movement
for uniform legislation and the expansion of federal
activity in many legal areas indicate the desirability of
one legal system for the entire country. One such legal
order could provide for a unified administration of
decedents' estates in the territory of the United States
and thus eliminate all the problems raised by separate
administrations. Since this would require drastic constitutional amendment, such a solution is not even remotely possible and the answer must come from other
directions.
As long as there are a number of separate legal orders
in the territory of the United States, a completely unified administration is a rather forlorn hope. Even if all
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the legal orders participated in the achievement of a
system of unified administrations, it is very likely that
the multiple statutes and decisions would reach a
variety of results in the various states. 24 However, the
fact that about half of the states retain the commonlaw rules with little or no statutory modification indicates that the desire to solve this problem is not allpervading. Therefore, we must treat unified administration as an ideal and work toward the elimination of
as much of the unnecessary ancillary administrations
as possible.
The states could as a matter of comity through court
decision go a long way towards achieving a sufficient
unified administration and, as a matter of fact, have
done so. If the courts would permit a foreign personal
representative always to sue to collect assets, would
refuse to permit any actions brought against a foreign
personal representative, and would not interfere with
his collection of local assets, there would be little need
for an ancillary administration. If this were coupled
with the power to refuse to grant an ancillary administration in the state unless it were absolutely necessary
for efficient administration, most of the problems would
be solved. However, the doctrine of stare decisis will
influence the courts to retain most of the rules which
are currently in force, and the evolutionary process
which the common law takes is not rapid enough to
give an immediate solution. The answer would seem to
have to come from legislation.
.
The legislation must be adopted in all the forty-eight
24

The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was adopted in all fortyeight states quite early. The experience with that piece of legislation has
been that cases decided in pursuance of the same act by different courts
in different states do not always produce uniformity. See Britton on
BILLS AND NoTEs, 19-22.
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states. There has been a great deal of piecemeal legislation dealing with specific problems, but in only about
half of the states. In order to achieve unified administration of a decedent's estate, there must be legislation adopted in each state in which the decedent might
leave property, and that legislation must have in effect
the same provisions. This will, of course, require the
enactment of some uniform legislation.
Naturally, the desirability of such legislation has not
escaped the notice of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and they have
promulgated and adopted two acts in this area. The
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act 26 was
adopted by them in I 94+ It has not been adopted in
any state. 26 The Act in essence provides that in the
absence of an ancillary, administration, the foreign
personal representative "may exercise all powers which
would exist in favor of a local representative." This
will include the power to maintain actions and to give a
valid discharge to persons who deliver property or pay
debts to him. The Act has the further advantage of permitting such action only by the domiciliary representative. A unified administration requires action by only
one administrator, and the logical one to select is the
domiciliary representative.
The Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates
Act 27 was adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1949· It has
been adopted in Wisconsin. 28 In addition to providing
25

See infra Appendix A.

26

HANDBOOK oF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERs oN

1953. Table at 317.
See infra Appendix B.

UNIFORM STATE LAws,
't1

26 HANDBOOK oF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATES LAws,

1953· Table at 317.
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that the probate court may refuse to grant ancillary
administration, the purpose of the Act is to permit the
foreign personal representative appointed in the domicile to act as ancillary administrator. Not only is he
preferred in the appointment of an ancillary administrator, but he may be substituted for a local administrator already appointed. The Act attempts to achieve
as unified an administration as possible by providing
that in the insolvent estate all creditors, regardless of
their residence, are entitled to share equally in the
assets of the ancillary administration, taking into account what they have received in other administrations. The important provision in this Act is that which
provides that the probate court may refuse to grant an
ancillary administration if the estate can be conveniently settled without it. There can be no truly
unified administration as long as there is any ancillary
administration on the estate. If the jurisdiction will
refrain from requiring local administrations except when
absolutely necessary, it will be possible to achieve a
high degree of unity in probate administrations in this
country.
Any legislative remedy which is to be adopted in the
various states must have two viewpoints, that of
administrations which are domiciliary in the state and
that of estates where the decedent is domiciled elsewhere. In the case of the nondomiciliary estate, the
provision must be that the domiciliary representative
takes title to all of the property of the decedent in the
state and that he may maintain actions to collect this
property and may discharge obligations due to the
estate. The Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives
Act is well drafted to accomplish this and consequently
should be adopted in all the states. In addition, the
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state must adopt legislation providing that no ancillary
administration may be had in the state on a nondomiciliary estate. The Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act, while well drawn to eliminate the
unnecessary ancillary administration, still retains the
principle of separate administrations and should not
be adopted. Under such a legislative program, the
domiciliary representative could perform all the functions of administration in the state.
Some changes must be made in the probate practice
of the state dealing with a domiciliary estate in order to
achieve unified administration. It must be made clear
and certain that creditors from other jurisdictions
will be treated in exactly the same way as creditors
resident in the state in order to alleviate the fear of
other states that their residents might be discriminated
against. Secondly, the personal representative must be
placed under a duty to collect all the assets in those
states which participate in this program of a unified
administration. Finally, in those frequent situations
where a decedent maintained extensive contacts with
another jurisdiction or jurisdictions so that he has
substantial property interests and creditors there, the
personal representative should be required to give
notice of the administration, and to receive and pay
claims in that locality.
There is doubt whether many states will be interested
in adopting such a legislative program. The strongest
reason is probably the inertia which is usually responsible for maintaining the status quo. A second reason
for the retention of the present system is that the
ancillary administration provides fees for the bar which
will not be available under a unified administration.
Only a minority of the lawyers are motivated by this
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consideration, but their active interest in retaining the
ancillary administration is usually strong enough to
overcome the less enthusiastic efforts of the rest of the
bar at reform. The third reason, and the one which is
always given to support the rule, is the desire to protect
local creditors. As we have seen, the state of the common and statute law in this country at present is such
that foreign administrators can remove assets from the
jurisdiction in a large number of situations, and thus
the local creditors are often unprotected. Further, under
a system of unified administration where the domiciliary
state treats all creditors equally, the interests of local
creditors will be protected just as well as they can be
by requiring an ancillary administration. So this reason
is not so impelling as it would seem at first.
One plan has been suggested which will exert strong
pressure towards a uniform system of unified administrations in the United States. 29 The Federal Government
has authority to enact bankruptcy legislation under
which the property of any person who is insolvent may
be administered. Under this power, it could provide a
system of single administration on any decedent's
estate which is insolvent. The solvent estates would
still be under the control of the separate states, but as
the experience of the bankruptcy legislation indicates,
the states are strongly influenced to make their law
conform to any federal enactment in the field.
It is impossible to see an adequate solution to this
problem in the immediate future. The difficulties are
likely to become worse rather than better. The rules
of ancillary administration were developed in a semifeudal society where the population was almost com29 Nadelmann, "Insolvent Decendent's Estates," 49 MicH. L. REv.
II29 at II6I-II62 (1951).
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pletely immobile. A person today no longer lives his
life in as nearly a stationary fashion as a building or
tree. In the jet age, a person's community may well
become the world. In the world of tomorrow with its
ever-increasing commercial types of property, to
attempt to chop up a man's property interests into
segments based on their location at his death and to
administer each segment separately from the rest will
lead to the most unsatisfactory results. This is one
area where it is imperative to change the rules designed
in an older society for those which are more suitable
for the present and the future. As Justice Holmes said
in another connection:
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past." 30
30

Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 HARV. L. Rev. 457 at 469 (1897).
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Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act
(This text was taken from the Handbook of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1944) 325)

Be it enacted . .
Section 1. (Definitions.) As used in this act:
(1) "Representative" means an executor, administrator,
testamentary trustee, guardian or other fiduciary of the
estate of a decedent or a ward, duly appointed by a court
and qualified. It includes any corporation so appointed,
regardless of whether the corporation is eligible to act under
the law of this state. This act does not change the powers or
duties of a testamentary trustee under the non-statutory
law or under the terms of a trust.
(2) "Foreign representative" means any representative
who has been appointed by the court of another jurisdiction
in which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death,
or in which the ward is domiciled, and who has not also been
appointed by a court of this state.
(3) "Local representative" means any representative
appointed as ancillary representative by a court of this state
who has not been appointed by the domiciliary court.
(4) "Local and foreign representative" means any representative appointed by both the domiciliary court and by a
court of this state.
Section 2. (Powers of Foreign Representative in General.)
When there is no administration or application therefor
pending in this state, a foreign representative may exercise
all powers which would exist in favor of a local representative, and may maintain actions and proceedings in this
state subject to the conditions imposed upon nonresident
suitors generally.
Section 3· (Proof of Authority in Court Proceedings194
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Bond.) Upon commencing any action or proceeding in any
court of this state, the foreign representative shall file with
the court authenticated copies of his appointment, and of his
official bond if he has given a bond. If the court believes that
the security furnished by him in the domiciliary administration is insufficient to cover the proceeds of the action or
proceeding, it may at any time order the action or proceeding
stayed until sufficient security is furnished in the domiciliary
administration.
Section 4· (Proceedings to Bar Creditors' Claims.) Upon
application by a foreign representative to the [probate]
court of the county in which property of the decedent or of
the ward is located, the court shall cause notice of the
appointment of the foreign representative to be published
once in each of [three] consecutive weeks in some newspaper
of general circulation in the county. The claims of all
creditors of the decedent or of the ward, unless filed with
the court within [
] after date of the first publication,
are barred as a lien upon all property of the decedent or of
the ward in this state, to the extent that claims are barred
by a local administration. If before the expiration of such
period any claims have been filed and remain unpaid after
reasnnable notice thereof to the foreign representative,
ancillary administration may be had.
Section 5· (Effect of Local Proceedings.) The Powers
granted by this act shall be exercised only when there is
no administration or application therefor pending in this
state, except to the extent that the court granting local
letters may order otherwise, but no person who, before
receiving actual notice of local administration or application
therefor, has changed his position by relying on the powers
granted by this act shall be prejudiced by reason of the
application for, or grant of, local administration. The local
representative or the local and foreign representative shall
be subject to all burdens which have accrued by virtue of
the exercise of the powers, or otherwise, under this act and
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may be substituted for the foreign representative in any
action or proceeding in this state.
Section 6. (Uniformity of Interpretation.) This act shall
be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it.
Section 7· (Short Title.) This act may be cited as the
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act.
Section 8. (Repeal.) [
and] all [other] acts or parts of
acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act
are hereby repealed.
Section 9· (Time of Taking Effect.) This act shall take
effect ....
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Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act
(This text was taken from the Handbook of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(I949) 330)

Be it enacted ...
Section I (Definitions) As used in this act:
(I) "Representative" means an executor, administrator
[testamentary trustee], guardian or other fiduciary of the
estate of a decedent or a ward, duly appointed by a court
and qualified. It includes any corporation so appointed,
regardless of whether the corporation is eligible to act under
the law of this state. [This act does not change the powers or
duties of a testamentary trustee under the non-statutory
law or under the terms of a trust.]
(2.) "Foreign representative" means any representative
who has been appointed by the court of another jurisdiction
in which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death,
or in which the ward is domiciled, and who has not also
been appointed by a court of this state.
(3) "Local representative" means any representative
appointed as ancillary representative by a court of this
state who has not been appointed by the domiciliary court.
(4) "Local and foreign representative" means any representative appointed by both the domiciliary court and by a
court of this state.
Section 2.. (Application for Ancillary Letters and Notice
Thereof.)
(I) §Gualifications of and Preference for Foreign Representative.
(a) Any foreign representative upon the filing of an
authenticated copy of the domiciliary letters with the
[probate court] may be granted ancillary letters in this state
notwithstanding that the representative is a nonresident of
this state or is a foreign corporation.
197
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(b) If the foreign representative is a foreign corporation
it need not qualify under any other law of this state to
authorize it to act as local and foreign representative in the
particular estate if it complies with the provisions of sections
4 and 5 of this act.
(c) If application is made for the issuance of ancillary
letters to the foreign representative, the court shall give
preference in appointment to the foreign representative
unless the court finds that it will not be for the best interests
of the estate or the decedent shall have otherwise directed.
(2) Intervention upon application. When application is
made for issuance of ancillary letters any interested person
may intervene and pray for the appointment of any person
who is eligible under this act or the law of this state.
(3) Notice to foreign representative. When application is
made for issuance of ancillary letters to any person other
than the foreign representative, the applicant shall send
notice of the application by registered mail to the foreign
representative if the latter's name and address are known
and to the court which appointed him if the court is known.
These notices shall be mailed upon filing the application if
the necessary facts are then known, or as soon thereafter as
the facts are known. If notices are not given prior to the
appointment of the local representative, he shall give similar
notices of his appointment as soon as the necessary facts are
known to him. Notice by ordinary mail is sufficient if it is
impossible to send the notice by registered mail. Notice under
this subsection is not jurisdictional.
Section 3· (Denial of Ancillary Letters.) The [probate
court] may deny the application for ancillary letters if it
appears that the estate may be settled conveniently without
ancillary administration. Such denial is without prejudice
to any subsequent application if it later appears that ancillary administration should be had.
Section 4 (Bond.) No nonresident shall be granted ancillary
letters unless he gives an administration bond.
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Section 5· (Agent to Accept Service of Process.) No nonresident shall be granted ancillary letters and no person
shall be granted leave to remove assets under Section 7, until
he files in the [probate court] an irrevocable power of attorney
constituting the [clerk of the court] as his agent to accept and
be subject to service of process or of notice in any action or
proceeding relating to the administration of the estate.
The [clerk] shall forthwith forward to the representative at
his last known address any process or notice so received, by
registered mail requesting a return receipt signed by addressee
only. Forwarding by ordinary mail is sufficient if when tendered at a United States Post Office an envelope containing
such notice addressed to such representative, as aforesaid,
is refused registration.
Section 6. (Substitution of Foreign for Local Representative.)
(I) Application and procedure. If any other person has been
appointed local representative, the foreign representative,
not later than [fourteen] days after the mailing of notice to
him under section 2, unless this period is extended by the
court because the foreign representative resides outside
continental United States or in Alaska, or for other cause
which the court deems adequate, may apply for revocation
of the appointment and for grant of ancillary letters to
himself. [Ten] days' written notice of hearing shall be given
to the local representative. If the court finds that it is for the
best interests of the estate, it may grant the application and
direct the local representative to deliver all the assets,
documents, books and papers pertaining to the estate in
his possession and make a full report of his administration
to the local and foreign representative as soon as the letters
are issued and he is qualified. The local representative
shall also account to the court. The hearing on the account
may be forthwith or upon such notice as the court directs.
Upon compliance with the court's directions, the local
representative shall be discharged.
(2) Effect of substitution. Upon qualification, the local and
foreign representative shall be substituted in all actions and
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proceedings brought by or against the local representative
in his representative capacity, and shall be entitled to all
the rights and be subject to all the burdens arising out of the
uncompleted administration in all respects as if it had been
continued by the local representative. If the latter has
served or been served with any process or notice, no further
service shall be necessary nor shall the time within which any
steps may or must be taken be changed unless the court in
which the action or proceedings are pending so orders.
Section 7· (Removal of Assets to Domiciliary 'Jurisdiction.)
(1) Application. Prior to the final disposition of the ancillary estate under section 12. and upon giving such notice as
the [probate court] directs, the foreign representative or the
local and foreign representative may apply for leave to
remove all or any part of the assets from this state to the
domiciliary jurisdiction for the purpose of administration
and distribution.
(2.) Prerequisites to granting application. Before granting
such application, the court shall require compliance with
section 5 and the filing of a bond by the foreign representative
or of an additional bond for the protection of the estate and
all interested persons unless the court finds that the bond
given under section 4 by the local and foreign representative
is su:fficien t.
(3) Granting application-terms and consequences. Upon
compliance with this section, the court shall grant the
application upon such conditions as it sees fit unless it finds
cause for the denial thereof or for postponement until
further facts appear. The granting of the application shall
not terminate any proceedings for the administration of
property in this state unless the court finds that such proceedings are unnecessary. If the court so find, it may order
the administration in this state closed, subject to reopening
within [one year] for cause.
Section 8. (Effect of Adjudications for or against Representatives.) A prior adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction for
or against any representative of the estate shall be as conclusive as to the local or the local and foreign representative
as if he were a party to the adjudication unless it resulted
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from fraud or collusion of the party representative to the
prejudice of the estate. This section shall not apply to
adjudications in another jurisdiction admitting or refusing
to admit a will to probate.
Section 9· (Payment of Claims.) No claim against the
estate shall be paid in the ancillary administration in this
state unless it has been proceeded upon in the manner and
within the time required for claims in domiciliary administrations in this state.
Section IO. (Liability of Local Assets.) All local assets are
subject to the payment of all claims, allowances and charges,
whether they are established or incurred in this state or
elsewhere. For this purpose local assets may be sold in this
state and the proceeds forwarded to the representative in
the jurisdiction where the claim was established or the
charge incurred.
Section II. (Payment of Claims in Case of Insolvency.)
(I) Equality subject to preferences and security. If the
estate either in this state or as a whole is insolvent, it shall
be disposed of so that, as far as possible, each creditor whose
claim has been allowed, either in this state or elsewhere,
shall receive an equal proportion of his claim subject to
preferences and priorities and to any security which a
creditor has as to particular assets. If a preference or priority
is allowed in another jurisdiction but not in this state, the
creditor so benefited shall receive dividends from local
assets only upon the balance of his claim after deducting the
amount of such benefit. The validity and effect of any
security held in this state shall be determined by the law of
this state but a secured creditor who has not released or
surrendered his security shall be entitled only to a proportion
computed upon the balance due after the value of all security
not exempt from the claims of unsecured creditors is determined and credited upon the claim secured by it.
(2) Procedure. In case of insolvency and if local assets
permit, each claim allowed in this state shall be paid its
proportion, and any balance of assets shall be disposed of in
accordance with section I2. If local assets are not sufficient
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to pay all claims allowed in this state the full amount to
which they are entitled under this section, local assets shall
be marshalled so that each claim allowed in this state shall
be paid its proportion as far as possible, after taking into
account all dividends on claims allowed in this state from
assets in other jurisdictions.
Section 12. (Transfer of Residue to Domiciliary Representative.) Unless the court shall otherwise order, any moveable
assets remaining on hand after payment of all claims allowed
in this state and of all taxes and charges levied or incurred
in this state shall be ordered transferred to the representative
in the domiciliary jurisdiction. The court may decline to
make the order until such representative furnishes security
or additional security in the domiciliary jurisdiction, for the
proper administration and distribution of the assets to be
transferred.
Section 13. (General Law to Apply.) Except where special
provision is made otherwise, the law and procedure in this
state relating generally to administration and representatives
apply to ancillary administration and representatives.
Section 14. (Uniformity oj Interpretation.) This act shall
be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it.
Section 15. (Short Title.) This act may be cited as the
Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act.
Section 16. (Repeal.) [.... and] all [other] acts or parts of
acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are
hereby repealed.
Section 17. (Time of Taking Effect.) This act shall take
effect ....
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Amendment to Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates
Act
(The text of this amendment was taken from the Handbook
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (1953) 241.)
Section I I of the Uniform Ancillary Administration of
Estates Act as approved in 1949 is amended to read as
follows:
Section I I. (Payment of Claims in Case of Insolvency.)
(I) Equality subject to preferences and security. If the
estate either in this state or as a whole is insolvent, it shall
be disposed of so that, as far as possible, each creditor whose
claim has been allowed, either in this state or elsewhere,
shall receive an equal proportion of his claim subject to
preferences and priorities and to any security which a creditor
has as to particular assets. If a preference, priority or security
is allowed in another jurisdiction but not in this state, the
creditor so benefited shall receive dividends from local
assets only upon the balance of his claim after deducting the
amount of such benefit. Creditors who have security claims
upon property not exempt from the claims of general creditors, and who have not released or surrendered them, shall
have the value of the security determined by converting it
to money according to the terms of the security agreement,
or by such creditor and the personal representative by
agreement, arbitration, compromise or litigation, as the
court may direct, and the value so determined shall be
credited upon the claim, and dividends shall be computed
and paid only on the unpaid balance. Such determination
shall be under the supervision and control of the court.
( 2.) Procedure. In case of insolvency and if local assets
permit, each claim allowed in this state shall be paid its
proportion, and any balance of assets shall be disposed of
in accordance with Section I2.. If local assets are not sufficient
to pay all claims allowed in this state the full amount to
which they are entitled under this section, local assets shall
be so marshalled so that each claim allowed in this state
shall be paid its proportion as far as possible, after taking
into account all dividends on claims allowed in this state
from assets in other jurisdictions.
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Action by foreign personal representative. See Foreign personal representative.
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bonis non, 28; development
of, IJ-14·
Ancillary administration
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of; 14-17, expense of, 52-53,
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Ancillary administrator
collection of chattels by, I 5o- I 51;
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appointment, 87; payment
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representative, 33-34.
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mission by, 140, statutory
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I45, 148.
Colonial Probates Act of I 892,

73-75·
Comity
action as a matter of, 32, 50-53.
67, collection of assets by, qo.
Commonwealth countries
capacity of foreign personal
representative to sue, JI, 47;
liability of foreign personal
representative to suit, 79·
Consent, jurisdiction based on,
95-I04.
binding on plaintiff, 98-99;
counterclaims, 9<]-IOO; statutory consent, Ioo-104; to
revive action brought against
decedent, 97--98.
Conservation of assets, 21-23.
Contract to convey, specific performance, I 27-I 28.
Corporate stock
action to rescind sale of, 88;
collection of, by foreign personal representative, I49; situs
of property, 25.
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against foreign personal representative, 99-100; statutory
trustee, 61.
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collection of (see Voluntary
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37-38.
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Voluntary payment of debts.
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delivery of chattels to, 148-151;
payment of debts to, 155-157;
title to movables of decedent,
142, 157, 183; unified administrator, as, 181-182.
Due process clause, 49, n8-120.
Ecclesiastical courts, 8-9, 12-16.
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outside the jurisdiction of, 9·
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with power of sale, 53-54.
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capacity of foreign personal
representative to sue, 31;
liability of foreign personal
representative to suit, 79;
personal representative as
trustee, 185-186; suit as Individual, 46-47.
Estate as entity, 19-20.
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authority of, 19, 127; de son
tort, 14 n. 33, II2-II4i development of, 7-13; with
power of sale in will, 53-54,
125-129.
Federal jurisdiction over foreign
personal representative, 75-77.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
17(b), 76.
Foreign personal representative,
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limitations of, 70-71, requirements, 69-70; wrongful
death, 58-63.
Fourteenth Amendment. See Due
process clause.
Fraudulent removal of assets into
forum, action based on, 93-95.
French law of succession, 5-6.
Full faith and credit clause, 39-41,
49, 66, 85, ro3-Io4, ro8,
II8, 120, 154·
Glanville, 9-1 I.
Hand, Judge Learned, n6.
Heir, English, as representative of
decedent, 9- I I.
Heres, 4-5.
Holmes, Justice, 193·
Immovable property. See Real
property.
In rem proceedings
judgment against foreign per-
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sonal representative (see Jurisdiction in rem); probate administration as, 83-84.
Insolvent estate, power of federal
government over, 192.
Judgment
against debtor in state of appointment, 153-163; by default (see Default judgment).
Jurisdiction
in personam against foreign
personal representative, 84-85;
in rem against foreign personal representative, 84, 8790: foreclosure of mortgage
on property of estate, 88,
movable property brought into
forum after death, 89-90,
quasi-in-rem, 9o-92, stock in
state of incorporation, 88.
Legal personality, 8o-82.
Legataire universe!, 5.
Lex Falcidia, 4·
Liability of foreign personal representative to suit as individual
on obligations incurred after
death, 109-II2; for fraudulent
removal of assets from state
of appointment, 93-95; general
common-law rule, 79-87; statutory liability, II4-122: constitutionality, under due process clause, II9-12o, under
full faith and credit clause,
I2o-121; desirability of, I2II22.
Local creditors
protection of, 32-33, 171-172,
175-179;
discrimination
against in a foreign administration, 175-176.
Management of assets. See Conservation of assets.
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Mercantile theory, 41, 49, 159·
Mortgage
foreclosure of, 88, release of,
16o-16I.
Movable property. See Chattels.
Non-interference with foreign tribunal of administration, policy
of, 86--87.
Nonresidents, prohibited from
serving as personal representative, 34·
Notice, who must be notified,
89 n. 26.
Objection to capacity of foreign
personal representative to sue,
waiver of, 35-38.
Obligation to pay foreign personal
representative, I 59-160.
Obligations incurred after decedent's death. See Liability
of foreign personal representative to suit.
Oil and gas
collection of assets arising from,
132-136; "unless" lease, continuation of, 136--138.
Ordinary, in ecclesiastical court,
9, 13.
Payment of debt to foreign personal representative. See Voluntary payment.
Personal action for money against
foreign personal represen tative, 84-85.
Personal property, title in personal
representative, 2o-21.
Personal representative, 17-24.
appointment of, 18-19; authority of, 19; development of,
7-17; duties: collection of
assets, 21, conservation of
property, 21-23, final account,
24, payment of claims, 23-24;
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title to personal property,
20-21.
Power of sale, exercise of, 22,
I25-I29.
by foreign executor, I25-128;
by successor to foreign executor, 128-I29.
Quasi-in-rem proceeding, 90-92.
Real property
direct descent to heir or devisee,
9, 20, 124; sale by foreign
executor with power of sale,
125-128; sale by foreign personal representative by statute,
IJD-IJ2; subject to payment
of debts, 20, 124, 131; under
control of personal representative by statute, 20, IJ4IJ5·
Receiver. See Statutory receiver.
Recission of stock sale, 88.
Release of mortgage by foreign
personal representative, 16oI6I.
statutory permission, I63-I64.
Representative personality of personal representative, 8o-82.
Res judicata, 49, 66, 99, I 54·

Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws, 4I, 42.
Revival statute, 104-109.
Rights acquired after death. See
Foreign personal representative.
Roman law of succession, 3-5.
Sale of land
by foreign executor with power
of sale, 125-128; statutory
permission to foreign representative, IJD-IJ2.
Sa/man,7-8, II, 13.

Separate administration. See Ancillary administration.
Sovereignty, 170.
Specific performance. See Contract to convey.
Statutory consent, judgment by,
Ioo-104.
Statutory liability to suit. See
Liability to suit.
Statutory permission to foreign
personal representative to sue.
See Foreign personal representative.
Statutory permission to foreign
personal representative to collect assets, 163-166.
Statutory receiver, 183-I84.
Statutory trustee, personal representative as, 61-63.
Stockholder's derivative action, 54·
Story, Justice, 30, 48, 87, 167, I70,
171, 175. 177·
Succession, split system of, 123.
Territorial limitation on personal
representative development of,
14-16, theory of, I6-17.
Title to personal property of
personal representative, 20-21.
Trustee, 185-I86.
Unified administration
desirability of, 17o-I79: ancillary
administration, expense of,
173, ancillary administration,
delay of, 173-174, unified
policy of conservation of
assets, need for, I74-I75,
certainty in personal representative, requirement of, I74;
means of achieving, 187-192:
court decision, I88, Federal
enactment under bankruptcy
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power, I92, uniform legislation, I88-I92.
Uniform Ancillary Administration
of Estates Act, I8o, I89, I9I.
text, Appendix B.
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act, I89, I90.
text, Appendix A.
United States, debts due from.
See Debts.
Universal successor, 3-7, I8J.
suit in common-law jurisdiction
to collect assets, 54-57·
"Unless" lease, continuation of.
See Oil and gas.
Voluntary payment of debts to

foreign personal representative, I5I-I66.
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I56-I57, local creditors, I55I 56, note evidencing debt,
I 58-I 59; explanation of result,
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Wrongful death. See Foreign personal representative.

